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Entrepreneurship 
The entrepreneur has been neglected over the years in formal economic theoriz-
ing. Previously there has been only eclectic theories, such as human capital theory 
and network dynamics which discuss certain aspects of entrepreneurial behaviour. 
This book closes a gap in the entrepreneurship literature. 
Inspired by modem physics, the author brings together an evolutionary methodo-
logy, along the way implicating quantum, graph and percolation theory. This book 
provides an interdisciplinary approach to entrepreneurship, opening up new ideas 
in modelling: 
• how to structure economic thinking in an easy way 
• how to implement new ideas into a simulation study 
• how to balance line modelling procedures with stylised facts. 
Thomas Grebel has provided a synthesis of all the main theories of entrepreneur-
ship and the original thinking within this book should be of interest to all those 
working in the area of business and management as well as economics. 
Thomas Grebel is lecturer in Economics at the University of Augsburg, 
Germany. 
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Plan of Book 
The entrepreneur has always been a pivotal point in economic history. His 
importance has never been in doubt - neither in politics nor in economics. 
Indeed, there is evidence that a high level of entrepreneurship creates jobs, 
economic growth and, hence, welfare. It is the entrepreneur, a man of ac-
tion, a heroic person, who is the key element of economic prosperity. Turn-
ing to economic theory, however, specifically to orthodox economic theory, 
the entrepreneur has gradually been deprived from that central position in 
the economy. Due to the need for a consistent, normative theory in eco-
nomics, in order to explain the optimal allocation of scarce resources rather 
than to consider the specificities of human behavior that may prevent (sup-
port) them from (in) doing so, the entrepreneur was eventually knocked 
off his pedestal and made way for a methodologically robust figure: the 
Homo economicus, a dispassionate seeker of efficiency, a playmate of the 
methodological treatment. 
In this work, the story of the entrepreneur in economic theory is briefly 
retraced. Furthermore, a methodological discussion will provide a sound 
underpinning for a model of entrepreneurial behavior. Thereby, it also tries 
to bridge the missing link in economics and bring psychological and soci-
ological aspects into economic theorizing. Therefore, this book is divided 
into three major parts. Part I delivers an overview of the literature on en-
trepreneurship. Part II takes up the methodological discussion about a ba-
sic evolutionary setting. Part III rounds off the work with an evolutionary 
model on entrepreneurship. 
The historical sketch (part I) starts with eclectic ideas and the basic in-
tuition on the role of the entrepreneur. A collection of possible functions 
and qualities of the entrepreneur is given at the beginning. Very early, the 
French School delivers lots of insights into entrepreneurial functions. The 
Classical School rather puts its focus on capital than on the entrepreneur. 
With the neoclassical era entrepreneurs have become gradually eradicated, 
when the Newtonian mechanics were introduced in economic theorizing; 
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methodology smothered the tiniest contingencies of entrepreneurial ac-
tions in theory. Due to the Austrian School, the entrepreneur was revived 
to stress his important position within the economic process. Despite the 
contributions it made to neoclassical methodology, the Austrian tradition 
initiated also a critical discussion of such methodology. Schumpeter criti-
cized the incapability of equilibrium analysis to substantiate the innovation 
process as a fundamental element of economic change. The endogenous 
element, Schumpeter put forth, is the entrepreneur, who pushes through 
new combinations, i.e. innovations, and destructs any kind of presumed 
state of optimality, which, quite contrarily, might never come into exis-
tence. Kirzner sought the entrepreneur in disequilibrium but in contrast to 
Schumpeter, he did not refrain from a final state of equilibrium. Knight 
discussed the idea of a parameterizable uncertainty, and came to the con-
clusion that there is the differentiation of true uncertainty which does not 
allow for any prediction, a state of economic ignorance which only an 
entrepreneur dares to cope with. But none of those economists build a 
framework to suitably incorporate the entrepreneur as a coherent feature 
into economic analysis. There was just the notion of an alternative ap-
proach. It was the term evolutionary, which was meant to summarize all 
heterodoxy in economic analysis contrasting some neoclassical shortcom-
ings. Not surprisingly, evolutionary economics rather became the allegory 
of economists' yearning for a standardizing body to tackle economic phe-
nomena which had been reduced to negligible side effects in the neoclas-
sical economic process. 
Consequently, the history of evolutionary economics is outlined in the 
second part leading into a discussion about the philosophy of science. The 
parallels between natural sciences, philosophy and social sciences point 
out the thread of rationality through all sciences suggesting a determinis-
tic view of the world. Taking into account the facts of observable data, 
empiricism likewise followed determinism. Even the reconciliation be-
tween both, rationalism and empiricism, did not give up a deterministic 
world view. In the 20th century, the findings in physics, such as in ther-
modynamics and especially in quantum physics, suggested accepting some 
indeterminism in nature; an idea that puts into perspective normative the-
ories as well as predictability; an unpleasant constraint for scientific re-
search in general and a fundamental critique on neoclassical economics 
in particular. Hitherto, however, indeterminism also turned out to puzzle 
evolutionary economists. The discussion in part II ends with a systematic 
methodological framework adapting Heisenberg's uncertainty principle to 
economic behavior in general and entrepreneurial behavior specifically. 
In part III, the core element of this book, the model of entrepreneurial 
behavior, is gradually introduced. The pivotal point is the bounded ratio-
nality of actors, whereby the bimodal ontology of the human mind, being 
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a part of reality as well as an actively creative element of reality, serves 
as a theoretical basis. Therefore, the psychology of actors is laid out. A 
static perspective of the human cognition process, with regard to human 
understanding and processing of new information and knowledge subject 
to limited absorptive capacities, is developed. New technological know-
ledge has to be absorbed by actors in the first place. Not before actors un-
derstand the principles of a new technology, such as the functioning of the 
internet, they become potential innovators in commercializing a new tech-
nology. Since the diffusion of knowledge is an indeterministic process, it 
cannot be modeled analytically. Therefore, percolation theory will serve 
as a metaphor and, apart from that, it will be used as a tool to implement 
this idea into the complete model at the end of this book. Furthermore, the 
sociological aspect of actors' psychology is introduced, since the mere un-
derstanding of a technology does not automatically make an entrepreneur 
out of actors. Decisions are made within a certain context. Individuals 
might hesitate to run a business all by themselves, but might do so when 
being supported by friends. In contrast to the behavior of the Homo eco-
nomicus there is symmetry-breaking in human behavior. This is one of 
the outcomes of part II which is taken up on. Apart from what an actor's 
friends believe, the overall evaluation of a new technology by actors in 
general is crucial for entrepreneurial behavior. If the economic potential 
of a technology is positively evaluated by actors, some are likely to engage 
in entrepreneurial actions anticipating future economic developments. It is 
the shared mental model of actors, influenced by socio-economic indica-
tors on new technologies and their economic applications that make actors 
confident of future prosperity. Once actors are informed about a new tech-
nology and form a positive attitude towards its economic applicability, they 
are activated in terms of entrepreneurial actions. If the general attitude of 
actors is in favor of a new technology, actors who understand a new tech-
nology and therefore are able to innovate on that technology (such as open-
ing up a bookstore on the internet), they start to engage in a networking 
process (chapter 8). In case all contingencies coincide, some actors hap-
pen to come together at a certain point in time and decide to found a firm. 
Conclusively, the basic findings in the entrepreneurship literature (part I) 
and the meta-theoretical reflections delivering a methodological founda-
tion (part II), are brought together in part III. Thus, the characteristics of 
bounded rational actors with an economic behavior subject to individual, 
sociological and some indeterministic facts become the driving forces of 
entrepreneurial behavior. The results of the model meet stylized facts, so 
that eventually a consistent evolutionary model of entrepreneurial behavior 
based on a sound methodological framework is developed. 
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Part I 
The Critical Path of the 
Entrepreneur in Economic Theory 

1 A Historical Sketch of the Research on 
Entrepreneurship 
The analysis of entrepreneurship has been one of the most challenging 
subjects in the history of economic analysis. Research on entrepreneur-
ship is as old as economic analysis itself. The importance of entrepreneurs 
in economy has always been emphasized but it has never come as far as 
to be develop into a consistent and comprehensive theory on entrepreneur-
ship. Why is that? When doing research on entrepreneurship, almost every 
economist comes to a point where he wonders whether the entrepreneur 
does not fit into orthodox economic analysis or, vice versa, orthodox eco-
nomic analysis is not able to explain the phenomenon of the entrepreneur. 
The literature on economic behavior seems to comprise of a nearly holistic 
approach to the understanding of humankind's way of dealing with scarce 
resources. The literature on entrepreneurship, however, is eclectic and al-
most fails to track the quintessence of entrepreneurial behavior. 
When we talk about entrepreneurship, we talk about assumptional frame-
works, how to treat uncertainty, knowledge, rationality, etc.; and on top of 
it, we talk about methodology. This is what makes it very difficult to tell a 
distinct story about the entrepreneur leaving aside such kind of seemingly 
secondary aspects. 
This part gives an overview on the work that has already been done on 
the topic of entrepreneurship in the economic literature and, furthermore, 
the attempt is made to categorize literature in order to track the develop-
ment of the different strands of thought leading to different paradigms in 
economic analysis and thus determine the apparently symptomatic treat-
ment of the entrepreneur. 
1.1 The Pre-Neoclassics 
It is not obvious at all where the actual starting point to analyze entrepreneur-
ship is found. When we look at the literature there are various suggestions 
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how to approach entrepreneurship.1 Casson (1990) provides a fourfold di-
vision of entrepreneurship approaches: some focus on the factor distribu-
tion of income, some investigate the entrepreneur's role within the market 
process, others focus on a heroic Schumpeter vision and the fourth group 
analyzes the entrepreneur in the context of a firm. Nevertheless, the en-
trepreneur's origin, his economic identity and his distinct economic role 
is still puzzling. Hebert and Link (1982) assorted various "themes" which 
differentiations, concerning the entrepreneur's role, have been put forward 
in economic literature: 
1. The entrepreneur is the person who assumes the risk as-
sociated with uncertainty ( e.g., Cantillon, ThUnen, Man-
goldt, Mill, Hawley, Knight, Mises, Cole, Shackle). 
2. The entrepreneur is the person who supplies financial 
capital ( e.g., Smith, Turgot, Bohm-Bawerk, Edgeworth, 
Pigou, Mises). 
3. The entrepreneur is an innovator ( e.g., Baudeau, Ben-
tham, ThUnen, Schmoller, Sombart, Weber, Schumpeter ). 
4. The entrepreneur is a decision maker ( e.g., Cantillon, 
Menger, Marshall, Wieser, Amasa Walker, Francis Walker, 
Keynes, Mises, Shackle, Cole, Schultz). 
5. The entrepreneur is an industrial leader ( e.g., Say, Saint-
Simon, Amasa Walker, Francis Walker, Marshall, Wieser, 
Sombart, Weber, Schumpeter ). 
6. The entrepreneur is a manager or superintendent ( e.g., 
Say, Mill, Marshall, Menger). 
7. The entrepreneur is an organizer and coordinator of eco-
nomic resources ( e.g., Say, Walras, Wieser, Schmoller, 
Sombart, Weber, Clark, Davenport, Schumpeter, Coase ). 
8. The entrepreneur is the owner of an enterprise ( e.g., Ques-
nay, Wieser, Pigou, Hawley). 
9. The entrepreneur is an employer of factors of production 
(e.g., Amasa Walker, Francis Walker, Wieser, Keynes). 
10. The entrepreneur is a contractor (e.g., Bentham). 
11. The entrepreneur is an arbitrageur ( e.g., Cantillon, Wal-
ras, Kirzner ). 
12. The entrepreneur is an allocator of resources among al-
ternative uses ( e.g., Cantillon, Kirzner, Schultz). 2 
Besides the literature explicitly focusing on entrepreneurship, the re-
lated literature is so huge that almost every subject in economic analysis 
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is touched. So the entrepreneurial element becomes a prevailing element 
within the economic realm. Nevertheless, it has to be stated that the dis-
cussion, as done in orthodox theory, can also be lead without referring to 
the entrepreneur at all; and paradoxically, the entrepreneurial element de-
creases to a minor economic phenomenon not considered necessary to be 
taken into account. 
Owing to the elusiveness of the entrepreneur within orthodox economic 
theory, a brief historical sketch will help to trace back the origin and the 
paradigmatic development of the research on entrepreneurship in order to 
get into the discussion. Hebert and Link (1982), Casson (1982) and Bar-
reto (1989) among others have already given a profound overview on the 
literature to be investigated. 
Figure 1.1 depicts a possible categorization of economists that elabo-
rated or touched on the entrepreneur in his work. 
1.2 The French School 
Richard Cantillon (1680s - 1734) Cantillon3 has to be seen as the pre-
cursor of the research in entrepreneurship. Cantillon was renowned as a 
successful entrepreneur himself (to use this term in a colloquial sense). He 
described economic life at his time: landowners would lease their land to 
farmers and live on the rent they earn. A second group, the hirelings, are 
employees who earn a fixed amount of money. The third group of people 
Cantillon calls the undertakers; they take the entrepreneurial part in eco-
nomic life. The specific feature Cantillon associated with the undertaker 
was the fact that they face a high degree of uncertainty. Consequently, 
all actors who produce or buy goods at a certain price and sell them for 
an uncertain price, thus earning an unfixed income, belong to the group 
of undertakers. Cantillon emphasized that the prominent quality of those 
undertakers is the willingness to deal with uncertainty.4 They function as 
a medium to facilitate exchange and circulation. They coordinate, make 
decisions, engage in markets and connect producers with consumers.5 
Fran~ois Quesnay ( 1694 - 177 4) Cantillon had a great influence on Ques-
nay's work. Quesnay was actually a physician employed by Louis XV. In-
spired by Cantillon's idea of the circular flow of income, he used the anal-
ogy to the human blood circulation, which was also discovered in those 
days. This resulted in Quesnay's famous Tableau Economique, an analyt-
ical model which was the first mathematical model based on the general 
equilibrium concept. Quesnay has also become known as the leader of the 
so-called Physiocrats, a group of people whose ideas were based on the 
metaphor ofnature.6 Quesnay's as well as Cantillon's entrepreneurial vi-
sion was restricted to agriculture. Conclusively, Quesnay also divided eco-
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nomic actors into three groups adding some more specific qualities to these 
groups: the landowners he also called the proprietary class with property 
rights in land. The farmers he labeled the productive class capable to make 
profits and produce material for the third class, which is the artisans that 
manufacture goods. Quesnay was the first who brought the role of capital 
into the debate and pictured the entrepreneur as an independent owner of 
a business.1 It is obvious that agriculture played a dominant role in eco-
nomic analysis at that time so that the concept of the entrepreneur was not 
expanded beyond the agricultural sphere. 
Nicolas Bandeau (1730 - 1792) Nicolas Baudeau was one of Quesnay's 
disciples. Furthermore, Cantillon's vision of the entrepreneur as a risk 
bearer also influenced Baudeau's ideas on entrepreneurship. Moreover, he 
contributed the idea of the entrepreneur as an innovator. He formulated the 
basic need of the entrepreneur to reduce his cost to increase his profits, an 
idea we nowadays call process innovation. Thus, he touched Schumpeter's 
theory on innovation and entrepreneurship. Besides, Baudeau stressed an-
other important aspect that had already been put forward by Quesnay, that 
is, the importance of the individual's energy, knowledge and ability, which 
represent some of the determinants of economic success. These specific 
qualities provide the entrepreneur with the chance to control some aspects 
of the economic process whereas in terms of non-controllable aspects he 
puts himself at risk. 8 
Anne-Robert Jacques Turgot (1727 - 1781) Turgot's work delivered a 
footing for a large field in economics. He initiated preliminary thoughts 
to the theory of utility, anticipating the concept of diminishing marginal 
utility. He generated a theory on value and money and finally a theory on 
capital, savings and interest which had a striking impact on his concept of 
the entrepreneur. 9 Turgot was finance minister of Louis XVI and therefore 
familiar with the importance of capital in economy. According to Turgot, 
the accumulation of wealth goes along with the accumulation of money, 
which is achieved by saving. Once economic agents accumulate money 
they become capitalists who can make investment decisions. Then, they 
are in the position to decide whether to buy land, to invest in a business 
or simply lend the capital to others. Consequently, Turgot's entrepreneur 
in the first place is a capitalist and may opt to either become a landowner, 
simply stay a capitalist as a pure lender, or become an entrepreneur. In 
Turgot's concept of the entrepreneur, the significance of capital dominates 
the entrepreneurial role. The entrepreneur is a capitalist-entrepreneur who 
seeks to earn interest on the capital invested and to obtain remuneration for 
his manpower. 10 
Jean-Baptiste Say (1767 - 1832) Jean-Baptiste Say accomplished a big 
step forward in two fields: not only did he deliver he the building blocks 
for economic theorizing still to come at that time, he also managed to in-
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tegrate the entrepreneur into a complete system. 11 Concerning entrepre-
neurship, he was the first to solidify the entrepreneur as an independent 
economic agent who combines and coordinates productive factors. Thus, 
Say emphasized the functional role of the entrepreneur as a coordinator, 
as the active role within the economic process, which makes the entre-
preneur unequivocally distinguishable from the capitalist, the landowner 
and the workman.12 At the same time, Say's economic concept consti-
tutes a pivotal point in economic analysis and provides the foundation for 
various schools of thought. It bears the notion of general equilibrium the-
ory and, in a larger sense, of the Neoclassical School. Apart from that, 
he puts the entrepreneur, as a coordinator, on top of the market process 
making it a story of the Austrian School. In addition, Say describes the 
entrepreneur's specific qualities foreshadowing the heroic Schumpeterian 
vision of the entrepreneur. Say marks the bifurcation point between ortho-
dox and heterodox economics. To be more precise, it is necessary to set 
forth the basic ideas of Say's theory of production and distribution. Fol-
lowing Barreto (1989), figure 1.2 shows Say's production system. There 
are three fundamental production factors Say calls capital, human industry 
and natural agents. The underlying capital concept contains real capital 
as well as monetary capital. The natural agents enclose the entire nature 
with the resources it supplies and the laws it is guided by. These three fac-
tors are combined to produce final goods. However, Say decomposes the 
human industry into three subgroups: philosophers, workmen and entre-
preneurs. Correspondingly, the production process is divided into the fol-
lowing steps: before a.final good can be produced, one has to study "( ... ) 
the laws and conduct of nature ( ... )".13 In other words, a functional part of 
human industry is the task to generate the necessary technological knowl-
edge to produce a tradable good. The next step is to launch and coordinate 
the production process which will be executed in the third step by a work-
man. The generation of knowledge is done by a philosopher that elaborates 
a theory which then finds its application through the entrepreneur who co-
ordinates the whole production process, which eventually is executed by 
the workman. The entrepreneur commands, supervises and coordinates 
the whole system. If the entrepreneur is left out in Say's production sys-
tem, the economic process will come to a halt. Barreto (1989)14 calls him 
a central processing unit, Hebert and Link (1982)15 call him a catalyst to 
underline the importance of Say's entrepreneur. When we look at Say's 
distribution process in figure 1.3, the significant role of the entrepreneur 
comes even more obvious. Not only coordinates the entrepreneur the pro-
duction process, he also takes the key role in income distribution. He pays 
the capitalist interest on the financial capital he borrowed; if not the entre-
preneur himself is a capitalist. He pays rent for the natural agents and he 
recompenses the workman (philosopher) for the labor (knowledge) pro-
vided. 
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Figure 1.2: The production system of Jean-Baptiste Say. 
The residual amount of the revenues gained out of the turnover of fi-
nal goods accrues to the entrepreneur. The share in income of each group 
is thereby determined by market forces. Say's law, the renowned theory 
of markets (la theorie des debouches), sets out the argumentation for the 
corresponding share of income of each factor. The demand of consumers 
for final goods determines the entrepreneur's demand for input production 
factors. The price system balances out a possible surplus of either demand 
or supply. 16 Say even suggests a market for entrepreneurs: the demand 
in the goods market implies the demand for entrepreneurs. The supply of 
entrepreneurs is constrained by the individuals' personal and environmen-
tal context. A potential entrepreneur needs a sufficient amount of capital, 
either provided by others or by himself, to ensure his solvency. Moreover, 
a charismatic personality that foreshadows entrepreneurial success in or-
der to use essential connexions and bear the burdens of an entrepreneurial 
Iife.17 
A further important note concerning the distribution of income has to be 
made. The entrepreneur needs capital to finance the required productive 
factors in advance. The recompensation of them happens before possible 
revenues can be collected. Hence, the entrepreneur pays an ex ante ne-
gotiated remuneration to production factors and stays with the residual, 
uncertain income that remains from the revenues drawn off the turnover. 
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Figure 1.3: The income distribution of Jean-Baptiste Say's system. 
1.3 The Classical School 
According to Hebert and Link (1982)18 the Classical School, all in all, 
neglected the entrepreneur and did not manage to develop an indepen-
dent theory on entrepreneurship. Pre-classical as well as classical writ-
ers did not even use the term entrepreneur. When they touched entre-
preneurial functions they used terms such as adventurer, projector or un-
dertaker. Adam Smith (1723 - 1792) focused on capital as the decisive 
element in economic development. Parallel to Turgot, he saw the un-
dertaker, decision-maker or projector, respectively, as a capitalist in the 
first place, and, moreover he reduced the entrepreneur to an ordinary eco-
nomic agent that just puts his capital at stake. This is even more surpris-
ing given that Smith knew Quesnay and therefore was in touch with the 
French School.19 David Ricardo (1772 - 1823) almost ignored the notion 
of an entrepreneurial element in his writings. A plausible explanation for 
this might be that Ricardo had a different understanding of what political 
economy was.20 He regarded it as a science of laws where an entrepre-
neur could not fit in.21 Other classical economists such as John Stuart 
Mill (1806 - 1873), and Thomas R. Malthus (1766-1834) are hardly 
cited in the context of entrepreneurship literature, nor did they contribute 
any major improvements to that theory,22 even though Casson (1982) as-
cribes them a certain influence on the research of entrepreneurship.23 Al-
fred Marshall (1842- 1924) collected various ideas to entrepreneurship 
and labeled the entrepreneur a coordinator, superintendent, uncertainty-
bearer. He discussed the entrepreneur's role but did not state the unique 
function of the entrepreneur. 24 The only writer who concentrated more on 
the entrepreneur than his classical contemporaries, was Jeremy Bentham 
(1748 - 1832). Bentham was a close follower of the French School. In 
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contrast to Smith, who was his mentor, he conceptualized the entrepreneur 
in his work, although he never used the term entrepreneur but, correspond-
ing to Smith, named him projector. Bentham fiercely criticized Adam 
Smith for the negative picture he painted of the projector as a wasteful, 
self-interest-driven man.25 Bentham was quite far ahead of his time. He 
assigned the active role in economy to the creative entrepreneur, as Redlich 
( 1949) interprets what Bentham termed the projector. He saw the projector 
as anything but an ordinary economic agent, and anticipated Schumpeter's 
heroic vision of the entrepreneur as an innovator. 26 
To sum up, although British classical economists touched the role of the 
entrepreneur in their writings, they did not explicitly develop a theory on 
entrepreneurship. 
1.4 The German Classics and the German 
Historic School 
Hebert and Link (1982) discuss the following German classical econom-
ists: J. H. von Thiinen (1785 - 1850), H.K. von Mangoldt (1824 - 1858), 
Gottlieb Hufeland (1760-1817), Friedrich Hermann (1795 -1868) 
and Adolph Riedel (1809 - 1872). The work of those economists is closely 
related to Say's Treatise,21 which had been translated at the beginning of 
the 19th century. The concepts of Hufeland (1815) and Hermann (1832) 
were focused on income distribution, with the entrepreneur receiving re-
muneration for his special capabilities. Riedel (1838-43) linked his con-
cept to Cantillon's, explaining the entrepreneur as an uncertainty reducer 
for other risk-averse economic actors; by doing this, he increases his own 
risk. 28 As already mentioned, most of their works underlined the entre-
preneurial concept of the French School. The design of Thtinen (1921) 
reminds us of Cantillon's production and distribution theory.29 He subdi-
vided the entrepreneurial income by subtracting wages of management and 
insurance against business losses from the entrepreneur's residual wages 
similar to the distribution theory of Say in figure 1.3. Thus, he specified 
the role of the entrepreneur in more detail. The entrepreneur might be but 
does not need to be the manager. Even though the manager may be equal 
to the entrepreneur in qualifications and capabilities, it is the entrepreneur 
who spends sleepless nights because of the risk he takes. This makes him 
more engaged and also innovative to ensure a successful business venture. 
Hence, the residual entrepreneurial income contains a recompensation for 
the risk he takes and it contains a return to ingenuity.30 
The German Historic School was founded by Wilhelm Geoi F. Roscher 
(1817 - 1894). In his Die Grundlagen der Nationalokonomie 1 he o~ened 
up a discussion of institutional aspects within economic theorizing. 2 To 
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Roscher, it was not enough to just look at the individual not taking into ac-
count the national differences in religion, science, language, art, law, etc. 
He gathered a lot of data adequate to describe the social and economic de-
velopment of a nation and its population in order to derive general propo-
sitions. Bruno Hildebrand (1812 - 1878) and Karl Knies (1821 - 1898) 
followed Roscher on this path. It was Gustav Schmoller ( 1838-1917) 
within the German Historic School who discussed the entrepreneur. He 
analyzed a vast quantity of historic data and found a crucial element in 
economy which was the entrepreneur, an energetic, active man: a coordi-
nator, manager and innovator. However, he did not enhance the theory of 
entrepreneurship. 
The central point of interest within the German Historic School, how-
ever, was not the investigation of the entrepreneur. 
Notes 
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2Hebert and Link (1982, p. 152). 
3There were others before Cantillon who touched the entrepreneurial function in their work, 
but with regard to economic analysis Cantillon has to be seen as the precursor of the en-
trepreneur in economic theory. See Hebert and Link (1982) for further details. 
4See Cantillon's work Essai sur la nature du commerce en general, Cantillon (1931). Al-
ready in his early times he covered a lot of the successive discussion on entrepreneurship. 
He made the entrepreneur the pivotal point of his theory. 
5Compare Cantillon (1931). 
6 Physiocracy stands for the rule of nature. 
7See Hebert and Link (1982, p. 31). 
8See Hebert and Link (1982, p. 31). 
9Compare Groenenwegen (1971). 
10compare Turgot (1977) and Hebert and Link (1982, p. 33). 
11 As figure 1.1 shows, Say is classified as a member of the French School, which, all in 
all, is quite a bold venture. His nationality would definitely not disapprove of it, whereas 
the fact that Say himself many times referred to Adam Smith and obviously highly valued 
Smith's Wealth of Nations would suggest a closer link to the Classics. See Say (1845) for a 
more profound inquiry. Some associate Say neoclassical economics (see e.g. Roll (1961). 
Others consider him a member of the Austrian School. His contributions to economic 
theory are huge so that different classifications are obviously possible. Nevertheless, Say's 
entrepreneurial concept is located closely to the French School. 
12Compare Barreto (1989, p. 6). 
13say (1845, p. 20). 
14Barreto (1989, p. 11). 
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2 The Neoclassical Era 
2.1 The Birth of Neoclassical Analysis 
Chapter 1 gave us a lot of intuition on the subject matter. Economists put 
forward different aspects that have to be taken into account when investi-
gating the entrepreneur. The emphasis was put on the entrepreneur's role 
as a coordinator, risk-taker, capitalist, etc. All in all, almost every writer 
recognizes the entrepreneur as a unique element in economic life. 
Proceeding along the historical path of entrepreneurship research, we 
will see that basically the intuition has never vanished with regard to the 
important position of entrepreneurs in economy. Nevertheless - and that is 
why a cesura has to be made at a certain point in time - around the 1870s 1 a 
new era in economic thinking started, an era that created a masterpiece of a 
methodological toolbox apt to investigate economic phenomena in a strin-
gent and consistent way. Those economists we nowadays call the founders 
of the Neoclassical School, such as Jevons, Walras and Menger. They had 
developed a standardizing body that seemed to enable us to handle the 
whole complexity of the economic world. The neoclassical methodology 
definitely was and still is an extraordinary accomplishment in economics. 
Undeniably, a lot of insights have ever since been gained in all respects of 
economic theorizing, but when we talk about entrepreneurial behavior, we 
encounter the boundaries of the neoclassical paradigm. When we question 
the role of the entrepreneur, we challenge methodology and this is why 
we have to trace back the path that led to an explanatory dead end in the 
research of entrepreneurship. 
As already mentioned, the 1870s saw the beginning of the 
Neoclassical School. The publication of Leon Walras Elements d'econo-
mie pure2 can be seen as the first comprehensive synthesis of neoclassical 
thoughts which was the concept of general equilibrium. 
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William Stanley Jevons (1835 - 1882) enhanced the theory of Smith and 
Ricardo3 and introduced marginal utility. Carl Menger (1841 - 1921) 
provided the mathematical toolkit for a corresponding analysis.4 The way 
was smoothed to develop a theory of the firm that had to do without the 
entrepreneur. The following has been discussed extensively in literature, 
so that only a short summary of the disappearance of the entrepreneur in 
neoclassical theory need be given. 5 The neoclassical setting established at 
that time made possible to develop a modem production theory6 which ba-
sically consists of three optimization problems: First, to find the minimal 
cost input mix; second, to produce the profit-maximizing output; and third, 
to employ inputs optimally. As it is well known by first-year economics 
students, the solutions of those three problems coincide when marginal rev-
enues equal marginal cost. Thtinen was the first to put forward a verbal for-
mulation of this concept.7 Wicksteed (1992) elaborated the graphical and 
mathematical formulation showing that each production factor receives its 
marginal revenue. Wicksell ( 1934) rounded off the optimization problem 
as he formalized the notion that when marginal revenues equal marginal 
cost the optimal quantity of input factors to be employed is reached. The 
optimization problem at the output side was already discussed in 1838 by 
Coumot (1927) which is also well-known in standard textbook econom-
ics. A lot of work had still to be done at that time: Marshall analyzed the 
upward-sloping supply curve. 8 Roy Harrod and Jacob Viner reflected on 
short-run cost curves.9 The task to put the pieces together into a whole was 
spurred by Irving Fisher, solving the consumer's optimization problem. 10 
The consumer maximizes utility by choosing to buy the optimal mix of 
goods subject to a budget constraint. It was obvious that consumers and 
producers faced the same optimization problem - at least from a mathe-
matical point of view. The completion of the production theory was done 
by William Ernest Johnson when he set forth a verbal, mathematical and 
graphical representation of both the consumers' as well as producers' op-
timization problem. Figure 2.1 shows the graphical illustration. 
Yet, a full integration of the different facets of the firm's optimization 
problem had not been accomplished. Leon Walras, Arthur L. Bowley and 
John R. Hicks tried what Joan Robinson finally managed to do: she showed 
that the firm's profit can either be investigated from the output side or from 
the factor market side. 11 Barreto ( 1989) names some of those economists 12 
who contributed at the beginning of the 20th century to a full integration 
of a firm's optimization problems, connecting the factor market side to the 
output side and fitting the whole system into a general equilibrium frame-
work. Paul Samuelson has become one of the best-known economists for 
those achievements. 13 
This is the path Barreto ( 1989) draws of the disappearance of the entre-
preneur in microeconomic theory. Not only was the entrepreneur gradually 
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Figure 2.1: The graphical representation of the consumer's and producer's 
optimization problem. 
Note: From the consumer's perspective we consider the budget constraint and the 
indifference curve, from the producer's perspective we deal with isoquants and 
isocost lines. 
lost sight of, but the methodological framework that has been developed 
and widely accepted made it almost impossible to integrate the entrepre-
neur into an equilibrium system. 
Let us briefly continue the walk along the neoclassical path. When we 
think of figure 2.1 as the representation of the firm's optimization problem, 
it is not hard to make a step further to the underlying production function. 
Figure 2.2 shows the corresponding three-dimensional homogeneous pro-
duction function with diminishing returns to scale. 
A cut, parallel to the K-L-plane, 14 results in a two-dimensional produc-
tion function with one factor remaining constant and the other one being 
varied. That is what we call partial factor variation. 
The theory of the firm assumes that a firm constantly produces on its pro-
duction function (figure 2.2) at a given level of technology, which means 
that the firm produces efficiently. This implies that the firm minimizes 
costs (figure 2.1). Cost-minimization depends on the mix of input factors 
and their prices. Factor prices depend on their marginal product. The to-
tal demand for input factors is derived from the demand for output goods 
by consumers. Consumers' demand for output goods is determined by the 
utility consumers draw out of the consumption of those goods. The coun-
terpart to the firm's production function is the consumer's utility function. 
In the same way the production function implies isoquants, the utility func-
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Figure 2.2: The neoclassical production function. 
tion provides for indifference curves. Hence, we return to figure 2.1 which 
tells us exactly the consumer's optimality calculation for his optimal con-
sumption pattern. The latter will be pointed out in figure 2.3. It will even-
tually show that in such a framework, the entrepreneur has to be neglected 
because there is no space left for him in such kind of approach. 
The complete system 
Figure 2.3 gives a simplified version of the general equilibrium framework. 
Suppose there are only consumers (households) and producers (firms). 
Households offer their labor on the factor market and demand consumer 
goods on the goods market. Producers demand labor on the factor mar-
ket and, on the goods market, they sell the goods produced. This is the 
real part of the circular flow within economy. Correspondingly, the flow of 
money in the economy is as follows: producers pay wages to households 
and households, in return, pay the price for the goods they consume. 
The first quadrant represents the goods market and the third quadrant 
the factor market. 15 The second quadrant shows the firms' aggregate pro-
duction function, PFo, we discussed above. The fourth quadrant maps the 
price system of the factor market and the goods market. At first, we look at 
the goods market. The indices of all parameters signify the initial state of 




Figure 2.3: The general equilibrium system. 
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the system. The reason why aggregate demand, ADo, portrays an upward-
sloping curve is that the horizontal axis denotes real wages i. Wages are 
usually not discussed in the goods market. Therefore, let us set W equal 
to one. Price P is in the denominator, so that the usually downward slop-
ing aggregate demand curve is flipped. Accordingly, the aggregate supply 
curve ASo is flipped, too. In H, the goods market is in equilibrium and 
total output Yo is determined. In the second quadrant, the corresponding 
point of production is shown in A, which delivers the amount of factor 
units lo employed, when C is produced efficiently at minimal costs. The 
labor market in the third quadrant - since there is only one factor of pro-
duction -is equilibrated in E, where firms' aggregate labor demand W 0 16 
equals households' aggregate labor supply LS0 .17 Thus, the level of nomi-
nal wages W is determined in the factor market and the price level P is de-
termined in the goods sector; consequently, general equilibrium is reached 
in both markets at a given ratio ( i )0. Since all agents, producers as well 
as households, exert optimal performance, a state of Pareto-efficiency has 
been reached. Hence, there is no incentive for any agent to change be-
havior; innovation, entrepreneurial behavior and structural change have no 
endogenous legitimation. 
Ever since economists started to theorize on human behavior, they have 
been looking for consistency in theory. What classical theorists could 
not achieve, neoclassical economists succeeded in. The marginal school 
and, in particular, the Walrasian general equilibrium theory eliminated 
the shortcomings in terms of inconsistency within economic theory. They 
managed to refine the patchwork of classical thoughts to a consistent unity, 
but at the cost of some important aspects of the economic world. The in-
genious accomplishments of Walras, Jevons, Menger and other contempo-
raries at that time had some side effects concerning the assumptions to be 
made in order to exert such kind of mathematical calculation. Those as-
sumptions, listed below, require a certain type of an omnipotent economic 
agent, which was named Homo economicus: 
i) Each consumer's preferences are described by a utility function with 
positive first and negative second derivatives. 
ii) Each producer's set of technical possibilities are described by a pro-
duction function with positive first and negative second derivatives. 
iii) Competitive behavior assumes that the quantities demanded and 
supplied will be equated in every market, and that excessive prof-
its will be eliminated. 
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iv) Marginal utility and marginal cost determine equilibrium in the mar-
ket, and marginal productivity and marginal disutility determine equi-
librium in the factor market. 
v) There is perfect competition. 18 
Economic agents and economic processes are represented by functions. 
The functions build a set of equations which results in an equilibrium point. 
In other words, if economic agents cannot be described by functions no 
equilibrium point can be calculated. The bottom line is: equilibirium re-
quires optimal behavior, optimal behavior presumes perfect rationality, 
and finally, perfect rationality requires perfect foresight and information. 
In the following section the necessary set of assumptions will be sketched 
to show which implications the neoclassical methodology generated for 
economic analysis in general and for the entrepreneur specifically. 
2.2 Searching for the Entrepreneur in 
Neoclassical Theory 
Now, the question to be answered is where the entrepreneur could fit in. In 
section 1.1 we find the different connotations of the entrepreneur ever since 
the term was mentioned in literature by Hebert and Link (1982). 19 Yet, we 
cannot discuss all of the items discussed in chapter 1.1. But we can pick 
out the ones that fit into a general equilibrium framework in the following 
manner: item 2 (supplier of financial capital), 6 (manager or superinten-
dent), 8 ( owner of an enterprise) and 9 ( employer of factors of production) 
suggest a picture of a static entrepreneur that does not take a key role in 
economic life, which most writers intuitively ascribed to him. As Hebert 
and Link (1982) put it: "Only in a dynamic world does the entrepreneur 
become a robust figure. " The remaining eight items provide a dynamic 
notion of the entrepreneur. Even though it seems obvious that we cannot 
discuss dynamic aspects within a static model such as figure 2.3 yet it is the 
starting point to find out to what extent the idea of entrepreneurial behavior 
can be pursued with such a basic setting. Item 1 puts forward uncertainty 
and item 2 suggests that the entrepreneur is a decision maker. In a general 
equilibrium, we will always reach efficiency, i.e. a state of ( Pareto) opti-
mality. Consequently, this kind of entrepreneur will never make any wrong 
decisions, so that uncertainty cannot be the subject matter in his decision 
making process. Decision-making and therefore uncertainty can only be 
dominant features in disequilibrium. So are items 7 (the entrepreneur as 
organizer and coordinator of resources), 10 (the entrepreneur as contrac-
tor), 11 (the entrepreneur as allocator) and 12 (the entrepreneur as allocator 
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of resources). This leaves us with items 3 and 5, the entrepreneur as in-
novator and industrial leader, respectively. A static equilibrium does not 
allow for justifying a dynamic entrepreneurial figure that tries to change 
a state of optimality. Therefore, as figure 2.4 shows, economic change is 
banned to the outer economic sphere: in most equilibrium models, inno-
vation is treated as an exogenous shock. Hence, the entrepreneur as an 
innovator and industrial leader must be an exogenous element, too. 
y 
W/P 
Figure 2.4: The comparative statics system. 
For a graphic illustration within this framework (figure 2.4), suppose a 
positive exogenous shock occurs and the productivity is increased. 20 The 
production function in the second quadrant will shift up (proportionately) 
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towards P F1 inducing simultaneously a shift of the aggregate supply curve 
to AS 1, since every producer is willing to supply a higher quantity of output 
goods for a given price level ( i )o. The shift of the aggregate supply curve 
causes an endogenous movement along the aggregate demand curve, ADo, 
to point E. On the factor market, according to the standard textbook case, 
the workers' increased productivity, i.e. their marginal product, initiates a 
shift of the labor demand curve LDo to LD1• Yet, general equilibrium has 
not readjusted. The shift of the aggregate supply curve, which led to the re-
puted equilibrium point E does not coincide with the real-wage ratio ( i) I· 
In order to accomplish that, the aggregate demand curve must also shift 
to AD1, which basically describes Say's renowned law of markets: sup-
ply creates its demand. Eventually, general equilibrium has been reached 
in points F, G and H. In short: to reach equilibrium after an increase in 
productivity, the labor demand curve as well as the aggregate supply curve 
have to shift; meaning one and the same thing, since labor demand depends 
on the firms' output level, the output level depends on aggregate demand, 
aggregate demand reflects households' preferences which implies house-
holds' labor supply. The conclusion is that the explanatory power of such 
an analytical system is confined to ends, not means. Although Walras him-
self emphasized the importance of entrepreneurs in real life, for analytical 
reasons he thought this would not be a necessary point for discussion. Wal-
ras starts where the economic function of an entrepreneur has already been 
performed efficiently. 21 
Figure 2.4 was an attempt to illustrate the bone of contention from a 
simple, static perspective. There are also a number of neoclassical models 
dealing with dynamics. Kihlstrom and Laff ont (1979) develop a general 
equilibrium model. They manage to implement into an equilibrium model 
the decision process of economic agents whether they want to become an 
employee, and, therefore, earn less risky wages, or whether they want to 
become an entrepreneur and gain risky profits. Kihlstrom and Laffont in-
stigate the process by implementing dynamic wage changes, whereby they 
start with comparative statics and continue with a dynamic analysis. They 
concede that their procedure is subject to the same criticism as the one 
we discussed above.22 Justman (1996) also touched entrepreneurship and 
modelled swarming mechanics within a general equilibrium framework 
using a dynamic optimization technique to determine equilibrium. The 
calculation process is done backwards, starting form the distant future to 
determine optimal behavior. 23 Again, we see the symptomatic treatment 
of a dynamic element such as the entrepreneur within equilibrium. There 
are many equilibrium models that start out with a set of intuitive ideas 
which are pursued until the general equilibrium framework stipulates an 
optimizing, perfect rational economic agent deprived from the possibility 
of failure. Hence, the entrepreneur can neither be an innovator nor can he 
be a leader. 
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Technical change and innovation is exogenous; a need for a leader is absent 
in a system where all actors know their optimal paths. 
Notes 
1Compare Hebert and Link (1982, p. 63). 
2The first edition appeared in 1874 and a revision of it was published in 1926. See Walras 
(1954). 
3Smith and Ricardo differentiated utility and value. There is no inherent value to commodi-
ties or goods but the value is dependent, besides the scarcity of the good, on the utility one 
draws out ofusage. See Ricardo (1821, eh. 1). 
4For a detailed inquiry see Menger (1968). It has to be mentioned at this point that Menger 
did not only supply the proper mathematics but also founded a new school of thought which 
is known as the Austrian School. In his Grundsatze he discusses the concept of marginal 
utility and introduces the subjectivist view of individuals. For more information about the 
Austrian School, see chapter 3. 
5Barreto (1989, p. 69) shows the whole process in detail. 
6This is what we nowadays call standard textbook production theory. It can be found in any 
introductory textbook on microeconomics. 
7Compare ThUnen (1921). 
8see Marshall (1948). 
9Compare Harrod (1930) and Viner (1931). 
10compare Fisher (1925). 
11Compare Robinson (1969, p. 251). 
12 Allen, Bowley, Coase, Frisch, Georgescu-Roegen, Harrod, Hicks, Hotelling, R. F. Kahn, 
Kaldor, Knight, Leontief, H. L. Moore, Robbins, Robinson, Schneider, H. Schultz, Schum-
peter, Viner and Zassenhaus. Barreto (1989, p. 93). 
13see Barreto (1989, p. 93). 
14 As in the standard textbook fashion, K stands for the input of capital and L stands for the 
input of labor. 
15For simplicity, a static representation is chosen, where, on top of it, only one production 
factor (i.e. labor) is discussed. 
16Labor demand derive directly from the demand for output goods. 
17Labor supply derive from the households optimal mix of labor and leisure time that yields 
maximal utility. 
18Keita (1992, p. 62). 
19see citation on page 4. 
20Toere is one remark to be made with respect to the labor supply curve. In figure 2.4 an 
inelastic labor supply curve is used. There are also other types of labor supply curves 
such as an elastic and a backward bending one; those options would change the point of 
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equilibrium but they would not change the propositions made concerning the deficiencies 
of general equilibrium analysis when analyzing the entrepreneur. 
21 Compare Hebert and Link (1982, p. 72). 
22See Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979, p. 734). 
23In this model he uses Bellman equations to analyze a single-firm's optimization behavior. 
Bellman equations facilitate a recursive optimization calculation, whereby several possible 
dynamic paths are determined and the expected value of the present value of each path is 
computed. Eventually, the optimal path is taken. 

3 The Austrian School 
Entrepreneurship research has been a focal point in Austrian economics. 
Paradoxically, the Austrian School put forth major achievements in neo-
classical economics but also confronted neoclassical procedures with its 
deficiencies as discussed above. Due to its bifurcating position in eco-
nomic analysis, the Austrian tradition is put third in this brief historical 
sketch. 
3.1 Founders and Disciples 
Carl Menger (1840 - 1921) marks the beginning of the Austrian School. 
At the same time that Jevons published his Theory of Political Economy, 1 
Menger presented his Principles2 in which he develops the Austrian theory 
of utility and value. 
To his mind, there was no objective value of anything that exists per se. 
Neither it is scarcity of goods, nor resources. Value comes into existence 
after utility is incurred. Menger emphasized the consumer's side. The sub-
jective value is derived from the utility the consumer can draw off consum-
ing a certain good. 3 In contrast to this, the classical view of value and price 
was biased to the supply side: the exchange value of goods would be de-
rived from the price which is determined by supply and demand, whereas 
supply is a function of production costs.4 Only when "things" are use-
ful or at least can be transformed into being useful "things" so that the 
consumer's needs can be satisfied, can a subjective value be determined. 
Menger emphasizes the role of human beings that strive to satisfy their 
needs and they only succeed when they undertake human action. To his 
mind, value depends on the following conditions: 
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1. There must be a human need. 
2. The "thing" that is to Jui.fill the need must possess properties that 
enable the individual to form a causal connection between that and 
satisfaction. 
3. The individual must "know" of this connection. 
4. The individual must be able to command access to the "thing" and 
be able to direct it to the satisfaction of the need. 5 
Proceeding this way, the satisfaction of needs is not limited to a cogni-
tive process of an individual but it also depends on environmental condi-
tions. The individual has to consider the objective reality since: 
All things are subject to the law of cause and effect. This great 
principle knows no exception, and we would search in vain in 
the realm of experience for an example to the contrary. Hu-
man progress has no tendency to cast it in doubt, but rather the 
effect of con.firming it and of always further widening knowl-
edge of the scope of its validity. Its continued and growing 
recognition is therefore closely linked to human progress. 6 
The satisfaction of needs, therefore, has two determinants: one is in-
ternal to the individual and the other is the state of the external world. 
When the individual begins to understand the external determinants and 
its dependence on it, he is able to adjust his actions to satisfy his needs. 
By doing this, the external world is changed and this brings along further 
changes since the whole economic world underlies the law of cause and 
effect.7 
Consequently, human action becomes the dynamic element in Austrian 
economics. The value of goods is the imputed potential of goods to satisfy 
needs: lower-order goods first have to be transformed into useful first-order 
(i.e. consumable) goods. Lower-order goods might be lower in value, 
they can even be of zero value taking into account that obviously useless 
goods are produced in economic reality. Value can be created provided that 
human knowledge enables economic agents to make the necessary causal 
links to produce valuable goods. Furthermore, the agent has to be entitled 
to exert necessary actions, which addresses the prerequisite of individuals' 
property rights. 
The transformation process, according to Menger, is time-consuming. 
As the causalities might change in the course of time, this transformation 
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process is uncertain. The producer requires, besides technological knowl-
edge, foresight to meet future consumers' needs. Future wants are pre-
dictable - not perfectly, but at least to a certain degree - otherwise human 
action would not occur. Hence, uncertainty becomes the driving force of 
human action; whereas knowledge about markets and existing first-order 
goods is essential to forecast consumers' needs in order to plan and con-
duct an efficient production process. 
The latter is exerted by an economizing individual: the entrepreneur. 
The entrepreneur basically has to predict consumers' future needs in order 
to produce a potentially useful good. Then, he has to acquire the nec-
essary technological knowledge and the knowledge to select the adequate 
means from the ones available. Second, an economic calculation is vital to 
ensure efficient production to combine lower-order goods whose value is 
determined by the prospective value of the first-order good to be produced. 
Third, the act of will assigned to a human being (the entrepreneur) that 
initiates the igniting spark of any dynamic development. 8 Out of the latter 
two aspects it is clear that Menger's entrepreneur was a capitalist-entrepre-
neur.9 
Engen von Bohm-Bawerk (1851- 1914) and Friedrich Freiherr von 
Wieser (1851 - 1926) were Menger's intellectual followers. Bohm-Bawerk 
put the bits and pieces together, not making essential contributions himself, 
to build the edifice of the Austrian School. Wieser worked on the subjec-
tivist view of utility and especially emphasized property relations. The 
entrepreneur he described as a 
( ... ) director by legal right and at the same time by virtue of 
his active participation in the economic management of his 
enterprise. He is a leader in his own right. He is the legal 
representative of the operation, the owner of the material pro-
ductive goods, creditor for all accounts receivable and debtor 
for all accounts payable. As a lessor or lessee he is obli-
gated or privileged. He is the employer under all contracts for 
work and labor ... His economic leadership commences with 
the establishment of the enterprise, he supplies not only the 
necessary capital but originates the idea, elaborates and puts 
into operation the plan, and engages collaborators. When the 
enterprise is established, he becomes its manager technically 
as well as commercially. 10 
After World War I, Ludwig Edler von Mises (1881 - 1973) acceded 
Austrian economics. His objective was to pursue a deductive science to 
advance to the truth, independent of historical data but suitable to explain 
30 The Entrepreneur in Economic Theory 
historic events. Mises objected to a radically positivistic view that empir-
ical data alone has to be the platform gaining insights by induction, thus 
denying any rational, hypothetic-deductive approach. 
He divides the universe into two parts: the realist part which eludes from 
a factual human understanding subject to epistemological reservations, and 
the rational part which is created by a cognitive process of human beings. 
The first part conceptualizes realism, affirming that there is a true reality 
independent of any cognitive representation. Hence, the deliberate conclu-
sion would be empiricism, which contradicts such a rational component. 
Consequently, mankind is not able to access reality by rational, conclusive 
reasoning; any aprioristic theory has to be abandoned and any hypothetic-
deductive methodology is useless. The second part of Mises' distinction 
- at first sight paradoxical - brings in rationality. The decisive difference, 
however, lies in Mises' concept of rationality. Neither does he claim that 
mankind would be able to perceive and understand reality in its nature nor 
that it is possible to make any a priori axiomatic assumptions. But eco-
nomic behavior is aim-oriented and based on logical reasoning and in this 
sense human behavior is a priori rational. 11 Mises labels this concept the 
concept of praxeology,12 "( ••• )the aprioristic theory of human action." 13 
Praxeology was the axiomatic foundation he suggested for economic anal-
ysis. This concept has become Mises underpinning of the (Austrian-type) 
subjectivist view and in terms of methodology the call for methodological 
individualism. To his mind, economics had to be a science built on logic 
and mathematics but also to include institutional aspects. 
Although this approach was in contradiction to a positivist and inductive 
view, Mises left room for an empiric investigation of such general laws 
derived in his methodology. Owing to the imponderability of economic 
reality he linked aprioristic theory to empirical validation: 
Economics does not follow the procedure of logic and mathe-
matics. It does not present an integrated system of pure apri-
oristic ratiocination severed from any reference to reality. In 
introducing assumptions into its reasoning, it satisfies itself 
that the treatment of the assumptions concerned can render 
useful services for the comprehension of reality. 14 
With his praxeological concept Mises managed to escape the epistemo-
logical critique on economics. Sciences, especially natural sciences, try to 
know what reality is. The praxeological approach is one step less demand-
ing. It does not discuss ontological questions but rather investigates human 
action and its context of occurrence, whereby human action is based on in-
dividuals' rational logic and their subjective perception of reality. 
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Mises originates from a quite philosophical stance and explores human 
action from a more realistic perspective, so he refrains from an optimizing 
economic agent and models an imperfect human being who acts accord-
ing to his beliefs. Moreover, his notion of human action is a prerequisite 
for entrepreneurial behavior. His ideas about entrepreneurial behavior def-
initely are motivated by his praxeological conception, even though he has 
not developed an independent theory of entrepreneurship. 
Economics, in speaking of entrepreneurs, has in view not men, 
but a de.finite function. This function is not the particular fea-
ture of a special group or class of men; it is inherent in every 
action and burdens every actor. In embodying this function in 
an imaginary figure, we resort to a methodological makeshift. 
The term entrepreneur as used by catallactic theory means: 
acting man exclusively seen from the aspect of the uncertainty 
inherent in every action. In using this term we must never 
forget that every action is embedded in the flux of time and 
therefore involves a speculation. The capitalists, the landown-
ers, and the laborers are by necessity speculators. So is the 
consumer in providing for anticipated future needs. ( ... ) In 
the context of economic theory the meaning of the terms con-
cerned is this: Entrepreneur means acting man in regard to 
the changes occurring in the data of the market ( ... ). 15 
The American tradition Among other American economists Hebert 
and Link (1982) mention Frederick B. Hawley (1843 - 1929), John Bates 
Clark (1847 - 1938), Herbert Davenport (1861 -1931) and Frank Taussig 
(1859-1940), Amasa Walker (1799-1875), his son Francis Walker 
(1840- 1897) and finally Frank Knight (1885 - 1972).16 Basically, the 
American tradition in entrepreurship research is deeply rooted in the Aus-
trian tradition. Amasa Walker contributed some more precise ideas to the 
distinction of the capitalist and the entrepreneur. His son, Francis Walker, 
refreshed ideas of the French tradition. Hawley reflected on uncertainty 
till Clark came up with the distinction between insurable and non-insurable 
risk foreshadowing Knight's work, which will be discussed below. Further-
more, Clark assigned the dynamic part within the economy to the entrepre-
neur, again, motivating Knight, on the one hand, and on the other, giving 
Schumpeter a cue to an equilibrium - destroying agent. Similarly, Herbert 
Davenport aligned his entrepreneur concept to the thoughts of the Austrian 
School. He tried to make the entrepreneur the core element of economic 
theory, 17 although he did not succeed completely in his venture. A con-
temporary of Davenport, Frank Taussig, touched the innovative role of the 
entrepreneur in economy, while Schumpeter had already finished his sem-
inal work on the Theory of Economic Development. Frank Knight was one 
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of the American economists who contributed most to the theory of entre-
preneurship, as it is portrayed in the following section. 
3.2 Knight and the Entrepreneur as Uncertainty 
Bearer 
Frank Knight ( 1885 - 1972) resumed the topic of uncertainty what had 
been put aside in a rather methodologically motivated discussion such as 
Schumpeter's and Kirzner's. 18 After Cantillon had implicated uncertainty 
in entrepreneurial behavior at the beginning of the 18th century, it had to 
wait till 1921 when Knight published his work on Risk, Uncertainty and 
Profit. 19 Knight discussed the importance of uncertainty in detail. He 
distinguished true uncertainty from risk, the latter being insurable because 
it can be parameterized by the probabilities of possible outcomes, whereas 
the former type of uncertainty is uninsurable since neither the outcome nor 
probabilities can be attached. 
His criticism of perfect knowledge reflects the starting point of his entre-
preneurial concept. Without uncertainty, the economic outcome would 
simply be the result of a purely mechanistic process. Economic actors 
would not differ in terms of their individual knowledge and their intel-
lectual capacity. According to Knight, uncertainty is an economy-wide 
feature affecting all economic agents, since economic actors are heteroge-
neous in their individual intellectual endowment. With perfect knowledge 
missing, the economic actors have to make decisions on "what to do and 
how to do it",20 thus the pure act of exerting economic actions, once a de-
cision is made, becomes less important in economic behavior. The way 
agents deal with uncertainty induces heterogeneous economic behavior: 
1. an adaptation of men to occupations on the basis of kind 
of knowledge and judgment; 
2. a similar selection on the basis of degree of foresight, for 
some lines of activity call for this endowment in a very 
different degree from others; 
3. a specialization within productive groups, the individu-
als with superior managerial ability (foresight and ca-
pacity of ruling others) being placed in control of the 
group and the others working under their direction; and 
4. those with confidence in their judgment and disposition 
to "back it up" in action specialize in risk-taking.21 
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Based on these four points, Knight derives his concept of the entrepreneur, 
which he referred to as the business man: 
Under the enterprise system, a special social class, the busi-
ness men, direct economic activity; they are in the strict sense 
the producers, while the great mass of the population merely 
furnish them with productive services, placing their persons 
and their property at the disposal of this class; the entrepre-
neurs also guarantee to those who furnish productive services 
a fixed remuneration. 22 
Producers have to make predictions concerning the consumers' needs 
and accordingly, they have to coordinate production factors to produce 
tractable goods. That is, what Knight calls a situation of uncertainty. Only 
a small group of agents is willing to face uncertainty and, at the same time, 
has the intellectual capacity and power to direct and control others who are 
rather doubtful and timid. The latter have their risk insured by the former, 
that means, the entrepreneurs guarantee their employees a fixed income 
whereas the entrepreneurs bear the imponderableness of an uncertain fu-
ture.23 
3.3 Kirzner and the Entrepreneur as Arbitrageur 
Israel M. Kirzner (born in 1930) also developed a comprehensive the-
ory of the entrepreneur embedded in the realm of the Austrian School. 
Menger and Mises (his academic father), Bohm-Bawerk, Hayek among 
others delivered the preliminary Austrian-type framework Kirzner could 
build his entrepreneurial concept on. In his works Competition and Entre-
preneurship24 and Perception, Opportunity and Profit, 25 the role of Kirz-
ner's entrepreneur in economy can be extracted. 
Equivalently to the Austrian tradition he rejected the idea of simply ex-
ploring general equilibrium and its conditions, although he flirted with the 
idea of general equilibrium as we will see later on when talking about 
Kirzner's entrepreneur as an equilibrator. It would neglect important as-
pects in the economic system which not least enables the justification of 
any entrepreneurial element. Equilibrium denies the existence of markets 
because such a state of optimality does not allow for a lack of knowledge 
and capabilities of any agent involved, consumers as well as producers. 
Without such deficiencies of actors we end up in the tautological conclu-
sion that there is no entrepreneur with superior knowledge if there is no 
agent with imperfect knowledge. If we allow for differences in knowledge 
on either side, consumers and producers (suppliers), we also allow for the 
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discussion of markets and therefore talk about a situation of disequilibrium 
characterized by continuous change.26 Kirzner refers to Hayek when talk-
ing about the role of markets to emphasize their importance of information 
diffusion in order to explain the entrepreneurial function: 
Hayek's pioneering view of market process as being one of in-
formation dissemination and discovery( ... ) has given us: the 
guidepost to an entrepreneurial perspective on market pro-
cesses.27 
Kirzner starts at the individuals' level. He presupposes a decision-making 
process which aligns with the Mengerian subjectivist valuation of individ-
uals. They strive to fulfill their needs and act in a specific way, if they 
know how to make the causal connections and if they know how to make 
a "thing" to satisfy their needs. Hence, knowledge is the focal point of his 
entrepreneurship discussion. 
Moreover, he narrows down the Misesian proposition of the entrepren-
eurial quality to be attached to each individual but he parallels the function 
of the individuals decision-making process to the function of the entre-
preneur in the market. Human action is Mises' praxeological explanation 
for an individual's decision-making process basically saying that every 
economic actor is an entrepreneur, But, to Kirzner, as entrepreneurship 
refers to market interaction, this economic function of the entrepreneur is 
restricted to an individual "( ... ) who buys in one market in order to re-
sell, possibly at a considerably later date, in a second market. "28 Overall, 
Kirzner's intention is to isolate the entrepreneurial element from any other 
economic function. A further step was to face the entrepreneur with the 
Robbinsian economizer who is an optimizer and therefore invulnerable to 
imperfections saying that he owns perfect knowledge about given means 
and ends, not making any mistakes and consequently, always hitting his 
target. It is obvious that this is not the type of man Kirzner has in mind. 
He searches the entrepreneurial element in a Crusoe situation. The key 
to his approach is spontaneous leaming.29 Spontaneous learning suggests 
that there is a piece of knowledge Crusoe is not yet aware of. That is 
what Kirzner calls a hunch. The bits of information Crusoe consciously 
knows represent a pure resource he employs in production. "But concern-
ing Crusoe's hunches and his visions in the face of a changing, uncertain 
environment, it cannot be said at all that Crusoe knows he has a hunch or 
a vision of the future. 1130 It is not that all of a sudden Crusoe would know 
how to put his hunch into practice. "He does not act by deliberately uti-
lizing his hunch about the future,· instead, he finds that his actions reflect 
his hunches. "31 To conclude to the actual entrepreneurial element, it be-
comes obvious that"( ... ) the essence of entrepreneurial vision, and what 
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sets it apart from knowledge as a resource, is reflected in Crusoe 's lack 
of self-consciousness concerning it. Crusoe does not 'know' that he pos-
sesses a particular vision, ( ... ). "32 Subsequently, as he gradually realizes 
through the ends of his actions that his hunch was right towards a hoped 
result, the hunch becomes knowledge and the entrepreneurial vision van-
ishes. This process is a subconscious learning process, the recognition of 
a yet unrecognized entrepreneurial vision. 
Spontaneous learning refers to all economic actors, consumers and pro-
ducers. To K.irzner, the state of mind that nurtures the possibility to spon-
taneous learning is alertness. Every economic actor makes decisions, even 
if they do not have any resources, including knowledge. Nonetheless, de-
cisions are made best to the individual's knowledge. He might recognize 
that he lacks some knowledge necessary to make the "right" decision, he 
might even be able to collect this kind of knowledge but this is not what de-
notes spontaneous learning in K.irzner's sense. Spontaneous learning can 
only occur with regard to knowledge which is, at the most, subconsciously 
known by the individual. It is a hunch, an intuition about the future which 
is spontaneously discovered and transformed into conscious knowledge. 
Then, the hunch has become a resource of production. 
The consumer might learn spontaneously about new opportunities to sat-
isfy his needs, he is alert to new means to satisfy his ends. The individual 
who is alert to market opportunities to make profits, K.irzner calls the entre-
preneur. 33 This finally implies the act of will to complete entrepreneurial 
actions. The propensity to entrepreneurial behavior is increased if the alert 
individual believes that the accidentally discovered information is benefi-
cial.34 
Alertness is also the crucial quality that differentiates the Robbinsian 
economizer from the entrepreneur. Once the alert individual discovers, i.e. 
spontaneously acquires new knowledge, he is a pure entrepreneur. Then, 
knowledge has become conscious to the entrepreneur and therefore does 
not need further alertness and spontaneous learning to be used repetitively. 
Consequently, the entrepreneurial quality disappears and, if this individual 
lacks any other hunches, he becomes an ordinary Robbinsian economizer. 
For analytical convenience, and as Kirzner wants to isolate the entrepre-
neurial element, he distinguishes between the pure Robbinsian economizer 
and the pure entrepreneur. 
As mentioned above, K.irzner works out Ludwig von Mises' concept of 
human action. Individuals act on their subjective view of the economic 
situation. A common term for such sort of subjectivism is expectations. 
Not knowing the true situation, they have to make decisions based on their 
knowledge, which includes expectations about other actors and their envi-
ronment; an individual's mental construct, mental connections built on per-
ception and accumulated experience. Obviously, actors make mistakes and 
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adjust their behavior to a changing environment; they learn from their mis-
talces. The adjustment process of their expectations is a subconscious one 
because no one is able to deliberately discover other persons' plans. The 
pure entrepreneur discovers subconsciously what he considers to be market 
opportunities to make future profits. Subsequently, he acts according to his 
hunch and seeks a capitalist to borrow money from in order to finance his 
venture. The production process has to be organized and launched to earn 
revenues to recompense production factors to remain with the residual, the 
entrepreneur's profit. 
According to Kirzner, it has to be emphasized that the pure entrepre-
neur is neither a capitalist nor a coordinator of production factors. The 
only characteristic feature a pure entrepreneur owns is the role of an arbi-
trageur. 35 
The idea of Kirzner's entrepreneur is rooted in the Austrian tradition, 
the critique on equilibrium analysis. He also refrains from such theoretic 
conception while he assigns to the entrepreneur the role of an equilibrator. 
Human decision making and spontaneous learning operate equilibrating 
on the individuals as well as on the market level. In a world of uncertainty 
individuals become aware of available opportunities, and adequate actions 
are taken to increase their well-being. On the market level, entrepreneurs 
recognize opportunities and rearrange resource allocation. Hence, on the 
individuals' as well as the market level, mis-allocation and error are grad-
ually eliminated. 36 
3.4 Schumpeter and the Entrepreneur as an 
Innovator 
Schumpeter's methodology The most popular view of the entrepre-
neur in economics has been developed by Joseph A. Schumpeter 
(1883 - 1950). His achievements in supporting a heterodox approach in 
economics had been so well received among economists that a whole strand 
of literature relates to him. Schumpeterian economics has become synony-
mous to innovation economics and economics of (technological) change. 
The key to his theoretical system is innovation and the element in this sys-
tem to bring along innovation is the entrepreneur. His work is an allusion 
to the fundamental reservations of orthodoxy, though at his time, it was 
neglected for a long time. It is not that Schumpeter's thoughts were com-
pletely new, but he managed to collect numerous ideas to create a seminal 
platform for an alternative approach to economic analysis. 
Schumpeter's work was tremendously influenced by a critical review on 
equilibrium theory. Though fascinated by Walras' system of equilibrium, 
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he stated that equilibrium theory contributed as much as it could; but fur-
ther insights could not be expected. Surely, Walras was not the only one 
who influenced Schumpeter's thinking. There are many others that deliv-
ered preparatory work affecting his Theory of Economic Development (first 
published in 1911 ), Business Cycles ( 1939) and later Capitalism, Socialism 
and Democracy (1942). 
A closer look at his work shows roots in the edifice of thought of Weber, 
Menger, Wieser, Say, Hayek, Bohm-Bawerk, to name a few. Schumpeter 
is to be classified as an Austrian economist. Though fascinated by Say's 
work, where we evidently can find a lot of parallels to his formulation 
of the innovation process, and also his esteem of Walras, who probably 
was the source of his critique on the circular flow, Schumpeter processed 
mostly Austrian ideas. 37 
Quesnay developed the idea of the circular flow as an analogy to cir-
culation of blood in humans.38 Walras equilibrium system became the 
neoclassical formal representation of the circular flow. Schumpeter starts 
his critique right at that point. The circular flow is shown in figure 3.1:39 
Schumpeter considered the circular flow as a static representation of an 
economic system. Consumers ( or households) offer their labor and earn 
wages which they spend in return on consumption goods they buy from 
producers. Suppose we have one single agent in an economy, which means 
to say the agent lives in autarchy. Furthermore, we assume that the only 
thing he produces is pastry and consequently, as he is the only one within 
the system, eats it. The agent is consumer and producer in one person. 
Thinking in the way of the circular flow, he offers his labor force to the 
producer and produces five pieces of pastry. In return he gets paid the 
wages equivalent to five pieces of pastry. Being at the same time the 
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consumer, he spends the money earned on consumption goods and buys 
five pieces of pastry as pastry is the only good he can buy. The circular 
flow is completed and thus the system is in equilibrium.40 Yet, the thought 
of equilibrium in this context is intuitively obvious. When we expand the 
model to a system of two agents, one consumer and one producer, we sim-
ply split economic functions on two distinct agents. The gist of the train of 
thought remains the same, besides a necessary discussion, which will not 
be led here, about the distribution of productive factors and property rights 
among those two individuals. The equilibrium concept would suggest that 
the consumer in the same manner would offer his labor force, earn money, 
which he eventually would spend on consumption goods. But the decisive 
difference to the fictitious one-man economy is that the decision which 
quantity to produce and which quantity to consume fall apart and two in-
dependent agents make decisions based on the expected action of the other. 
Of course, it is still very easy for the producer to get to know how much 
the consumer wants to consume by simply asking him demanding in re-
turn the consumer's labor force. But as soon as we introduce a multitude 
of consumers and producers, the coordination process of each actor's plan 
to match the other actors' ones, the henceforth created complexity sheds 
doubts on the actual existence of an equilibrium. Knowledge, information 
and communication matter. Schumpeter calls such an equilibrium, if ever 
reached, a timeless and static system. All actors' plans have to coincide. 
From a theoretical perspective this is made possible by the definition of 
an equilibrium that implies optimal behavior according to perfect rational-
ity.41 This makes change impossible since the coincidence of all plans also 
includes the correct expectations on actors' future behavior. Hence, there 
cannot be an economic development. 
The dynamic version of the circular flow also shows the static properties 
Schumpeter assigns to equilibrium analysis.42 
Schumpeter advocates a dynamic system, a system subject to endoge-
nous change. He understands the production process as a combination of 
production factors and he states the fact that there are changes in the way 
combinations are made. The occurrence of new combinations brings along 
change and disturbs the previously existing equilibrium. 
It is spontaneous and discontinuous change in the channels of 
the flow, disturbance of equilibrium, which forever alters and 
displaces the equilibrium state previously existing. Our theory 
of development is nothing but a treatment of this phenomenon 
and the processes incident to it. 43 
Schumpeter distinguishes five cases of new combinations, which he also 
calls innovations. They are: 
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(1) The introduction of a new product or a new product quality. 
(2) The introduction of a new production method. 
(3) The opening of a new market. 
( 4) The use of new raw materials or sources of semimanufactures. 
(5) The creation of a new industry organization.44 
These innovations do not fall from heaven but are initiated by economic 
actors, which Schumpeter calls the entrepreneurs.45 The entrepreneur con-
sequently is a disturber of equilibrium; he causes what Schumpeter named 
creative destruction, a term that has become the emblem of Schumpeterian 
research. 
The innovation process after Schumpeter in figure 3.2 shows both Schum-
peter's parallels to Say's production theory46 and a methodological conno-




Figure 3.2: The innovation process in Schumpeter's theory. 
Thus, the entrepreneur becomes the core element of Schumpeter's dy-
namics of economic change. The creation of knowledge, to draw Schum-
peter's parallels to Say, is accomplished by a philosopher. Workers exe-
cute the production process, which is the combination of natural agents 
and capital. The entrepreneur in Say's world takes the role of coordinat-
ing the entire production process. Schumpeter, however, discounted this 
function as the task of a pure manager but not of an entrepreneur. The 
entrepreneur is the one who carries out new combinations, he innovates. 
Other economic agents follow along the lines of the innovator, when they 
observe the successful diffusion process on the market side, and imitate the 
entrepreneur's actions. This way, swarms of innovations occur which lead 
to a boom till the economic system falls into recession inducing business 
cycles in the economic evolution.47 
The qualities of Schumpeter's entrepreneur: in conclusion to Schum-
peter's approach, the entrepreneur cannot be an optimally acting agent by 
definition. He destroys equilibrium, a superior, general state of optimality. 
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Moreover, all non-entrepreneurs cannot be of the kind of an Homo eco-
nomicus either, a perfect rational economic actor. This would not allow for 
entrepreneurial behavior. 
Schumpeter's methodological approach to the entrepreneur clearly ad-
vocates the necessity of a dynamic element in a de facto continuously 
changing economy. Equally, it is plausible to attribute such an element 
to a certain type of actor in economy. Without economic actors there is 
no economic world. Unfortunately, Schumpeter offered only a descriptive 
and intangible version of his entrepreneur, which is still difficult to detect 
in economy. 
In summary, Schumpeter's entrepreneur was developed straight out of 
his reflections on economic change. The entrepreneur symbolized the dy-
namic element in economy. The entrepreneur was a leader. There might 
be many who know about economic opportunities but there are only few 
who are willing to do the thing, some who show leadership48 and carry out 
new combinations. "It is therefore, more by will than by intellect that the 
leaders fulfil their function, more by 'authority,' 'personal weight,' and so 
forth than by original ideas. "49 He is someone special who has the ability 
and the strength to break through traditional structures and challenge the 
accepted way of doing things. Schumpeter's heroic entrepreneur thus par-
allels what Weber described a charismatic leader. 50 The entrepreneur is 
neither an economic man who simply weighs marginal cost and benefits to 
perform efficiently, nor a pure hedonist; he rather has 
( ... ) the dream and the will to found a private kingdom, usu-
ally, though not necessarily, also a dynasty. ( ... ) Then there 
is the will to conquer: the impulse to fight, to prove oneself 
superior to others, to succeed for the sake, not of the fruits of 
success, but of success itself. ( ... ) Finally, there is the joy of 
creating, of getting things done, or simply of exercising one's 
energy and ingenuity. 51 
Schumpeter clearly criticizes the concept of a Homo economicus and 
asks for an altered methodological approach to substantiate the entrepre-
neur. 
Notes 
1Compare Jevons (1871). 
2Compare Menger (1968). 
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3From a philosophical perspective, this introduces constructivism into economic theory. 
4In order this proposition to hold, a true objective value of resources has to exist. 
5Menger (1968, p. 53). 
6Menger (1968, p. 51). 
7Menger opposed the radical empiristic procedure of the German Historical School, which 
denied any economic law to be deducible by pure analytical reasoning so that the last re-
sort has to be "looking at the data" and by means of induction develop a comprehensive 
theory of economic phenomena in historic time (this describes the so-called "Methoden-
streit" in those days). Menger made a step towards a "rational" world saying that there has 
to be some general laws because everything "( ... ) is subject to the law of cause and ef-
fect" (Menger (1968, p. 51)). This has become a paradigmatic assumption of the Austrian 
School. Human action only makes sense if there are causal links in economy. This has 
become known as the praxeological approach coined by Ludwig von Mises. Se I gin (200 I, 
p. 21) puts forward: "Praxeology represents an attempt to escape the nihilistic implications 
of both historicism and empiricism. It affirms the operation of inviolable laws within the 
realm of human action. It purports to establish the universal validity of these laws by de-
ducing them from the allegedly incontestable truth that people act purposefully, the axiom 
of action." 
8See Menger (1968), Perlman and Mccann (1998, p. 420). 
9Hebert and Link (1982) come to an opposite interpretation of Menger's entrepreneur. 
'°Wieser (1927, p. 324). 
11 See Kastrop (1993, p. 196). 
12By and large, praxeology comes close to the Cartesian rationale: "/ think, therefore I am, 
was so certain and so evident that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics 
were not capable of shaking it( ... )", (Descartes (1637, p. 53)). 
13 von Mises (1962, p. 73). 
14von Mises (1959, p. 66). 
15 von Mises (1959, pp. 252-254). 
16Compare Hebert and Link (1982, p. 84). 
17See Davenport (1914). 
18To be discussed later in this section. 
19See Knight (1921). 
20Knight (1921, p. 268). 
21 Knight (1921, p. 269). 
22see Knight (1921, p. 271). 
23 compare Knight (1921). 
24Compare Kirzner (1973). 
25compare Kirzner (1999). 
26 See Kirzner (1973, p. 6). 
27 Kirzner (1999, p. 33). 
28 Kirzner (1999, p. 172). 
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29Kirzner (1999, p. 146). 
30Kirzner (1999, p. 169). 
31 Kirzner (1999, p. 169). 
32Kirzner (1999, p. 169). 
33see Kirzner (1999, p. 130). 
34see Kirzner (1999, p. 149). 
35 Kirzner (1973, p. 48). 
36See Kirzner (1999, p. 171). 
37Kirzner (1990). 
38see previous section. 
39Figure 3.1 has become a standard textbook diagram. See e.g Barreto (1989, p. 25). 
40This illustrates also Menger's concept of subjective value, Mises implicit idea of "human 
action" and Kirzner's idea that an individual's human action is equilibrating. The individual 
draws utility from the consumption of pastry; that is, he is not hungry anymore. This 
attaches a subjective value to a piece of pastry. Since there are no other consumers there is 
no market and therefore there is no need for money and prices do not exist. The consumer 
has a need, knows the "thing" that satisfies this need, he has the knowledge how to produce 
this "thing", he is willing to act and he, last but not least, has the required property rights. 
Finally as his needs are satisfied, the individual is in equilibrium. 
41 Schumpeter (1934, chap. 1). 
42Barreto (1989, p. 26). 
43Schumpeter (1934, p. 64). 
44Schumpeter (1934, p. 66). 
45Schumpeter (1934, p. 75 ). 
46Compare with figure 2.1. 
47Schumpeter (1939a). 
48Compare also Schumpeter (1939b, pp. 102). 
49Schumpeter (1934, p. 88). 
50see Weber (1965) in detail. 
51 Schumpeter (1934, p. 93). 
4 Synthesis and Summary 
In this part, a threefold analysis of the existing literature on 
entrepreneurship has been undertaken. 
Chapter 1 sketches the multitude of ideas from the early 18th century 
to the 1870s. It exposes the roots of entrepreneurship research as well 
as attempts a categorization of strands of thoughts. The beginning was set 
with Cantillon 1 who had provided a basic scaffolding to be expanded by his 
successors: Quesnay incorporated the role of capital which was elaborated 
further by Turgot. Baudeau added innovation. Say rounded off the French 
School contributing not only to a distinct theory of the entrepreneur in 
economy but, moreover, delivered a platform for upcoming economists to 
shape a clear-cut, consistent and stringent theory of economics. 
Classical economists were put aside a bit. This should not reduce the 
seminal insights they generated in economics but in terms of the theoret-
ical treatment of the entrepreneur most had already been discussed by the 
French tradition. 
The German Classics and the German Historic School also touched the 
topic of the entrepreneur, whereas the latter rather stirred up the Method-
enstreit than focused on the entrepreneur. 
Chapter 2 shows the advent of the Neoclassical era, when we experi-
enced a unique convergence in economic thinking which has led to what 
we nowadays call standard textbook economics. It has more and more 
submitted itself to a compelling, mathematical elegance and a convincing 
methodology. But, as a by-product, the entrepreneur had to be sacrificed. 
Chapter 3 contains heterodox approaches which are associated with the 
Austrian School, if such kind of distinction is legitimate at all.2 Menger, 
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Mises, Bohm-Bawerk, Hayek, among others, refined the critique upon 
the neoclassical paradigm and, thus, supplied the foundation for other 
economists to build their theoretical framework on, which emphasized 
the importance of entrepreneurs in economy. Davenport, an American 
(Austrian-type) economist, even tried to make economics a theory of en-
trepreneurship. 
The most promising and comprehensive concepts of the entrepreneur 
were picked out and shown in detail: most notably, Schumpeter and Kirzner 
but also Knight, developed explicit theories of entrepreneurship. They all 
started from the critique on orthodox theory emphasizing different aspects: 
Kirzner stressed the market process and alertness, Knight focused on un-
certainty and knowledge, Schumpeter discussed economic change, inno-
vation and, in particular, methodology. Knight made uncertainty the pivot 
of entrepreneurship. Concerning Schumpeter and Kirzner, there is a long-
lasting debate about what the significant difference between these two con-
cepts is, as Schumpeter's and Kirzner's entrepreneurs seem to look alike. 
Kirzner ( 1999) himself undertook the venture to clarify this distinction. He 
asserts that the psychological profile of Schumpeter's entrepreneur is valid 
and so is the idea of the entrepreneur as a creative destructor. But the en-
trepreneurial function in the real economic world is being alert to market 
opportunities. A personal psychological profile might be helpful for en-
trepreneurial actions; furthermore, entrepreneurial actions might be disrup-
tive to existing structures. But only if an economic actor passively learns 
about an opportunity, only if he is alert, can he unfold his qualities of lead-
ership and bring along the destruction of existing structures. To Kirzner, 
such a pre-existing structure cannot be a state of equilibrium; since any 
innovation creates a state of higher efficiency compared to the one before. 
By definition, equilibrium is a state of efficiency and a state preceding a 
state of "higher efficiency"3; therefore it cannot be a state of equilibrium.4 
Let the reader's taste make the decision whether this distinction between an 
equilibrium-disturbing and an equilibrium-creating entrepreneur provides 
further insights into entrepreneurship. 5 
Much more importantly, the Schumpeter-Kirzner discussion address-
es methodology. Besides the intuition. about entrepreneurship which had 
already been articulated by the French tradition and even mentioned in 
neoclassical theories, 6 theoretical work always comes to a halt at method-
ological issues. The question is which methodological approach to choose 
in order to gain further insights in entrepreneurship research. The domi-
nant paradigm is the neoclassical methodology; but as we saw, there are 
two extreme views on that, the one saying that equilibrium theory does not 
allow for entrepreneurs, the other saying that entrepreneurs do not allow 
for equilibrium. The first basically reflects the symptomatic nihilism of 
neoclassical methodology towards the entrepreneur. The second reflects 
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Schumpeter's vision of the entrepreneur as an innovator, which suggests 
a heterodox approach to certain phenomena such as entrepreneurship and 
therefore does not allow equilibrium analysis. Kirzner tries to reconcile 
these two extreme views by taking into account the critique on neoclassi-
cal methodology. 
Concerning the intention to investigate the entrepreneur the first option 
of methodology, which is equilibrium analysis, turns out to be inadequate, 
since the entrepreneur is believed to be an important figure in economy and 
therefore should also be an important figure in economics. Kirzner's inter-
mediate position suggests disequilibrium analysis, whereby he primarily 
focuses on the market process rather than discussing methodology beyond 
the Austrian background he refers to. Schumpeter advocates and explicitly 
searches for a heterodox methodology and this makes him a prominent fig-
ure in heterodox economics. He showed that to investigate the entrepreneur 
means also to investigate methodology. He portrayed the interdependence 
between assumptions, modelling and methodology exemplifying the en-
trepreneur. Methodology is essential to model economic phenomena and 
modelling requires assumptions upon real-world phenomena. When we 
reject a model we might be able to retain a model's explanatory power 
by rearranging the underlying assumptions. In case, however, such rear-
rangements impinge on methodological constraints, we additionally have 
to question methodology. The Schumpeterian entrepreneur embodies the 
question of methodology. Unfortunately, Schumpeter did not couch in 
terms how such methodology looks like. Nonetheless, Schumpeter was 
one of the first to give guidance towards evolutionary economics. 
In the next chapter a metatheoretical reflection is undertaken to find out 
fundamental aspects of a heterodox approach that allows to investigate en-
trepreneurial behavior. 
Notes 
1To set the beginning with Cantillon is common in economic literature, as he obviously 
introduced the entrepreneur to economics. With respect to the intellectual roots of en-
trepreneurship, it seems to be arbitrary, since many others before Cantillon, such as philoso-
phers, dealt with such sort of phenomenon. Nevertheless, for the sake of this economic 
analysis it suffices to start at that point of history. 
2Doing this, it has also become more difficult to sustain a distinct classification of economic 
schools of thought. The French School, the Classical School and the Austrian School 
contributed to neoclassical theory. The confusing part of the story might be, for example, 
Carl Menger, who is called the founder of the Austrian School, on the one hand, and, on 
the other, he is also one of the designated fathers of the Neoclassical School. Besides, the 
American tradition is strongly aligned to the Austrian tradition. There are further examples 
that seem to contradict to such classification of economic schools as it is undertaken in 
figure 1.1. For a better understanding, however, it appears to be profitable. 
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3The term "higher efficiency" is put in quotation marks because by nature the definition of 
efficiency there is no comparative. This leads us to the discussion of static and dynamic 
efficiency which will not be led in this context. 
4Kirzner (1999). 
5 As a matter of perspective, if we allow to think of the alertness to market opportunities 
and the agent's implied human action as being a part of innovativeness - neglecting the 
question whether a state of equilibrium in a dynamic economic world will ever be reached 
before another dynamic entrepreneur comes along to prevent economy from equilibrium 
- it would leave us with the center-piece of the Schumpeterian dynamics of economic 
change, i.e. the entrepreneur. 
6Walras, for example, also emphasized the importance of the entrepreneur in real econ-
omy but he suggested, for intellectual reasons, that it would be legitimate to start right 
after all adjustment processes which eventually lead to equilibrium, which means that all 
entrepreneurial actions have already been completed. Compare e.g. Biirgermeister (1994). 
Part II 
From the Evolution of Economics 
to the Economics of Evolution 

5 Evolutionary Economics 
5.1 Introduction 
Part I illustrated both the intuition on entrepreneurial behavior as well as 
the overwhelming influence of methodology on economic thinking. The 
role of entrepreneurs in economy has always been recognized among eco-
nomists. Nevertheless, in economic theory, the entrepreneur has gradually 
been buried in oblivion during the accession of a more and more domi-
nant neoclassical paradigm. It is not surprising that neoclassical theory 
has become the paradigm of orthodox economics, as it is hard to escape 
the fascination of its clear-cut methodology, a methodology that renders 
invulnerable consistency by means of its mathematical formulation. The 
elegance of its formal treatment and the rigor in its reasoning elucidates 
tremendously the complexity of economic phenomena - and also offers 
the unambiguity of a deterministic world. The concessions to be made 
show up in the set of assumptions required by neoclassical methodology, 
concessions at the cost of the entrepreneur. The postulate of perfect ratio-
nality, including complete information and foresight, thereby is the most 
doubtful core assumption in such a framework. 1 Contrarily, if we relax 
the assumption of perfect rationality, we move towards a non-teleological 
framework, a world of arbitrariness, which seems to disallow any general 
propositions about economic behavior. The challenging venture to face 
such neoclassical shortcomings led to a movement amongst economists, 
which has become known as evolutionary economics. 2 To develop a pos-
sible evolutionary setting, the next section on the philosophy of science 
will sketch both the evolution of economic theory and the corollary of evo-
lutionary theory as its necessary and logical endorsement, contrasting the 
neoclassical paradigm, in order to overcome some neoclassical shortcom-
ings. 
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5.2 Economics and Philosophy of Science -
Parallels and Prospects 
Economics has its origin in philosophy and, in its nature, still is philos-
ophy3; and as much as philosophy has been searching for a better un-
derstanding of mankind in general, economics has been trying to inves-
tigate the human being in his economic environment, and how he manages 
to cope with scarce resources and uncertainty. The path of philosophy 
was influenced by several scientific revelations that gradually tore religious 
mythology, as a metaphorical answer to the ends of human existence and 
the existence of god, from its pedestal and fuelled even more the scientific 
thirst for knowledge.4 Thereby, natural sciences influenced philosophy, 
philosophy influenced economics, economics influenced biology and vice 
versa. The more insights gained, the more mankind thought to come closer 
to a complete understanding of the functioning of the world. Figure 5.1 is 
meant to summarize the parallels and cross-fertilization effects of various 
disciplines. Such a short inquiry can never be complete nor start at the 
ultimate origin. For the purpose here, suffice it to start as follows: 
Rationalism vs. empiricism, a reconciliation and the persistence 
of the Newtonian world 
Descartes (1596- 1650) was the first philosopher who refrained from the 
clerical dominance and advocated to trust one's own rationality and thus 
introduced rationalism. His attempt was to develop a system of thoughts on 
mathematical grounds, giving a precise and complete account of all natural 
phenomena, reduced to their gist, with absolute mathematical certainty. 
The Physiocrats, as discussed in section 1.2, complied to the implications 
of a Cartesian5 system as well as, a century later, classical economists such 
as Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, etc. tried in vain to construct a coherent and 
consistent economic theory in the realm of the Cartesian construct. 
A full mathematical account of nature was developed by Newton; his 
mechanics became the "obstetrician" of the neoclassical paradigm. New-
ton gave the Cartesian world a mathematical formulation and it was only a 
matter of time until Newtonian mechanics became the heart of neoclassi-
cal methodology, although some necessary assumptions had to be accepted 
implicitly: every agent has to have full understanding of cause and effect; 
every agent necessarily has to own the innate capacity to access substan-
tial reality all alone by cognition, so that aim-oriented behavior renders 
optimality. 
In the 17th century, however, British philosophers rejected the idea that 
mankind could access reality solely by rational reasoning as suggested by 
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Figure 5.1: An overview of the philosophy of science. 
52 Evolutionary Economics 
mathematics. John Locke (1632 - 1704) objected to the proposition of 
god-given, logical principles and moral norms; instead, he saw human con-
sciousness as a tabula rasa that generates ideas by experience which lead 
to further ideas by reflection. 6 
Besides the methodological question of epistemology in general, this 
view had also some implications for theorizing on human behavior in par-
ticular. Rational agents act best to their knowledge. For Locke, knowl-
edge is a sensation which an individual experiences within himself. Con-
sequently, the question arises whether there is an outside reality that corre-
sponds to the individual's internal representation and whether that reality 
can actually be known by the individual. To his mind, the individual's sub-
jective and internal representation is at least supported by the existence of 
substance and causality. From an epistemological point of view, this con-
cept advocates empirical investigation. Concerning human behavior, as 
knowledge is subjective, the predictability of human behavior is restricted. 
Empiricism, as this strand of philosophy is called, was taken to an ex-
treme by David Hume (1711-1776) who disconnected factual reality 
from human cognition. He altered Locke's concept by denying the ex-
istence of substance and axiomatic causality.7 It is habit that makes in-
dividuals believe that repetitively perceived connections represent reality 
and therefore suggest generally valid causalities. In other words, as long 
as we observe a certain connection between two "things", we think that it 
must be the objective truth. According to Hume, this conclusion cannot be 
drawn. Know ledge is based on experience and experience does not imply 
that a subjective view (i.e. knowledge) will be confirmed in the future and 
therefore has no ontological foundation. 8 
In economics, again with a bit of a time lag, it was the German Histor-
ical School which took a positivist position. It denied a priori knowledge 
and the knowledge of general axioms. Empiricism would be the key to 
access the real world,9 hence, knowledge and (economic) behavior would 
be the result of experience, and thus doubt was cast on the neoclassical 
rationality postulate. 
Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) formulated a synthesis of both views, 
empiricism and rationalism. On the one hand, he vehemently criticized 
empiricism that denies the possibility of axiomatic knowledge. On the 
other hand, he contrasted a dogmatic view of rationalism: in the 18th 
century, Kant showed that self-organization of living organisms cannot 
be explained by a Newtonian mechanical system. There are analytical 
judgements which are true a priori.10 All other judgements are synthetic 
ones; they ask for empirical validation. 11 Kant's critical rationalism 12 was 
worked out by Georg W. F. Hegel (1770- 1831), saying that the evo-
lution of human mankind is determined by a dialectic process, thesis and 
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antithesis, which leads to a synthesis, and therefore to a progress to a higher 
predetermined level called idealism. 13 
At the end of the 19th century, these two extreme philosophical views, 
rationalism versus radical, empirical sceptism, were also the subject matter 
of the so-called Methodenstreit in economics. The alterer Methodenstreit 
was a discussion about which method to prefer, induction versus deduc-
tion. The jiingerer Methodenstreit was about to what extent economics 
can give normative propositions at all. 14 One of those discussants was 
Menger, the founder of the Austrian school, who supported deduction. He 
inaugurated the marginal school and thus contributed to the neoclassical 
paradigm. But in the course of time, neoclassics and the Austrian tradition 
took a divergent path: 15 Both views are definitely Cartesian in a sense that 
they stipulate, from a epistemological perspective, the validity of known 
causes and effects; but they are different with respect to the following: the 
neoclassical school has remained Newtonian, whereas the Austrian school 
has taken into account the Kantian critique on Newtonian mechanics. 16 
Determinism versus Indeterminism Despite the common base of 
neoclassical and Austrian-type economics, the neoclassical school has won 
the race. The reason seems to be straightforward, since neoclassical method-
ology itself is straightforward. It is reductionist and simple because it is 
deterministic. It is linear but not complex; unequivocal, normative though 
not open; all in all, it is idealistic and pragmatic, so that it had to become 
orthodoxy in economics. As figure 5.1 shows, determinism is prevailing 
as an implicit assumption in all sciences. This is not surprising, since de-
terminism is a necessary condition, a prerequisite for guided research to 
come up with generally valid propositions. Up to that point in time, espe-
cially the findings in natural sciences seemed promising enough to come 
closer and closer to a comprehensive understanding of the world in its 
very nature. However, with Albert Einstein, who refrained from absolute 
propositions by introducing his relativity theory, the edifice of a determin-
istic world gradually crumbled. Einstein also inspired Karl Popper, who 
took up on the Humian idea that the objectivity of normative propositions 
does not have an ontological foundation. Popper sustained that the mental 
representation of reality is subjective and it will hardly ever be possible 
to verify such general propositions. All that any science can do is to de-
duce falsifiable hypotheses. Thereby, the refutation of those hypotheses is 
the principle task of scientists. Hypotheses which could not be falsified 
for a long time he calls corroborated but not necessarily true. Progress in 
science is achieved when long-term hypotheses could finally be rejected 
as Einstein's relativity theory rejected Newtonian physics, so that new hy-
potheses can be formed. Popper objects to rationalism as well as empiri-
cism.17 The influence of his fallibilism on economics is self-explanatory as 
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Popper's work is part of any introductory course in economics. He put the 
possibility to derive generally valid propositions into perspective so that 
the necessity to forebear indeterminism became more and more obvious. 
Philosophy mirrors the linkage of all sciences. The findings in natural 
sciences, especially physics, motivated philosophy to find adequate an-
swers. Once a philosophical framework had been constructed, social sci-
ences fancied those ideas and adopted them for its own purpose. The suc-
cess of neoclassical economics was stimulated by the findings in natural 
sciences at the end of the 19th century. When we indulge in the tempting 
fallacy, according to Hume, and let the habit of repetitively experienced 
sensations make us believe that this causality continues and the philosoph-
ical implications of modem natural sciences might again stimulate eco-
nomic theorizing, then it seems straightforward to look at new findings 
and developments in modem philosophy in order to anticipate the future 
path of economics. 
The most challenging observations of the 20th century were made in 
physics, observations that subsequently raised some major questions in 
philosophy. It is talked about as a new paradigm that turns classical physics 
upside down, a paradigm that makes the world indeterministic. Unfortu-
nately, this new paradigm is an accumulation of endless questions rather 
than an offer of an alternative toolbox for heterodox (evolutionary) eco-
nomics. Nevertheless, it might give us some useful hints for economic 
modelling. It is quantum theory that casts doubt on established epistemo-
logical and metaphysical concepts and clearly rejects determinism. It is 
not necessary to undergo the entire analysis of quantum physics for the 
purpose of this work, but it will make things easier to comprehend, there-
fore an intuitive explanation of the quantum theory is given in the appendix 
A. Although, the quantum theory has not yet provided a comprehensive ex-
planation for its puzzling insights, it offers some implications that has to 
be taken into account in evolutionary economic theory. 
Quantum theory brings in subjectivity. It stresses the role of the in-
vestigator of a subject matter. The observer does not simply perceive a 
certain scenario but causes a reciprocity between the macroscopic envi-
ronment (the observer and its methodological procedure) and the subject 
matter under investigation. Henceforth, the investigator partly plays the 
role of a creator so that reality becomes the intermingling result of "ob-
jective" perception and subjective cognition. Thus, natural and social sci-
ences18 are elevated onto a common denominator. The laws of nature, 
gained via experimental physics, all of a sudden become axiomatic as-
sumptions - concessions social sciences had to struggle with ever since. 
Similarly, quantum physics addresses the locality of phenomena, which 
contextually react within a certain method of observation, and at the same 
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time it allows the recognition of non-local, macroscopic phenomena tran-
scendent to time and sf ace. That is what the idea of the superposition (par-
ticle/wave) suggests. 1 Furthermore, the idea of superposition suggests, 
contrarily to Newtonian mechanics, that we do not have a complete set of 
particles and properties but that we do have a set of possible properties 
of which some will never come into existence, such as the simultaneous 
observation of the location and velocity of a particle;20 the existence of 
different sets of possible properties is complementary, a once observed 
definite state of a property does not necessarily imply that it will show the 
same property again in future. The future is indeterministic and unpre-
dictable but open for creativity and novelty. We are situated in a proba-
bilistic world in which we observe random behavior on a micro level and 
apparently quasi-deterministic behavior on a macro level. In other words, 
the whole is not just the sum of its parts but it is more as we observe sym-
metry breaking. It is a dynamic, unstable system which is governed by the 
non-linearity of a complex world. 
Quantum theory questions traditional methodology in physics as much 
as evolutionary economics questions orthodox economic methodology. In 
the following section, the parallels in economics are elaborated further. 
Hereby the term evolutionary economics is referred to. Eventually a syn-
thesis in chapter 6 will merge implications of quantum theory with a sound 
evolutionary setting to model entrepreneurial behavior. 
5.3 The Mystery/Misery of Evolutionary 
Economics 
The closer we get to the intellectual frontier of contemporary heterodox 
economics, the more elusive the path of economics gets. We started out 
our journey through the history of economics with the phenomenon of en-
trepreneurship in economic theory. We realized that this issue is not only 
a question of the analysis of the entrepreneur in particular, but also the 
question of economic methodology in general. Furthermore, we saw the 
evolution of philosophy and its delayed impact on economics until we ar-
rived in the 20th century. The more insights we gained along that path, 
the more questions emerged. If we really intend to answer those ques-
tions and if we do not want to run the risk of rephrasing old stories of 
economics over and over again, we need to change our way of thinking. 
This is easier said than done. Criticizing neoclassical theory turns out to 
be a simple task: we just discuss the framework of assumptions and subse-
quently question methodology. To come up with a constructive alternative 
approach, however, proves to be a complicated challenge. No wonder that 
heterodox approaches are manifold; the term evolutionary economics has 
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become popular in use and comes closest to a generic term of heterodox 
economics, but it seems to be impossible to give an exact definition ad-
equate to subsume the common imagination of all economists using this 
term. 
Over and over again, the evolutionary metaphor is mentioned in eco-
nomic literature. Alfred Marshall, a dyed-in-the-wool neoclassical econ-
omist himself, puts forward such an alternative approach, addressing the 
deficiencies of neoclassical mechanisms: 
The Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology rather 
than in economic dynamics. But biological conceptions are 
more complex than those of mechanics; a volume on founda-
tions must therefore give a relatively large place to mechan-
ical analogies; and frequent use is made of the term "equi-
librium, " which suggests something of statical analogy. This 
fact, combined with the predominant attention paid in the present 
volume to the normal conditions of life in the modem age, has 
suggested the notion that its central idea is "statical, " rather 
than "dynamical. " But in fact it is concerned throughout with 
the forces that cause movement: and its key-note is that of 
dynamics, rather than statics. 21 
Besides Marshall, many other economists came across the term 'evolu-
tionary' .22 Veblen (1898) discussed the evolutionary metaphor, whereas he 
linked this term to institutionalism. 23 The Austrian School is considered to 
be evolutionary, whereupon - most adjacently - the biological connotation 
served as an analogy.24 Schumpeter emphasized the necessity to take into 
account evolutionary aspects in economic theorizing but contrarily rejected 
the biological concept. 25 
Each of these strands of thought would assert to be disjunct from each 
other but, at the same time, claim to be evolutionary. Hodgson (2000) 
undertakes a detailed survey about evolutionary theory with the resulting 
resignation that 
( ... ) the word 'evolutionary' is extremely vague. It is now 
widely used, even by economists using neoclassical techniques. 
"Evolutionary game theory" is highly fashionable. Even Wal-
ras is described as an evolutionary economist (Jolink ( 1996)). 
( ... ) In precise terms it signifies little or nothing. 26 
Conclusively, the definition of evolutionary economics is reduced to an 
undeterminable complement of orthodox neoclassical theory. So it is not 
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surprising that there is no consistent way of doing evolutionary econom-
ics. Their common feature is the critique on neoclassical theory and the 
consequential intention to do things differently. 
In chapter 2 we saw how the neoclassical edifice has been built, how 
the perfect rationality postulate became the foundation of the assumptional 
scaffolding on which its methodology spans. The path of criticism sketches 
forward. When we relax the rationality postulate, saying that actors neither 
have perfect information/foresight nor perfect capabilities we end up with 
bounded rationality. 27 Removing the foundation, we have to disassemble 
the scaffolding of the remaining assumptions and henceforth question the 
formal Newtonian methodology. Perfect rationalii made it possible to 
assume optimal behavior denying true uncertainty. 8 Any contingencies 
the future might bring are parameterizable with probabilities in order to 
calculate expected values so that at least a breeze of indeterminism can 
be integrated into a de facto deterministic world. Determinism, however, 
requires completeness. All elements and connections within the economic 
system have to be known, but completeness simultaneously means a closed 
system which allows for a general equilibrium. Thus, Newtonian mechan-
ics is legitimized in methodology to render the idea of predictability via 
normative theories. It is self-explanatory to call this concept static, leaving 
no space for creativity and novelty, no possibility for change, and therefore 
no right to exist for the entrepreneur. 
With bounded rationality, however, the argumentation looks different. 
With bounded rationality, we end up with imperfect economic actors, ac-
tors without perfect information, foresight and capabilities. Thus we allow 
for true uncertainty but lose - at least to some extent - predictability of 
economic behavior, since we get in addition heterogeneous actors.29 In-
stead of having perfect rational actors, who are no different from each 
other, they are not homogeneous. Since there is no definite state of im-
perfection, imperfect actors have to be heterogeneous in their specificities. 
Actors are not able to optimize any longer, they might not even be able to 
determine an optimal path ex post; they have to evaluate their actions them-
selves to eventually reach a state of satisfaction. Obviously, this makes the 
framework of assumptions rather realistic but also the economic system 
indeterminate and unpredictable. In such a system there is room for nov-
elty. It is not an Homo economicus acting in a completely transparent and 
closed system but it is a passionate, lively human being that has the option 
to discover novelties in "( ... ) an economic universe that is fundamentally 
open-ended in its possibilities( ... ). 1130 It is open to creativity. The latter 
also shows up in the different perspectives of heterodox (evolutionary) ap-
proaches. Again, the common denominator of heterodox economics is the 
critique on neoclassical assumptions. Unfortunately, criticism alone does 
not automatically provide for an adequate methodology. Institutionalism, 
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Neo-Schumpeterian economics, the biological metaphor, etc. paraphrase 
the trial-and-error process in economic theory to eventually find an alterna-
tive heterodox approach, an approach different to the neoclassical one but 
as specific as the neoclassical paradigm. Followers of Veblen31 tie their 
evolutionary framework to an institutional context. Schumpeter's concep-
tion is associated with innovation. 32 When using a biological metaphor, it 
referred to the Darwinian/Lamarckian evolutionary biology, 33 whereby it 
is not yet clear to which extent such an analogy is useful to explain human 
economic behavior. 34 In other words, it still has to be managed to develop 
a standardizing body in methodology to flesh out the term 'evolutionary' 
with a consolidated economic (evolutionary) paradigm.35 
As far as one can say, despite the detours and turnarounds in evolu-
tionary economics, the common found of evolutionary thinking looks as 
follows: Evolutionary economics 6 refers to a theory 
• that is based on heterogeneity,37 which is 
• transformed via a dynamic process, i.e. a coordinating, selective 
process into a 
• pattern of economic change;38 
• takes into account historic time and irreversibility of economic de-
velopment, and 
• allows for novelty.39 
Up to this point, the paradigm of evolutionary economics and its diffi-
culties in practice have been addressed. Next, a synthesis between the im-
plications of quantum mechanics and some basic evolutionary principles is 
undertaken, to develop the methodological setting for the entrepreneurship 
model which will finally be constructed in this work. 
Notes 
1 See chapter 1 for a detailed discussion of neoclassical assumptions and their contradiction 
to an entrepreneur in such theory. 
2Evolutionary economics has become a popular term in economic theory. But as we will 
see later on, this term has probably become the most unlucky choice to subsume the need 
for heterodoxy in economics. It has a lot of different connotations. In this work it is used 
as a collective term for heterodox economics. 
3There are many parallels between economics and philosophy and it is impossible to disen-
tangle the mutual fertilization of these two disciplines. To mention one obvious parallel, 
Evolutionary Economics 59 
we can detect this linkage in utilitarism. It was Jeremy Bentham (1789) who initiated utili-
tarism in economics. Individuals' actions are driven by pain and pleasure, a concept Hume 
had already worked on. John Stuart Mill (1962) refined and expanded Bentham's ideas. 
Till the beginning of the marginal school, and along with Jevons, Walras and Menger, all 
nuances of utility and its importance for economic behavior had been discussed in detail. 
See section 5.2. 
4 As an example, Kopernikus dislocated mankind out of the middle of the universe. Dar-
win sensed the human species as a random product of evolution. Freud imputed human 
self-determination with a sexual motivation. And many more scientific disclosures spurred 
philosophy, spurred the human need to discover the truth about the existence of human 
mankind. The search for a better understanding of the world, the search for general propo-
sitions, for principles, for axioms that could be based on absolute certainty. 
5See Mainzer (1996b, p. 248). 
6compare Locke (1690). 
7He distinguished impressions from ideas. The former were the direct sensual perceptions, 
the latter the individuals cognitive representation. Conclusively, every mental connection 
of ideas, an individual makes, is a subjective, mental construct. Compare Hume (1748). 
8This extreme negation of an objective reality and the concept of subjectivism is also re-
ferred to as radical constructivism. 
9Realism suggests that reality exists independent of human consciousness and perception. 
10For example, to deny the proposition "It is raining or it is not" would be a contradiction in 
itself. Hence, this statement is analytically true. 
11The fact that water boils at 100 degrees centigrade cannot be proved analytically, but by 
empirical investigation. 
12Compare Kant (1884). 
13Compare Hegel (1996). 
14Tois would come close to the sceptical empiricism of Hume. See Kolb (1991, p. 15) 
15See chapter 3 to make this comparison. 
16In figure 5.1 the Austrian school is subsumed under the term "evolutionary economics". 
17Compare Popper (1959). 
18Compare Penrose (1990) and Zohar (1990) 
19See appendix A. 
201n physics this is referred to as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. 
21 Marshall (1948, p. 19). 
22See for example Dosi (1991, p. 5), Hodgson (1998, p. 160) or Foster and Stanley (2001). 
23 Also the work that relates to institutionalism is associated with evolutionary economics. 
See for example Hodgson (1995b, p. xv). 
24Menger and Hayek introduced many biological terms into their work. See Hodgson ( 1998, 
p. 160). And still, the biological metaphor very often serves modern evolutionary thinking. 
See also Nelson and Winter (1982) and Foster and Stanley (2001). 
25Compare Hanusch (1988), Shionoya (1998, p. 437) among others. 
26Hodgson (2000). 
27Compare Simon and Egidi (1992). 
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28compare Knight (1921). 
29This illustrates most obviously the closeness to the biological metaphor entering the eco-
nomic discussion, concerning heterogeneity, variety, population thinking, etc. See for ex-
ample Hirschleifer (1982). 
3°Foss (1994, p. 22). 
31 See Dopfer (1986a), Dopfer (1986b) and De Bresson (1987). 
32See Hanusch (1988). 
33compare figure 5.1 on page 51. 
34See Caplan (1978), Coming (1996), Wilson (1998), Hodgson (1995a), Hodgson (2002) for 
further exemplary attempts and thoughts on biology and economics. 
35Dopfer (2001) gives a collection of seminal contributions towards this attempt. 
36For a succinct setting of an evolutionary theory, see for example Nelson (1995). 
37Metcalfe (1994a), Metcalfe (1994b), Metcalfe, Fonseca and Ramlogan (2000), Saviotti 
(1996), Cantner (1996) and Cantner and Hanusch (2001) stress the role of heterogeneity as 
the ultimate source of any evolutionary development. 
38See Metcalfe et al. (2000, p. 2). 
39Witt (1987, p. 9) may serve as one out of many possible references. 
6 Synthesis of Evolutionary Ideas 
6.1 Consolidating Thoughts 
What we learn from the history of economics, natural sciences 
and philosophy Summarizing the preceding elaborations, we detected 
parallels between philosophy, natural as well as social sciences (focusing 
on economics). All try to generate general propositions, or even better, 
stable and generally valid axioms about the subject matter under inves-
tigation. At the end of the 19th century, natural sciences seemed to be 
on the verge of a comprehensive description of a deterministic world.1 
Social sciences and in particular economics have always been struggling 
to model analogously a deterministic world; in economics the outcome 
has become known as neoclassical economics. The scope of experimen-
tal economics is fairly narrow; at the most, very specific micro-level, i.e. 
rather psychological/sociological phenomena are "testable" in laboratory-
like conditions. But they hardly ever deliver generally valid axioms as 
classical physics is suggesting. Social and in particular economic phe-
nomena seem to be no constant ones. The 20th century, however, turned 
classical physics upside down and henceforth physics was burdened by 
Hume's (philosophical) reservation, which social science has always been 
struggling with: ideas, generated by reflections on perceived impressions, 
are a mental construct of the observer and therefore partially an artefact. 
(Classical) physics, on the other hand, seemed to be able to make irrevo-
cable statements, i.e. axioms that picture a stable, linear and non-dynamic 
world. Quantum theory put experimental phenomena into the perspective 
of the observer, so that experimental results apparently become biased. 2 
Modern physics challenges modern philosophy and at the same time par-
allels modern (evolutionary) economics, which was outlined in chapter 5. 
The need for heterodoxy is obvious, but to be different and specific all at 
once turns out to be difficult. 
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The question now is, how to bring in line intuition, theory, empirical ob-
servations on a common methodological ground, thereby taking into ac-
count the work done so far, and not simply retelling but hopefully con-
tributing new aspects to the subject chosen for investigation. Against the 
background of the history of economic thought and the disillusioning reve-
lations in natural sciences subsuming the puzzling questions of epistemol-
ogy and ontology in philosophy, the attempt to come closer to a Cartesian 
(Newtonian) formulation of the world is becoming more and more elusive; 
a world of precise interdependencies and causalities to derive behavioral 
instructions for an ultimate convergence of intentional and actual outcomes 
of human behavior, can this be an accomplishable goal to pursue, or will it 
turn out to be a persistent fallacy of science? 
Do we have to assume a deterministic world, a world of rationalism so 
that we end up with a neoclassical paradigm and thus buy predictability 
(normative theory) at the cost of a doubtfully idealized world? Or do we 
have to do economics totally without a tiny bit of determinism so that we 
have to accept a nihilistic chaos of indeterminacy, which at best allows for 
a purely descriptive economic theory? Presumably, the answer must lie 
somewhere in between, but where? We definitely have to give up the gen-
eral claim for a normative theory until we find, if ever, the "real" underlying 
causalities that allow for such theory. Some normative theories function 
quite well in economic reality, so that there might be no need to change 
anything, whereas others, e.g. entrepreneurship theories, do not work at 
all in a normative framework. The search for the entrepreneur in econom-
ics seems to raise the same puzzling questions as quantum theory does in 
physics. We know that there is entrepreneurial behavior which brings along 
innovation and economic change. But when we look at the specificities of 
an idealized entrepreneur, we are not able to figure out his detailed pro-
file. There is an indeterminacy phenomenon similar to the particle-wave 
duality in quantum theory: we observe the light wave but cannot observe 
the photon's locality and impulse at the same time. Newtonian mechanics 
proves to be inadequate to cope such phenomenon and therefore asks for 
an alternative treatment. 
In the following, the attempt is made to give a convergence of the eclec-
tic ideas collected above in order to propose a possible approach. 
Although we have to give up traditional (neoclassical) methodology to 
model entrepreneurship, we can take the underlying intuition which is 
independent of methodology. The French and the Austrian school offer 
this option. A suitable methodology still has to be developed. Aspects and 
analogies to philosophy and natural sciences will inspire a first attempt 
towards an alternative approach which will be evolutionary. To prevent a 
possibly unfortunate interpretation of this "evolutionary concept", it has 
to be emphasized that in this work, although it refers to various kinds of 
Synthesis of Evolutionary Ideas 63 
analogies from all strands of science, the intention is to establish a concept, 
independent, and primarily, with a focus on the economic perspective and 
not with a bias to some analogy such as biology or - as some readers might 
think - quantum theory. Those analogies are helpful to get an idea but 
also run the risk to get overanalyzed, neglecting the focus on economic 
behavior performed by aim-oriented human beings. 
The first important question to answer is the question about the ontolog-
ical foundation of an evolutionary approach. The methodological reflec-
tions of Hermann-Pillath (2001) on neoclassical growth theory illustrates 
the necessary ontological foundation of such a concept: Any theory has to 
make a reference to reality.3 Considering growth theory Hermann-Pillath 
(2001) states: "The production function is the only statement with reference 
to reality. "4 Hence, any empirical evidence reduces to testing the validity of 
the production function itself. As we saw above, however, the production 
function is a mental construct, abstracted from the ontological assumption 
of perfect rational agents. Therefore, according to Hermann-Pillath (2001), 
this neglects the 
[h]uman mind[, which] must be an integral part of any on-
tology of economics. [Furthermore, ]( ... ) ontology entertains 
a reflective relationship with ontology. There is no way to 
pull the scientific observer out of the world. We will therefore 
speak of a 'bimodal reality' of mind and world and hence a 
'bimodal ontology' (compare Dopfer, 1990b). Mind is an el-
ement of the world but at the same time a mirror of the world 
guiding human action within the world, including the scien-
tific observer's action. 5 
A bimodal reality allows for a discrepancy between the agents' men-
tal representation of the world and reality, which necessarily incorporates 
bounded rationality, learning and the role of (fallible) knowledge into eco-
nomic theory.6 Consequently, evolutionary economics has to link the hu-
man mind with reality and, with it, integrate the fallibility of human think-
ing since the human mind takes a dual position is such world; an epistemo-
logical and an ontological one.7 Subsequently, the idea suggests itself that 
the intention in traditional economics to separate its theoretical foundation 
from other behavioral sciences, such as psychology, can no longer be main-
tained. The openness of the economic system is another consequence of a 
bimodal ontology, i.e. the fact of the human mind's fallibility. The men-
tal representation of reality may differ tremendously among individuals. 
There is a multitude of different possible states in human mind, states that 
one may call knowledge.8 Apart from ostensibly heterogeneous prefer-
ences of individuals, human behavior will differ solely because of these 
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different states of knowledge; we might even observe singularities in be-
havior, and, presupposing adaptive actors, also a change over time. Obvi-
ously, the basic evolutionary setting cannot be a closed Cartesian system, 
even less a Newtonian one. On the contrary, the world is not simply the 
sum of singularities, either. Theories about singular phenomena would 
be useless since they are impossible according to Aristotle. 9 In analogy 
to quantum theory, the singularity problem can be tolerated: the system 
duality, which is inherent to the superposition particle/wave, suggests 
a local contextual quasi-random behavior, which can be interpreted as a 
singularity, (Heisenberg's uncertainty principle) but on the other hand, it 
proposes also the existence of non-local phenomena, 10 which suggests the 
existence of general phenomena despite stochastically independent, local 
events. In economic terms: although micro behavior might be perceived 
as random, but independent, similar events (general phenomena) are ob-
served on a macro level. This advocates the connection between the micro 
and the meso/macro level. Besides, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle also 
stipulates symmetry breaking, since the transition from particle to wave 
apparently is not observable. Analogously in economics, ascending the 
aggregation level from the micro- to the macro-level we have to take into 
account symmetry breaking within economic behavior. An isolated hu-
man being acts in accordance with his psychology. Within the context of a 
social group, however, his behavior might change depending on the soci-
ology of the group. The environment of a firm might change his behavior 
even more when more and more compelling, formal institutions make him 
behave in a certain manner. Between each step we observe a symmetry 
breaking, which makes the aggregation from the micro to the macro level 
difficult. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the systematics. Heisenberg's uncertainty princi-
ple11 serves as an analogue to give economic thinking a different twist. 
Above, the heterogeneity of the human mind and consequently, the het-
erogeneity of human beings was stated. Some economic behaviors might 
be explicable to economists but some, and the decision to engage in en-
trepreneurial activity belongs to those, seem to be quasi-random phenom-
ena. 
Quasi-randomness means that there are determinants that support acer-
tain economic behavior, but we simply cannot figure out for example what 
exactly makes an entrepreneur. Therefore, looking at a specific individual 
a possible entrepreneurial decision is quasi random. Each individual has a 
certain propensity to become an entrepreneur, 12 but it is not a deterministic 
characteristic of the individual. It is a singular (local) phenomenon once 
an individual undertakes entrepreneurial actions. Apart from the individ-
ual's psychology (personality), the social context is a further determinant 
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The decisions an individual makes in isolation will differ from decisions 
made in a certain social context. This is what we call symmetry breaking. 
It is the sociology of a group that prohibits the conclusion from the indi-
vidual's behavior in isolation to the behavior of the entire social group.13 
It is not simply the sum of the parts that represents the whole. When we 
expand this thread, we detect another symmetry breaking towards the be-
havior within a firm, etc. Since the necessity of institutionalized behavior 
gets more and more compelling, actors' behavior will differ along this train 
of thoughts and the aggregation of individual behavior becomes more and 
more difficult when we do not want to neglect the fact of heterogeneous, 
local behavior and symmetry breaking. The latter makes one assume that 
we have to deal with a rather chaotic system. Empirical work, however, 
shows us that there must be some coordinating forces within the system. 
Though we observe local singularities, i.e. singular behavior of individu-
als, we observe a coordinated structure on a higher level, on a meso/macro 
level. 14 Somehow the heterogeneity transforms into a structure, into a non-
local, general phenomenon. 
Human behavior is neither deterministic nor completely chaotic. De-
spite the complexity of such a system, comprising heterogeneity and sym-
metry breaking, we have to assume causal behavior of rational agents al-
beit bounded rational ones. Some causalities might be obvious to the actor 
as well as the scientific observer, whereas others seem to be "non-causal" 
phenomena, which either denote quasi-random behavior under true uncer-
tainty, or simply the inaccessibility of individuals' internal motives to the 
observer. But there is guidance within the system. The fact of life is, and 
that is what economics is all about, that humankind has to deal with scarce 
resources and is burdened by uncertainty. The individual acts according to 
his knowledge, according to his belief of cause and effect, which need not 
reflect reality. Human behavior is subject to error, but it is aim-oriented 
though not deterministic as supposed by a perfect rationality postulate. 
Menger, among others, gave an implicit concept of an aim-oriented eco-
nomic action. His theory on value15 gives us the guide posts of economic 
behavior. The human beings' needs and their knowledge how to satisfy 
these needs, given a certain amount of owned resources, are the driving 
forces of human action. Knowledge, therefore, plays an important role; 
it contains a multitude of perspectives. As mentioned above, the bimodal 
reality introduces fallibility of behavior and the importance of the human' s 
capacity to learn, but knowledge is not only about technology, it is the in-
dividual's mental representation of reality and its functioning. Learning 
signifies the adaptation process in which the individual's mental represen-
tation of the world gets adjusted to reality. The individual learns about 
technology, but also about the economic behavior of others. Learning is 
a dynamic process, since economic behavior is an interactive and interde-
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pendent process among individuals. It is necessary for individuals to eval-
uate the potential behavior of others and thus the economic situation. For 
example, a potential entrepreneur has to evaluate whether there is a mar-
ket for the goods or services he wants to sell, whether he will stand future 
competition, whether there might be proper funding for his venture, etc.16 
So it is even more important to know the beliefs of others about reality than 
reality itself and to anticipate e.g. consumers' behavior. On account of the 
duality of human mind being an ontological element of the economic re-
ality as well as the epistemological instrument to access reality, the actor 
takes an ambiguous role. First, he observes past and present economic be-
havior and interprets it accordingly to adjust his actions. Second, he takes 
the chance to influence actual economic behavior with actions (e.g. actions 
of market-making). He influences the individuals' mental representation 
and thus influences their actions. Conclusively, he influences reality and, 
similar to quantum theory, the actor as an observer becomes a creator of 
(economic) reality. Furthermore, this reciprocity makes the consideration 
of feedback processes essential to any such theory. 
To sum up, because of local phenomena, heterogeneity and symmetry 
breaking, we have to deal with a probabilistic system. With the bimodal 
ontology of the human mind, the subsequent reciprocity asks for feedback 
processes within such theory; feedback processes between the observer 
and the observed, between local and non-local phenomena, between the 
meso/macro and the micro level, between the whole and the single ele-
ments of the system. As we cannot cover all causalities within a single 
theory - then, it would not be anymore a simple model but complex reality 
- we have to focus on a certain part such as the micro-level analyzing e.g. 
entrepreneurial behavior. Moreover, because of the reciprocity and feed-
back effects we cannot do partial analysis but we have to look at the whole 
system in order not to neglect important interdependencies necessary to ex-
plain the subject matter (holistic perspective). Obviously we have to make 
assumptions but no strict assumptions on the individuals' level to smother 
any chance for innovative behavior. 
In the following section, a possible instrument will be discussed, which 
allows to model a theory on grounds of the evolutionary setting derived 
above: an open system that allows for novelty and creativity; a complex 
non-deterministic system that gives a sound standing for an endogenous 
dynamic of economic change. 
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6.2 Graph Theory: A First Step Towards an 
Evolutionary Methodology 
Owing to the criticism on the neoclassical methodology, an alternative ap-
proach has to be found in order to structure the procedure of evolutionary 
modelling. Indeed, there are various tools that are used in evolutionary 
literature. At the present stage of evolutionary economics, as far as the 
author is apt to judge, a least compelling tool has to be applied to also keep 
the evolution of methodology open. A procedure has been selected which 
has already been put forward by others. More will be given later. 
Jason Potts (2000) in his seminal work on The New Evolutionary Mi-
croeconomics elaborated a useful apparatus to substantiate the evolution-
ary concept with a formal application, an application which critically dif-
fers from standard neoclassical methodology and sounds promising for 
evolutionary model makers. Potts also discusses traditional methodology 
and, among other things, focuses in his discourse on field theory as it is ap-
plied in neoclassical analysis: field theory usually defines the logical space 
of traditional economic theory. The ]Rn spans the canvas the economist 
(artist) paints his theory on, and hardly ever questions the adequacy of 
such subsurface. Neowalrasian economic theory is defined over such real 
field. The ]Rn, however, is a space in which every element has a unique 
position and a relation to all other elements within the space, all points are 
connected with each other. Hence, the ]Rn represents a Cartesian world. It 
is a complete, closed and deterministic subordinate to Newtonian mechan-
ics. So, the theoretic painting cannot live up to its promise: 
There is excess demand, but there are no trades; there is a 
price system, but there are no markets; there are agents and 
actions, but no events are observable; there are shares in pro-
duction, but production does not occur. I have been told that 
these and other 'anomalies' in neowalrasian theory are 'just 
a matter of semantics'. I do not disagree; but I am bound to 
reflect that science is concerned with little else. 17 
Excessive demand, trades, markets, etc. are real world phenomena, 
which are mere metaphors of disequilibrium in equilibrium analysis. In 
the neowalrasian world, the idea is to start right after all adjustment pro-
cesses towards equilibrium have already been completed, i.e. to start with 
equilibrium. Then, the result is a Cartesian system which allows to use 
field theory. Every element and every interaction between elements is ex-
pressed in functional forms that map the ]Rn to the ]Rn space. Hence, the 
]Rn is a complete set of interactions; as a consequence, economic actors 
have to have complete information and foresight that is perfect rationality. 
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But then, actual "( ... ) choice disappears; nothing is left but stimulus and 
response." 18 The nature of a field is to be an integral concept but the ge-
ometry of the economic space is a non-integral one. Not all connections 
between the elements of an economic system do actually exist. That is 
what Shackle (1972), O'Driscoll and Rizzo (1986) refer to when they talk 
about time: the existence of uncertainty and ignorance; aspects, which in-
deed cast doubt on the existence of an equilibrium, whose existence, 19 in 
return, is irrelevant to the context of field theory. 20 
When we want to describe real-world phenomena, when we want to in-
vestigate economic processes, we need to have a language. The neoclassi-
cal language is field theory as mentioned above. But any language is based 
on paradigmatic rules which is called grammar. It is impossible to for-
mulate meaningful sentences which do not comply with those rules. The 
grammar of the neoclassical language is tied to the equilibrium paradigm 
and therefore, theorizing is confined to equilibrium phenomena, if such 
a thing ever exists. To go beyond the frontiers of equilibrium analysis, 
we have to find a proper language which is less constraining but open for 
phenomena we strive to investigate: uncertainty, economic change, inno-
vation, entrepreneurship, etc. Graph theory looks promising to fulfill this 
claim.21 
The basics of graph theory will be outlined briefly below. By doing this, 
the suitability of graph theory - as the evolutionary language - will come 
to the reader's mind self-explanatorily. 
A graph G consists of a non-empty set of elements (vertices) V and a 
set of connections (edges) E,22 which not only constitute a graph but also 
represent the two ontological foundations of an evolutionary model. These 
two ontological propositions that Potts (2000) puts forward are: 
• Evolutionary-BC]: There exists a set of elements. 
• Evolutionary-HC2: There exists a set of connections. 23 
Compared to the neoclassic theory, the number of necessary assump-
tions is reduced to these two propositions.24 Instead of graph, we say sys-
tem to come closer to an economic terminology, i.e. the economic system, 
S = (V,E). The set of elements V looks as follows: 
(6.1) 
If two elements are connected, they are adjacent. The set of connections, 
E, that connects elements, i and j, denotes: 
E = (eiJ, .. . ) (6.2) 
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Figure 6.2: An economic system. 
V = (a,b,c,d,e,f,g) 
E = (ab,cd,de,df) 
The number of an element's connections, k, determines its degree. In a 
k-regular system, each of the n elements has the same number of con-




A possible (economic) system is shown in figure 6.2. 
(6.3) 
The adjacency matrix S(A) represents the connective structure of the sys-
tem. It is a 7x7 triangular matrix with rows and columns which contain 
the elements V. A connection eij between two elements, i and j, which 
makes them neighbors, is symbolized by a 1 in the adjacency matrix S(A), 
whereby an element is not connected to itself: 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
S(A) = 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 (6.4) 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The boundaries of all possible constellations of state-space are given by 
the two limiting cases - the null system and the complete system. The null 
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system denotes a state-space when no element is connected to any other 
element. Interpreting connections as economic interaction, then, in a null 




Figure 6.3: The null system. 
The number of all possible states of a system depends on the number of 
elements. Kauffman (1993) states s distinct n-systems. 
(6.5) 
A complete system denotes a state-space in which all elements are con-
nected with each other. The adjacency matrix S(A) then consists of only ls 
except for the diagonal which is only made of Os by definition. A complete 
system, as it is shown in figure 6.4, has the topology of a field. 
Figure 6.4: The complete system. 
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A system is incomplete as soon as k < n, and this is the general case in evo-
lutionary economics, adversely to a complete system which is prescribed 
by field theory. Thus, an incomplete system is an adequate description of 
a non-integral space, an open system. 
System-Element Duality and Hyperstructure Graph theory not only 
supplies an easy way to describe economic interaction but also enables us 
to cope with the nature of emergence and hierarchy. Elements and con-
nections embody a system, whereas the system in return may serve as an 
element for a higher-level system, and vice versa each element may itself 
be a system. This system-element duality allows to investigate the func-
tioning of a system and how emerging higher-level systems build certain 
structures (hierarchies). Potts (2000) suggests to call this conception hy-
perstructure,25 which merges the concept of emergence and hierarchy into 
a single construct. 26 Figure 6.1 in the previous section may serve as an 
example. The individual is an element of the system social group. A social 
group can be considered to be an element of the system "firm", whereby the 
firm is an element of the market system which is a three-level hyperstruc-
ture. In figure 6.5, the hyperstructured firm as an element of the market 
system is given. 
Figure 6.5: The hyperstructured firm. 
Note: A system is a system of systems. E.g.: the firm F1 is element 1 of a market 
system. The firm itself is a system of 3 social groups S}, with l = 1, 2, 3. Each 
social group l is a system of individuals fa;, with i = 1, 2, ... , 7. The superscript 
labels the emerging system level. Hence, we have a three-level hyperstructured 
system. 
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Complexity The idea of elements and connections, giving shape to the 
manifold states of a system, also allows to incorporate the notion of com-
plexity. It is frequently used as an opposite to simplicity. Starting with 
von Neumann - one of the first who dealt with complexity - complexity 
is considered as a stereotypical characteristic of natural systems: to his 
mind, complexity is a measurable magnitude which occurs once a thresh-
old has been exceeded and thus, a complex system differs from some kind 
of system which he assumed to be a simple one. 27 This understanding 
of complexity, however, does not explicitly ask for a different mathemat-
ical treatment than field theory. It is a more sophisticated conception of 
complexity that goes together with a graph theoretical approach. Unfortu-
nately, there is no clear-cut definition of complexity. Rosen (1987) refers 
to physics (such as quantum theory) and faces simple, mechanistic sys-
tems with complex ones that allow for novelty, i.e. emergence. Prigogine 
( 1987) also quotes physics as the first science that deals with complexity 
referring to thermodynamics which brings in entropy as a measure of in-
formation and disorder in a dynamic context. Not every initial state would 
lead to equilibrium. There are optional developments associated with self-
organization processes which show possible bifurcation mechanisms and 
eventually lead to complexity and irreversible trajectories. Forrester ( 1987) 
focuses on nonlinearities of complex systems, whereas Boulding (1987) 
discusses the role of knowledge in this context.28 
Irrespective of a unique definition, each of these concepts adopts a graph-
theoretic approach. The matter of emerging phenomena has been discussed 
above. The null system and the complete system mark two extremes in 
state-space. In a null system there are no connections. Therefore, there 
are no interactions, no interdependencies; it is a state of perfect order. In a 
complete system, each element is connected to all other existing elements; 
it is a state of chaos in which any perturbation leads to chaotic behavior. In 
other words, the connective structure of a system determines its complex-
ity. The degree of complexity is increasing with the number of connections 
within a system. It ranges from a state of perfect order, the null system, to 
a state of chaos, which is the complete system. Without any connections 
in a system, a change of an element in V does not affect any other ele-
ment. With a complete set of connections (interactions/interdepenecies), 
any change of some element propagates to all other elements. This means 
extreme instability. 
Considering human beings as social creatures, interacting with each 
other, the economic system is not a null system but a system with a con-
nective structure. Adding heterogeneity of actors to social interaction, the 
connective structure of an economic system changes over time: new con-
nections will be formed, old connections may be destroyed. Interactions 
shape the evolution of knowledge, preferences, institutions and technology. 
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In a general way, the basic setting of the evolutionary approach intended 
to be the meta-structure of the entrepreneurship model is given in the next 
part of this work. Proceeding with a concrete model, the notion of the 
constructed evolutionary scaffolding will become clearer. 
Notes 
1The (Newtonian) results seemed to be straightforward. Although many insights suggested 
the opposite, the imprint of a stable, deterministic, idealistic view of the world is persistent 
in the human mind. Take Einstein's relativity theory for example. He gave up the idea of 
an absolute measure of time and space. He claimed that natural laws would be stable from 
any point of view of the observer, independent of the speed of movement within space. 
It is the difference in the relative velocities of two observers that contradicts the axioms 
of classical physics such as an objective measure of time and space. Thus, he gave up a 
static concept of time and space. His general relativity theory reconciled the Newtonian 
law of gravitation and his special relativity theory for the sake of a static view of the world. 
Einstein maintained a deterministic position, though he would have been able to detect an 
overall dynamics. For more details see Hawking (I 988). 
2Concerning physics, it would be an interesting task to observe analogously to economics 
whether a Methodenstreit is unleashed and a period of "back-and-forth" physics is going 
on. But this is not the aim of this work. 
3Compare Maki (1998, p. 409) and Maki (1989, p. 179). 
4Hermann-Pillath (2001, p. 96). 
5See Hermann-Pillath (2001, p. 98). Note: With this ontological claim of an evolutionary 
approach by Hermann-Pillath, we can detect two parallels: the interdependence between 
the human mind and reality discussed in philosophy (John Locke and David Hume) and 
the reciprocity between the observer and the subject matter observed in quantum theory. 
6The Austrian School counts as a precursor of that tradition in economics, since the ap-
proach of Menger, Hayek, Mises, etc. pivots around knowledge within the market process. 
7Compare Campbell (1987). The analogy to quantum theory is the notion about the reci-
procity between the observer (apparatus) and the subject observed. 
8Compare Hermann-Pillath (2001). 
9Compare Hermann-Pillath (2001, p. 109). 
10This discussion has become known as the quantum dice dispute in physics (Einstein, 
Planck, Schrodinger, Bohr, etc.). See details in Heisenberg (2000). 
11To recall Heisenberg's uncertainty principle about the particle/wave issue: "The more pre-
cisely the position is determined, the Jess precisely the momentum is known." Be aware 
that any kind of comparison is a stretch. 
12That is: It has the superposition entrepreneur/non-entrepreneur. 
13Durlauf (1997), Brock and Durlauf (1999) give examples. 
14Using another analogy for illustration: the second Jaw of thermodynamics uses the same 
perspective. 
15Seechapter 3. 
16See Porter (1980). 
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17Clower (1995, p. 314). 
18Loasby (1976, p. 5). 
19compare Arrow and Debreu (1954). 
20compare Potts (2000, p. 23). 
21 Besides Potts (2000), Green (1996), Kauffman (1993), Kirman (1983) and Kirman (1987) 
have also recommended graph theory in their works. 
22See Neumann and Morlock (1993) as an introduction. 
23 HC1 and HC2 mean hard-core proposition 1 and 2, respectively. Potts (2000, p. 56). 
24Potts (2000, p. 57) confronts his evolutionary hard-core propositions with the ones in 
neoclassical theory, which are: HCl-There exist economic agents, HC2-Agents have pref-
erences over outcomes, HC3-Agents independently optimize subject to constraints, HC4-
Choices are made in interrelated markets, HC5-Agents have full relevant knowledge, HC6-
Observable economic outcomes are coordinated, so they must be discussed with reference 
to equilibrium states. Propositions HC2-HC6 are necessary propositions to legitimize the 
application of field theory. 
25The idea ofhyperstructured systems was also discussed by Bertalanffy (1962) and Koestler 
(1969). 
26Potts (2000, p. 68) refers to Baas (1994) and Baas (1997). 
27compare Rosen (1987). 
28Potts (2000) enumerates many more references concerning complexity. 

Part III 
Modelling Entrepreneurship from 
an Evolutionary Perspective 

7 Point of Departure 
In this part an entrepreneurship model is developed taking into account 
the reflections from the previous chapters. The model is meant to be a 
general approach to entrepreneurship, delivering constructive propositions 
for a basic evolutionary setting. Furthermore, it provides the basis for a lot 
of possible expansions for future research. 
To make things easier, the author's intuition about entrepreneurial be-
havior, observed in the Knowledge-based Economy, is given. After that, a 
short overview about subsequent chapters helps to put together the bits and 
pieces with respect to methodology, specific theories and the instruments 
used for modelling. 
7.1 The Intuition on Entrepreneurial Behavior in 
the Knowledge-based Economy 
As usual, any modelling effort starts with a basic intuition, with a basic 
idea about a subject matter. The initial spark of this project originates 
in the arrival of new information and communication technologies in the 
l 990's. The conglomerate of technologies which constitute the internet 
suggested an unprecedented innovation potential, obviously offering busi-
ness opportunities for almost everyone. At an early stage, first firm founda-
tions seemed promising and subsequently, spurred a wave of foundations. 
A fact that accounted for unexpected growth rates in GDP, 1 reducing un-
employment to a considerable degree along a non-increasing inflation rate. 
An astonishing but desirable development which even tempted economists 
to label it the New Economy. It was the beginning of the Knowledge-based 
Economy that was heralded and would change economic processes. 
From a scientific perspective, however, it is rather difficult to grasp what 
the Knowledge-based Economy is actually characterized by. Audretsch 
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and Thurik (2000) categorize the specificities of the Knowledge-based 
Economy and enumerate various "trade-offs" such as localization versus 
globalization, change versus continuity or turbulence versus stability, etc. 
According to them knowledge-based economies are more globalized, more 
turbulent and are subject to a higher rate of economic change. Therefore, 
the Knowledge-based economy is also a highly entrepreneurial economy. 
The specificities of the Knowledge-based Economy will not be discussed 
in detail here. It will do to state the basic characterization of the Knowl-
edge-based Economy as an example for entrepreneurial behavior in an 
economy. The term "knowledge-based" stresses the fact that knowledge 
has become a more important input and output factor (yet not necessarily 
a generically new input and output factor), facilitated by modem informa-
tion and communication technologies (ICTs). New ICTs have enhanced 
the transmissibility and exchange of information/knowledge in any eco-
nomic sector. These technologies constitute a general purpose technology 
(GPT), a key technology that provides opportunities for numerous, succes-
sive innovations, i.e. entrepreneurial behavior and the birth of new firms. 
The internet, as the prime example of all ICTs, is the result of such a com-
bination of various key technologies. The idea of a world-wide intercon-
nectedness, which delivers the opportunity of a world-wide availability of 
knowledge and accessibility of customers, sowed the seeds for further in-
cremental innovations, the creation of new knowledge. Thus, the hatchery 
of the "New Economy" was shaped and the "E-hype" followed in its wake. 
The internet, as the result of several highly knowledge-intensive tech-
nologies, became an easy-to-use device, accessible with common, "John-
Doe" knowledge. The internet has become the designated symbol for the 
surge of future process innovations waiting to come, since the transaction-
cost-saving argument of the internet as a new distribution and communica-
tion channel was intuitively evident. Consequently, the E-market pote,itial 
seemed almost infinite; the efficiency-improving qualities of the internet 
seemed obvious to everyone. Also, there was a quasi non-existing com-
petition due to a very low number of incumbent firms in the E-market and 
negligible barriers to enter, so that the new GPT offered a high potential 
for innovation. 
The easier the basics of such technology are understood by actors, the 
more potential entrepreneurs will emerge. At an early stage of the GPT, 
when entrants do not have to compete and catch up with long-term in-
cumbent firms, which usually have achieved a competitive advantage by 
accumulating market-specific knowledge, all economic actors work on a 
common ground. This was the case in the E-market: to some extent, in-
dividuals' accumulated knowledge (human capital) was almost equivalent 
to others as the new GPT has not yet undergone a specification process to 
render more sophisticated designs in technological knowledge. In other 
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words, at the beginning of the GPT's diffusion process only a few ac-
tors have accumulated technology-specific knowledge. Technology is new 
for everyone not having consolidated in usage, no first-mover advantages 
could have been accumulated conclusively. Hence, all actors face more or 
less the same terms to start a business: Software developers would simply 
use their skills to program web sites, while software users (E-commerce 
entrepreneurs) might not be able to do so. The latter, instead, may have 
advantageous knowledge such as knowing a business from the "Old Econ-
omy". Software integrators would help implementation, internet service 
providers (ISPs) and application service providers (ASPs) - as these new 
jobs are termed - assist the incremental innovation process. Many more 
jobs are created, each contributing a tiny bit to put together an E-business 
to transform accumulated knowledge out of the "Old Economy" into an 
innovative "New Economy" firm. 
The more the new GPT (the internet) gradually finds its application, and 
the more the technology's potential is exploited, the higher the complexity 
of the more specified technology gets. And along with it, the usage of the 
technology becomes more and more demanding in terms of actors' cog-
nitive capabilities. Consumers also specify their demand, which becomes 
more and more sophisticated, so that it is not enough any longer to simply 
program web pages. Integrated solutions are demanded and therefore will 
be offered. The more entrepreneurs (firms) undergo a learning-by-doing 
and learning-by-using process, the more technology- and business-speci-
fic knowledge is accumulated. During this process the discrepancy in the 
stock of knowledge between incumbent firms and potential entrepreneurs 
keeps on growing so that the general terms to start a business within a grad-
ually established market are getting worse while barriers to entry grow. 
In addition, the turbulence of an emerging market with actors who face 
a fierce shake-out process might temporarily smother entrepreneurial be-
havior. Moreover, the increasing complexity of knowledge, the increasing 
sophistication of technology, inhibits its diffusion among actors. The tac-
itness of knowledge and actors' absorptive capacities thus decrease the 
chances of innovation, i.e. the chances to found a firm.2 
7.2 Modelling Indications 
Part I of this work delivers a collection of the intuition on entrepreneurship. 
Furthermore, it addresses methodological problems and explains how the 
disappearance of the entrepreneur in economic theory came along. By 
consolidating the critique of Schumpeter, the body of thought from the 
Austrian School and Kirzner's adaptations to the entrepreneurial case, it 
turns out that research on entrepreneurship becomes the pivotal point of a 
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micro-based evolutionary theory. Part II discusses how in general such a 
heterodox, evolutionary approach ought to look like. Figure 6.1 summa-
rizes the results. Now, it is time to flesh out those ideas with a model to be 
developed in this part. We start at the micro level modelling heterogeneous 
actors differing in their individual endowments. Information is incomplete, 
in particular with respect to the future economic development, saying that 
agents have to deal with true uncertainty. As a consequence, the bounded 
rational3 agents are limited in their cognitive capabilities when perceiv-
ing and processing the accumulated information. With regard to novelty, 
in case agents want to go entrepreneurial, optimal behavior becomes an 
illusion. Therefore, individuals decide best to their knowledge. Agents 
form expectations about various conditions of their environment. First, 
they have to evaluate their individual endowment of resources, capabilities 
and competencies. Second, they have to reflect on the possibilities to ac-
quire missing complementarities (to be specified later on). And third, they 
have to assess the "economic situation", i.e. potential profit opportunities. 
Figure 7 .1 is meant to summarize the basics necessary to start the en-
trepreneurship model. It combines the methodological ideas discussed and 
illustrated in figure 6.1 on page 65. In addition, the graph theoretic ap-
proach is visualized in this figure referring to the system approach dis-
cussed in section 6.2. 
The left column in figure 7.1 shows bounded rational agents, who - ex-
plicitly considered - show a quasi-random behavior concerning entrepre-
neurial actions. To concretize the actors' psychology, the fundamental 
elements of human psychology are characterized (section 8.1.1). Actors 
have to understand their environment and economic processes, in partic-
ular if they intend to undertake entrepreneurial actions. A Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur, who actualizes new combinations, first has to understand the 
functioning of a new technology (GPT)4 such as "how the internet works" 
before he comes up with an innovative business idea. 
Thereby, the diffusion of knowledge is an indeterministic process. It 
depends on social interaction and the agents' learning capabilities. Section 
8.1.1 discusses the preparatory work delivered by cognitive psychology. 
The diffusion of knowledge is modelled using percolation theory. 
The understanding of technology is only one part of the story; it is a 
rather static process in terms of economic change: understanding does not 
necessarily entail economic action. Actors have to evaluate economic op-
portunities, they have to evaluate a technology's economic applicability, 
the question whether there will be a market or not. The social context 
thereby plays an important role. If many other agents are convinced of 
some subject matter, one is more tempted to share that opinion. If many 
agents believe that going entrepreneurial pays, it might stimulate entrepre-
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Those phenomena are discussed in subsection 8.1.2 by social psychology, 
which illustrates symmetry-breaking in human behavior. However, the 
reader has to wait until chapter 9 to see the resulting concept of shared 
mental models to be implemented into the model. 
Then, after understanding technology and evaluating business opportu-
nities, actors will start to engage in a networking process to find support 
for potential entrepreneurial actions. This will be done in section 8.3. But 
before that, section 8.2 describes actors from an entrepreneurial perspec-
tive. Their endowment set is defined by choosing personal characteristics 
which have been empirically tested many times, and seem to be most el-
igible to explain an individual's propensity to undertake entrepreneurial 
actions from an isolated perspective. This small excursion is necessary 
to merge the methodological approach with the entrepreneurship literature 
and, moreover, the idea of the network approach in section 8.3 gets clearer. 
The latter will be modelled via a cellular automaton. Up to that point, the 
micro level as the focus of entrepreneurial behavior is discussed. 
Chapter 9 contains the actual model. Since the methodological discus-
sion advocates a holistic approach to take into account relevant reciproc-
ities, the model contains some modules which have not been discussed 
explicitly before. The reason for that is simple, as those modules are not 
the focus of this project. To take into account reciprocities, the macro con-
text of economic actors must not be neglected, since the economy is part of 
the partially self-created reality. Consequently, the performance of firms 
within an industry has to be considered. By their performance, firms pro-
duce economic indicators. And again, it has to be emphasized explicitly 
that it is not the intention to explain firm behavior, which might be tempting 
to think when looking at the model. Therefore, a rather static perspective 
on firms is taken: exit (survival) depends on an ill-(well-)balanced endow-
ment set constituted by the founders. Competition is substantiated using 
an oligopoly approach. Hence, on the meso level we end up with a popu-
lation perspective, and the firm's cost structure as the selection criterion to 
pay tribute to some stylized facts of an industry's life cycle. 
Let us return to figure 7 .1 and take a look at the right column. Although 
we model heterogeneous actors with quasi-random behavior in terms of 
entrepreneurial actions, we observe actors who found firms and actors 
who do not found firms, actors we might want to call entrepreneurs and 
non-entrepreneurs, respectively. Moreover, we will also observe success-
ful and unsuccessful firms, whereby it has to be conceded that a firm's 
failure originates in the actors' fallible decision in founding an expectedly 
successful firm. In other words, symmetry-breaking or the adaptability of 
firms within the competitive process is ignored. So are the specificities of 
a sector's dynamic evolution. 
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Chapter 9 is closed by discussing results and some first, modest steps to-
wards an empirical application. 
Notes 
1Compare Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) and Helpman (1998). 
2The example of the Knowledge-based Economy simply serves for intuitive purposes. Tak-
ing a closer look at the short exposition and mapping its argumentation with the adequate 
literature, we will find in the literature on industry life cycles a lot of such examples. 
Klepper (1997), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), Klepper and Graddy (1990), Gort and 
Klepper (1982), Abernathy and Utterback (1978) deliver a lot of similar examples which 
may serve as an example as well. Nevertheless, the example of the Knowledge-based 
Economy is chosen, since it highlights the role of knowledge diffusion within the process 
of entrepreneurial behavior. 
3See e.g. Simon and Egidi (1992) for this discussion. 
4See example of the Knowledge-based Economy in section 7.1 for explanation. 

8 The Homo agens in a Socio-Economic 
Context 
8.1 The Cognition Process from a Psychological 
Perspective 
Having figure 7 .1 in mind when building a model on entrepreneurial be-
havior, we start with a set of actors. They neither have complete infor-
mation/foresight nor perfect (cognitive) capabilities, i.e. we have bounded 
rational 1 decision-making agents. They cannot make optimal decisions. 
Decisions are dependent on their knowledge and the information they have 
or receive, respectively, from their social, political and economic environ-
ment. 2 The agents' perception of their environment is thereby contingent 
to their limited information processing capacity and their limited attentive-
ness. They have to be selective in their information collection process sub-
ject to bounded cognitive capabilities, which, finally results in trial-and-
error behavior.3 Thus, the individual agent becomes a "creative observer" 
of his socio-economic environment. The latter influences the actor's per-
ception and knowledge of economic "reality" as well as the actor himself 
creates economic reality within a social cognitive process that directs eco-
nomic behavior. 
8.1.1 Determinants of Human Behavior in a Static 
Environment, Knowledge Diffusion and 
Understanding New Technology 
Cognitive psychology4 delivers preparatory work about the role of infor-
mation in the human decision and cognition process to model economic 
behavior form the lowest level possible. In contrast to behaviorism, which 
reduces human behavior to a passive stimulus-reaction process, cognitive 
psychology tries to identify the mental process of a thinking agent, who 
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takes an active part acting on the information received.5 Individuals col-
lect, memorize and use the information about their environment to direct 
behavior, they learn in order to adjust their behavior.6 Compared to ani-
mals, human beings' cognition capabilities detach their behavior from sim-
ple genetically given programs; henceforth, adjustment processes have by 
far a larger scope. Therefore, the learning process via observation and 
cognition talces a dominant role in the human decision-malcing process. 7 It 
is obvious that not all information, hypothetically available, will be talcen 
into account by the agent, subject to bounded rationality. Besides a lim-
ited attention potential and bounded cognitive capabilities, the agent might 
collect all relevant information due to high (opportunity) costs. There is 
a need for selectiveness in the information gathering process. Thereby, 
the search heuristic is guided by former cognition processes which build 
up certain patterns of (re)cognition.8 More precisely, if, for example, an 
individual wants to engage into the stock market, he collects the data he 
thinks to be relevant for his investment decision.9 Possible recognition 
patterns might be looking at fundamental data (i.e. balance sheets) or ap-
plying chart analysis techniques. Which pattern the individual chooses, 
thereby, is a cumulative result of experiences, of former learning processes 
that malce him think to use the right model. The recognition pattern guides 
the search, and the experience (learning process) influences the recogni-
tion pattern. Nevertheless, even having decided to be a "fundamentalist 
decision malcer" in stock market transactions, the individual might not col-
lect and use all the information he has access to. Too many options of 
a multitude of purchaseable stocks to consider would overflow his lim-
ited processing capacity. He has to decide to take just a bit of the data 
such as profit, a firm's sales growth rate and employment figures. 10 At 
the same time, the information gathered is categorized in order to cope 
with its abundance and to obtain a reductionist, distinctive mental repre-
sentation of an object (profitable stock, non-profitable stock). As already 
mentioned above, the recognition patterns change over time once the agent 
realizes that his cognition process leads to false conclusions and decisions. 
The agents' mental models I I, guides behavior and, at the same time, be-
havioral consequences influence their mental models. This way, we have 
individuals that act aim-oriented and therefore malce rational decisions best 
to their knowledge. The latter constitutes individuals' subjective mental 
model of reality. Conclusively, agents' decisions are subject to error and 
thus a sustaining cognitive learning process is going on. 
When we expand the ideas of cognitive psychology and focus on learn-
ing, Piaget (1974) gives a well-structured concept of such a process. I2 Ac-
cording to Piaget, the cognition process is constructivistic and can be cat-
egorized into four sub-processes: assimilation, perturbation, accommoda-
tion and equilibration. Assimilation is the cognition process in which the 
individual integrates the perceived reality in his cognitive system. It is the 
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way how the individual treats incoming novelty. New information is linked 
to the existing stock of knowledge, to existing mental structures. Some of 
the new information might not be easy to assimilate and perturbation oc-
curs. The cognitive balance is disturbed. 13 Novel information can be sur-
prising or expected, it can be enjoyable or annoying. Once, the individual 
considers the piece of information to be relevant, he adjusts his pattern of 
perception and, consequently, his behavior. Hence, accommodation takes 
place in order to reach a psycho-social and cognitive balance, which Pi-
aget calls equilibration. This implies that knowledge and rationality are 
subjective. 14 
Leaming is also a major topic in economics. There is a multitude of 
theories about learning. Brenner (1999) systemized the literature and dis-
cussed learning from an economic perspective. Here, it is not the intention 
to discuss all facets of learning. As mentioned, the issue of entrepreneur-
ship behavior raises methodological issues, therefore, the focus is put on 
how to model a learning process on a very rudimentary basis. Suffice it to 
refer to the relevant literature, which also favors a psychological approach 
as the apparently most promising one.15 For the purpose of modelling, 
some adaptations and simplifications will be made in the following. 
Knowledge and its Diffusion - the Catalyst of Economic 
Behavior 
It was stated that the human mind is taken as a ontological foundation 
of modelling economic phenomena. Conclusively, the cognition process 
becomes the crucial element to model specific economic behaviors. And 
with bounded rational actors, therefore, knowledge becomes the source of 
human action. Hence, knowledge becomes also the decisive determinant 
within the innovation process which the entrepreneur is the driving force 
of. In economic theory, however, it turns out to be a difficult task to take 
into account all nuances of knowledge. 
Referring to a perfect rationality postulate, it is a contradiction to talk 
about any kind of imperfect knowledge at all. On the contrary, heterodox 
approaches still try hard to model knowledge in its nature. Knowledge has 
been neglected for a long time when modelling economic processes. The 
first who integrated the notion of knowledge into the economic process was 
Arrow (1962b ). He models the incentive to innovate, i.e. to generate new 
knowledge, considering market structure. But when it comes to the speci-
ficities of knowledge he circumvent the issue of the public goods charac-
teristics of knowledge in order to avoid so-called technological spillovers. 
Assuming perfect patenting, the appropriability of innovation rents is guar-
anteed. Similarly, Non-Tournament models by Dasgupta and Stiglitz are 
built on the assumption that"( ... ) knowledge is monopolised by a.firm when 
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it pays for it. "16 Thus, knowledge is treated as an ordinary private good, 
which does not differ much from other input factors (land, real capital, 
etc.). Levin and Reiss (1984) first allow for technological spillovers into 
a Dasgupta/Stiglitz-type model to pay tribute that knowledge does neither 
wear out nor is rival in multiple usage. 
But taking into account the role of knowledge (in the way cognitive psy-
chology does) as the fuel and the outcome of a complex cognition process 
which eventually guides the behavior of a Homo agens, an economic man 
acting best to his knowledge, we have to make some more differentiations, 
irrespective of a definition of know ledge to put into practice in an economic 
model. 17 
The Austrian School provides a lot of contributions to knowledge, origi-
nating from the criticism on equilibrium analysis. 18 Nonetheless, for mod-
elling purposes only some selected literature will be used. Polanyi (1958) 
introduces tacit knowledge what Berry ( 1997) similarly paraphrases im-
plicit learning, the sort of knowledge we know we have but cannot articu-
late. Arrow ( 1962a) coins the concept of learning by doing and Rosenberg 
(1982) specified learning by using. Lundvall (1998) makes the useful dis-
tinction between information and knowledge; and Lundvall and Johnson 
(1994) reflect on the learning economy. Information would manifest the 
knowledge which can be transmitted via any kind of information technolo-
gies, whereas knowledge would imply a learning process to, first, under-
stand the existing stock of knowledge and, second, adds further knowledge 
to the stock of knowledge. 
The literature on the Knowledge-based Theory of the Firm also shifted 
its emphasis to the role of knowledge and capabilities. Penrose (1959a) 
considers the firm as a collection of resources that seizes its productive op-
portunities given a certain endowment of human and real capital subject 
to available capabilities. 19 Eliasson (1990) substantiated such competence 
as receiver competence, i.e. the firm's capability to acquire external (tech-
nological) knowledge and economic opportunities. The former Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989) specified as a firm's absorptive capacity, which basically 
means the capacity to understand new technologies necessary in order to 
make economic use of them. 20 
As the focus is chosen to be on individual actors, only some aspects will 
be selected to model entrepreneurial behavior. Bounded rational actors all 
have a certain understanding of the existing stock of knowledge, contin-
gent to their individual cognitive capabilities and experiences. It is the 
result of a cumulative, lifelong learning process. Some of the knowledge 
acquired will be codified; some will be tacit, which an actor implicitly 
learned by experience and social interaction. As a consequence, the in-
dividual's cognitive capabilities are also a determinant of the diffusion of 
knowledge. Concerning the emission of knowledge, the actor transmits 









Figure 8.1: The diffusion of information/knowledge with bounded rational 
actors. 
information and codified knowledge, provided that he is willing to do so. 
The rest of knowledge remains to the actor's human embodied knowledge 
capital.21 The total of an actor's knowledge will be called human capi-
tal in the model below. Evidently, information will spread more rapidly 
among actors than knowledge that requires a learning process. Thereby, 
the distance of actors has also an impact of the diffusion of knowledge. In-
formation might diffuse with zero marginal cost; sticky knowledge, as von 
Hippel (1994) calls it, is effectively transferred via a frequent, face-to-face 
contact and, furthermore, depends on its regional context.22 The diffusion 
of knowledge is not only restricted by the cognitive capabilities and the 
(observable) behavior which limits the emission of an actor's knowledge 
but also it is dependent on the absorptive cognitive capacity to receive, ab-
sorb and use external knowledge,23 knowledge that spills over from others. 
Figure 8.1 sketches the basic elements required to simplify the knowl-
edge diffusion process given a bounded rational actor with a certain de-
gree of absorptive capacity and knowledge transmission, constrained by 
the tacitness of knowledge. There is one concession made: technically, the 
actor serves as a valve that regulates (technological) knowledge transfer 
via actors, illustrating the duality of spillovers - absorption and emission. 
The generation of new knowledge is neglected at this point but will be ad-
dressed in the final model in which the shared mental model, the founding 
threshold,24 reflects the dynamic process of knowledge creation. 
Without knowledge diffusing through society, no economic change would 
happen. Without knowledge about new inventions and new technology, no 
entrepreneurs would arise out of society. The diffusion of knowledge, how-
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Figure 8.2: The square lattice. 
ever, is neither a deterministic process, nor a negligible aspect to be denied 
by a perfect rationality postulate. Knowledge is necessary to activate ac-
tors, to initiate entrepreneurial behavior. Furthermore, to pay tribute to the 
role of indeterminism discussed in the previous part and model an indeter-
ministic diffusion process, percolation theory will be used for two reasons, 
to give a metaphor and to incorporate this indeterministic process into the 
entrepreneurship model later on. 
Modelling Knowledge Diffusion with Percolation Theory 
The research field of percolation theory has a history of over forty years 
and has become more and more popular in various scientific disciplines. 
Percolation theory deals with disordered phenomena.25 It tries to describe 
the flow of fluids through medium, the spreading of epidemics or forest 
fires and so forth. More precisely, it investigates the topology and the 11 ( ••• ) 
interconnectedness of microscopic elements of( ... ) [a] system. 1126 It pic-
tures a system's apparently random morphology, which eludes a determin-
istic description - at least on a micro-level - forborne by quantum theory. 
"Percolation theory tells us when a system is macroscopically open to a 
given phenomenon. 1127 For example, it tells us the condition when a filter 
bag is penetrable by coffee. A filter without pores does not allow coffee to 
trickle through (percolate) into the can. The more pores, the more likely a 
closed system becomes an open system that shows a flow. The threshold 
that marks the transition from a closed to an open system is called perco-
lation threshold. 28 
To illustrate percolation processes, a regular network illustrated by a 
square lattice shown in figure 8.2 is used.29 
Looking at the squares of the lattice, we talk of sites. Regarding the edge 
of a square, we talk of bonds. Hence, there are two percolation problems, 
the site percolation and the bond percolation problem. Taking the latter 
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first: the bonds are either occupied, i.e. open to flow or diffusion, or vacant, 
that is impenetrable. The probability p gives the likelihood that a bond is 
occupied (open) or vacant (closed). Conclusively, two sites, the location 
of two crossing lines in case of bond percolation, are connected if there 
is at least one path of bonds that connects two sites (intersections). If p = 
1, then all sites are connected with each other. A set of sites, isolated to 
other sites by vacant bonds, builds a cluster. The transition point, which 
discriminates a macroscopically closed from an open structure, is called 
the bond percolation threshold. 
When considering site percolation, a site is either occupied with prob-
ability p or vacant with probability 1-p. Two neighboring sites are con-
nected, if both of them are occupied. Site percolation occurs, if there is an 
infinite30 sample-spanning cluster of occupied sites. Analyzing the square 
lattice, the value of the percolation threshold, Pcb in the case of bond per-
colation and Pcs in the case of site percolation, is equal to 1/2 and 0.5927, 
respectively. 
Sahimi ( 1994) summarizes the topological properties concerning some 
important quantities as follows: 
(i) Percolation probability P(p ). This is the probability that, when the 
fraction of occupied bonds is p, a given site belongs to the infinite 
(sample-spanning) cluster of occupied bonds. 
(ii) Accessible fraction XA(p). This is that fraction of occupied bonds 
belonging to the infinite cluster. 
(iii) Backbone fraction X8 (p). This is the fraction of occupied bonds in 
the infinite cluster which actually carry flow or current, since some 
of the bonds in the cluster are dead-end and do not carry any flow. 
The backbone of a percolating system plays a fundamental role in 
its transport properties, because the tortuosity of the transport paths 
is controlled by the structure of the backbone. 
(iv) Correlation length /;p(p). This is the typical radius of the connected 
clusters for p < Pc, and the length scale over which the random net-
work is macroscopically homogeneous (i.e., the length scale over 
which the properties of the system are independent of its linear size 
L for p > Pc)- Thus, in any Monte Carlo simulations of percolation 
we must have L > > /;p for the results to be independent of L. 
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(v) Average number of clusters of size s (per lattice site) n8 (p), since 
sns is the probability that a given site is part of an s-cluster, a mean 
cluster size Sp(P) can be defined by 
Sp(P) = Ess2ns 
Essns 
(8.1) 
(vi) Effective electrical conductivity ge. This is the electrical conductiv-
ity of a random resistor network in which a fraction p of bonds are 
conducting and the rest are insulating. Similarly, if a network repre-
sents the pore space of a porous medium in which a fraction p of the 
pores are open to flow or diffusion, an effective diffusivity De and a 
hydrodynamic permeability k can also be defined. 
(vii) Effective elastic moduli G. These are the elastic moduli of the net-
work in which a fraction p of the bonds are elastic elements (e.g., 
springs), while the rest have no rigidity of stiffness (i.e., they are 
cut).31 
Figure 8.3 illustrates some of the characteristics of site percolation in a 
square lattice depending on the probability p. X1 (p) depicts the fraction of 
isolated occupied sites. The analogy to economic phenomena is straight-
forward. Concerning the diffusion of knowledge, the percolation proba-
bility P(p) denotes the probability that economic agents (sites) belong to 
the infinite or sample-spanning32 cluster that perceives and understands 
the diffusing new technological knowledge. XA(p) is the actual accessible 
fraction of economic agents that belong to the infinite cluster, i.e. to the 
economic agents that receive and understand the incoming knowledge. The 
backbone fraction X 8 (p) is the part of the knowledge-receiving agents that 
carry the flow of knowledge, whereas some of the agents are dead-end and 
do not carry any flow; knowledge remains tacit. The correlation length ~P 
can be interpreted as the regional aspect of knowledge diffusion, thinking 
of local innovation systems (clusters) and taking into account the locality 
of external economies of scale that will also have an impact on the mean 
cluster size Sp(p). Furthermore, the effective electrical conductivity ge can 
be equated with the effective diffusivity of a set of actors with knowledge. 
Thereby, it has to take care of the different kinds of knowledge: The dif-
fusivity of pure information will be high but the more complex knowledge 
gets, the more absorptive capacities and limiting spillovers ( owing to the 
tacitness of knowledge) become inhibiting elements of knowledge diffu-
sion. 
To visualize the idea of percolation, figure 8.4 shows three diagrams in-
dicating different states of a medium's permeability. The underlying pro-
gram source is given in appendix B.1. 
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Figure 8.3: The dependence of some of the percolation quantities on p, the 
fraction of occupied sites, in site percolation on a simple cubic 
lattice. 
Source: Sahimi (1994, p. 13). Copyright © 1994. Reprinted by permission of Taylor & 
Francis . 
• -. ........ y ·- .. , ... -··.. . 
·J···-: ~ •••• : '~· '· ........... -:·~.· .. , -~·-.... :.,-- . 
..... ",A,.Y" :-: ... . ,:.·:. ...... ,.-... •-.-.,1-. ·•.c. .. - ... . ,J_ . •• • -... 'I,.--~~-:,-:. 
• )I •• • •• 
• I .-.J• • • ••• - .......... ) :: ........... .... 
■ I ~--~ ... • :::- ... :r. 
(a) p=0.2 (b) p=0.5 
··;: ·:~,-.~~-·--··.-:: :•:: .. • .... ·• .... - -~•-·: 
·-t ·····,c. ,: . ... rtl. _ i: ,.,.-.., •I•,•. .. . 
◄ •.": • I•~ :, 1 • J • • •, 
-, ~\ ~·:·.(\( ~~---~ 
I"' • J •• • 'I • • .. ,~•• I• I ■·,· •• ••••• : .... -.... ,:···· ~ ... ...... .. . -.· -· ...•. • . 
·1;, ·: . .... ·.·' ·.••:. ··, 
,• . ■ .. 11, • . I • •. • ' 
(c) p=0.8 
Figure 8.4: Percolation within a square lattice. 
The percolation probability p gives the fraction of occupied (permeable) 
sites within a square lattice of n2 actors. Gray squares signify vacant (non-
permeable) sites and black squares occupied ones. In case (a), the percola-
tion probability is p = 0.2, i.e. a low fraction of occupied sites, so that the 
existence ofa sample-spanning cluster is very unlikely; as a result, more 
isolated clusters33 occur. As p increases, the probability of percolation 
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grows. At the percolation threshold, which is about p=0.5, the fraction of 
occupied sites that belong to the sample-spanning cluster rapidly increases 
as diagram (b) shows (compare also figure 8.3). With p=0.8, almost all 
occupied sites are part of that cluster, meaning that almost every occupied 
site of the lattice is reachable. 
Figure 8.5: Actors within a lattice. 
-r = transferable (non-tacit) knowledge emitted by agent ij. 
IC= absorptive capacity of agent ij. 
Now, the notion of percolation theory will serve as a tool to model the 
diffusion of knowledge. According to figure 8.1, the agents have been ide-
alized by their individual absorptive capacities. Furthermore, knowledge 
has been differentiated by its tacitness. Putting together figure 8.1 and fig-
ure 8.2 yields figure 8.5: we obtain a set of actors scattered over a square 
lattice. Information is emitted and received by actors. Apart from the ab-
sorptive capacity 'IC of the agent, which determines whether the incoming 
knowledge will be understood or not, the quantity -r of transferrable (non-
tacit) knowledge will be emitted by the agent. 
For convenience, the actors have to be considered as an occupied site 
and the connections determine the permeability of the medium, i.e. the 
diffusivity of the set of actors thinking of knowledge diffusion. 
In a next step, knowledge is differentiated further to take into account 
the heterogeneity of bounded rational actors according to their absorptive 
capacities. 
The Diffusion of Knowledge with Bounded Rational Agents, 
Having Different States of Absorptive Capacities and States of 
Tacitness 
Notice that the role of knowledge is to be emphasized for several rea-
sons: (a) to refrain from the Homo economicus, the perfect rationality 
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postulate has to be dropped as mentioned in the chapters above. Subse-
quently, because of the heterogeneity of actors and their having differ-
ent endowments in capabilities, knowledge has (b) to be discussed from 
a methodological perspective; therefore, graph theory, a less restrictive ap-
paratus than the one used in equilibrium analysis, was introduced to model 
economic behavior. Moreover, since the ultimate focus of this project still 
is the investigation of entrepreneurial behavior, (c) the role of knowledge 
within the entrepreneurial process, within the innovation process has to be 
taken even more into account; the entrepreneurial function, as Schumpeter 
stated, originates in carrying out innovations, new combinations which 
imply newly generated knowledge. He differentiated invention from in-
novation. 34 Innovation signifies the actualization of an invention, of new 
knowledge. In order for the entrepreneur to be able to innovate, knowledge 
- created by invention - has first to be available, and second, understood 
by actors. No matter whether the entrepreneur himself or another person 
generates new knowledge, without new knowledge entrepreneurial behav-
ior comes to a halt. Apart from that, there is a further reason (e) which 
brings us back to the intuitive example in section 7.1. The Knowledge-
based Economy in the 1990s highlights the role of knowledge in economy 
as well as delivering a unique example for an entrepreneurial economy. 
Now, for the purpose of implementing knowledge into the entrepreneur-
ial model below, knowledge diffusion, taking into account tacitness and 
absorptive capacities, will be modelled by using a percolation model. 
Figure 8.6: Percolation - agents with heterogeneous absorptive capacities. 
A square lattice is considered in which each square denotes an actor 
with a given level of absorptive capacity (figure 8.6). The program is given 
in appendix B.4. Each rectangle represents a certain point in time, the 
starting point is top left. The changing colors of squares illustrate the five 
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different stages of knowledge being inherent to actors. Absorptive capaci-
ties are not visualized but randomly distributed via agents.35 Equation 8.2 
shows the tuple of an actor i with a stock of knowledge w and absorptive 
capacities IC;: 
a;= { W;, IC;} (8.2) 
In the top left lattice of figure 8.6, we see that only a few actors have a 
certain stock of knowledge. Dark squares signify actors without this kind 
of knowledge. A light gray square represents actor i with a stock of knowl-
edge, w,q = 1, that has sufficient absorptive capacities to process the new 
incoming knowledge: the basics of a yet unspecified GPT are understood. 
Interaction is modelled by using a cellular (von Neumann-)automaton, and 
knowledge propagates through agents subject to their absorptive capaci-
ties. In the second lattice, for example, some of the light gray clusters 
enclose a dark gray square, i.e. this signifies an actor with higher absorp-
tive capacities who is able to absorb more of the incoming information than 
the surrounding others. In each time step, while knowledge is diffusing, 
actors learn about e.g. a new technology. And the darker a square gets, 
the higher the agents' absorptive capacities are and the more the actors are 
able to use technological knowledge of a higher level of sophistication. 
In the lattice bottom right, all agents have partially absorbed the diffus-
ing knowledge; the dark gray color at the beginning, in the lattice top left, 
vanished completely, saying that all actors absorbed the basic understand-
ing of the new technology such as how the internet works and how to use 
it. The highest possible level of knowledge, W,q = 4, is scarcely reached; 
the last lattice shows that black squares only occur sporadically. To put 
it differently, all agents understand the basics of the knowledge trickling 
through, but as soon as the complexity of a technology increases, the us-
age of such will be constrained by the individuals absorptive capacities, the 
tacitness of knowledge, the connectiveness of agents and the randomness 
of the time-dependent diffusion process. 
What Can We Learn from Percolation Theory? 
Considering the lowest level of knowledge complexity, W,c; = 1 (figure 8.3), 
the percolation probability is equal to P(p) = 1, hence percolation has oc-
curred. All agents perceived the new technology and have a low-level un-
derstanding of it. With increasing usage, technology becomes more so-
phisticated denying more and more actors intellectual access. Hence, per-
colation becomes less likely. In the extreme case of W,c; = 4, percolation 
is even impossible. Table 8.1 indicates the distribution of absorptive ca-
pacities among actors. Absorptive capacities are assumed to be binomially 
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distributed. All actors have a certain level of absorptive capacities K:. The 
probability of either having absorptive capacities K: E { 1, 2, 3, 4}, respec-
tively, is a binomial distribution with n=3 and p=0.5. 
K:j 0 1 2 3 4 
p = "IC 0 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.125 
p > "IC 1 0.875 0.5 0.125 0 
Table 8.1: Distribution of absorptive capacities. 
Using figure 8.3 in order to interpret table 8.1, we see that for K: = 1 
or K: = 2 the percolation threshold is reached. Almost all actors belong 
to the sample-spanning cluster, i.e. almost all actors perceive and process 
the incoming knowledge constrained by their absorptive capacities K:. To 
that extent, all actors understand technology and realize its potential. As 
the GPT gets more elaborated by usage and market coordination and the 
diffusion of knowledge gets higher in complexity, the percolation threshold 
might not be reached and the fraction of actors not able to process the 
technological knowledge is high.36 
Besides the connectivity (reachability) of actors, the dynamics of the 
diffusing knowledge also looks different when looking at each complex-
ity level. Figure 8. 7 shows the corresponding diffusion curves of the four 
different knowledge complexity levels w E {1,2,3,4}, as pictured in fig-
ure 8.6. The more complex the diffusing knowledge is, the longer the 
diffusion process takes. Accordingly, the fraction of actors who perceive 
and understand the incoming knowledge decreases reciprocally with com-
plexity. 
To summarize: The cognition process of bounded rational actors has 
been investigated. Knowledge has been stressed as the fundamental deter-
minant of human (economic) action. In particular, when referring to en-
trepreneurial actions, the generation of innovative knowledge is critical. In 
order for the potential of new technologies to unfold, the technology has 
to be cognitively processed by actors. The easiness to grasp technology 
thereby decides whether a swarm of innovations occurs or not. Looking at 
it from the actors' perspective, their absorptive capacities are the limiting 
factors and inhibit the diffusivity of knowledge. 
So far, the agents modelled above are still passive and receptive. Wheth-
er knowledge is accumulated depends merely on a given, individual, cog-
nitive profile. Yet, no economic action has been performed. All we talked 
about was the process of recognition, the process of learning about new 
technologies. The fact of understanding, however, does not imply a deter-
ministic behavior just by itself. Understanding technology is only one part 
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time 
of the story, the motivation to actually use new technology (knowledge) 
is another. The process of innovation by entrepreneurs, the application 
of technological knowledge, depends on the alleged demand, the subjec-
tive utility expressed by prospective consumers. The economic potential 
has first to be assessed by actors to arouse their motivation to act. This 
evaluation is a subjective process by a potential entrepreneur. It is not 
an optimization problem to simply discount future innovation rents and 
equating with the costs of innovation. Ex ante, objectivity is an illusion 
prevented by epistemological reservations (Arrow (1991)). Economic re-
ality is the result of human interaction, hence, a self-creating process mo-
tivated by economic actors. Therefore, successful, entrepreneurial actions 
are the outcome of a well-anticipated commonality of economic behavior. 
The entrepreneur excels as a splendid (creative) observer, who on top of it 
manages to take a major part in the creation of economic reality. 
To bring in the dynamics of purposeful (inter-)acting agents, the process 
of the evolution of economic prospects in a social context is discussed 
in the next section. Eventually, the evolution of new firms and sectors, 
spurred by the individual actor's behavior will be elaborated. 
8.1.2 Determinants of Human Behavior in a Dynamic 
Environment - Perception, Creation and Evaluation 
of New Technological Potentials 
So far, we have considered the cognitive process of a bounded rational 
agent in a static context. Agents learn about their technological and eco-
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nomic environment, so that an adjustment in behavior may be induced. 
But, considering learning within the economic process, we have to take 
into account a dynamic environment. 
Learning to ride a bike is different from learning within the economic 
process, especially with regard to entrepreneurial behavior. The former 
describes a learning process by given facts: the aspiring candidate, who 
wants to learn how to ride a bike, has to cope with given facts of nature, 
with irrevocable natural laws that constitute reality. 37 The economic real-
ity, however, is different. Economic behavior means subjective perception 
and social interaction. Actors recognize their economic environment but, 
on the other hand, they create their economic reality since they take part 
in the economic process by being consumer, producer or entrepreneur, re-
spectively. 38 With social interaction, we obtain a reciprocity of the agent 
as an observer and a creator of reality. Actors adjust their behavior to their 
mental model about real economic processes. Doing this, they influence 
the mental model of others who assimilate this change of the dynamic en-
vironment to finally adjust their own behavior. In conclusion, economic 
behavior goes beyond mere stimulus-reaction behavior and even more be-
yond simple adjustment processes to synchronize one's mental model with 
reality; the economic agent, the learning individual as an observer of the 
economic reality, takes an active part in creating economic reality itself. 
Thereby, the most influential agent in this creative process may be consid-
ered to be the entrepreneur. 
In the last section, we discussed the cognition process of agents. While 
they learn about new technologies and obtain new knowledge, economic 
behavior might be adjusted, provided the actor senses a cognitive disso-
nance. Thus, the environment has an impact on economic behavior. This 
influence, however, is not a unilateral one. Economic behavior is no per-
sistent law of nature - though this seems to be true for some basic patterns 
of economic behavior, because every agent adjusts behavior to the eco-
nomic sphere which he himself is a part of (bimodal ontology). The social 
context influences economic behavior as much as economic behavior influ-
ences economic reality. To incorporate those aspects, the findings of social 
psychology will be discussed briefly. 
Social psychology puts the human cognition process into a social con-
text. It studies "( ... ) how people think about, influence, and relate to one 
another. "39 Human cognition is not simply a one-way process in adjusting 
one's behavior to a static environment. The behavior of individual A in-
fluences the behavior of another individual B and vice versa, opening up 
room for strategic and manipulative behavior to twist social and economic 
reality. The social context is crucial for our behavior. The social surround-
ings influence our self-awareness: in a group, we become self-conscious of 
our qualities that make us different to other members of the group, such as 
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being a black among white people or being a high-skilled among unskilled 
workers. Self-interest dyes our social judgement attributing the respon-
sibility for certain undesirable events to others, whereas making oneself 
more responsible for successful ones. The desire to belong to a certain 
group or at least to leave a certain impression on a group, our self-concern, 
makes us adjust one's behavior in a way that induces a certain social be-
havior. For instance, politicians try to understand the voters' needs during 
a campaign to get the majority vote. Without considering the social context 
of an individual, it seems to be impossible to predict a certain (economic) 
behavior. Even the individual himself often has a hard time predicting his 
own behavior. 40 It is not always obvious to the individual what has been in-
fluencing his performed behavior. Sometimes, he might not even be able to 
explain his behavior to others. Nevertheless, the individual's self-concept 
is critical in decision making and performance. His self-esteem, his evalu-
ation of his self worth, determines his appraisal of his traits and abilities. 
Ruvolo and Markus ( 1992) corroborated the hypothesis that people with a 
high self-esteem, with a positive appraisal of themselves, outperform oth-
ers with a rather negative self-appraisal. The optimistic belief in one's 
competence, effectiveness and actions (self-efficacy)41 renders confidence 
which yields positive results just by itself. Self-efficacy, however, is im-
proved not simply by self-persuasion but by others who credit one's "out-
standing" qualities. As a consequence, mutual appreciation among group 
members increases their self-efficacy so that the group's collective efficacy, 
the group's belief in their comprehensive competencies and capabilities, 
exceeds the sum of the individuals' self-efficacy.42 As a conclusion, some 
decisions become more likely to be made as a group decision compared to 
a decision in isolation. Hence, symmetry breaking in behavior can be ob-
served. 43 Considering the decision to found a firm, such kind of decision 
requires high self-esteem and self-efficacy, a decision which is more likely 
to be made as a group. 
So far, we discussed the individuals' and contextual determinants of 
a decision-making process. In the following, we will discuss the phe-
nomenon of the self-serving bias, a psychological aspect that reinforces 
self-efficacy and, consequently, certain behavior. 
As we process self-relevant information, a potent bias intrudes. 
We readily excuse our failures, accept credit for our successes, 
and in many ways see ourselves as better than average. Such 
self-enhancing perceptions enable most people to enjoy the 
benefits of high self-esteem, while occasionally suffering the 
perils of pride. 44 
Despite inferiority complexes, which seem inherent to all of us, 45 there 
is evidence to the tendency that we perceive ourselves favorably.46 
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Positive events are attributed to oneself, whereas negative events are at-
tributed to others or to given circumstances.47 When people evaluate them-
selves in comparison to others, they rank themselves higher than average 
in almost any dimension which is subjective and socially desirable. This 
phenomenon is even more pronounced when someone compares himself 
to unknown individuals.48 Most business managers for example rank their 
performance higher than their average peer.49 Similarly, when evaluating 
future events, Weinstein (1980) detected an unrealistic optimism about fu-
ture life events. Irrespective of the questions individuals were asked, such 
as future job search, risk of HIV-infection, probability of getting divorced, 
etc., most evaluated themselves to have better chances to desirable future 
events than others.5° Concerning an individual's opinion about what others 
think, we observe the so-called false consensus effect. The extent to which 
other people agree to one's own opinion tends to be overestimated by indi-
viduals.51 In the same way as people assess their abilities and desirable or 
successful behaviors, the individual that fails tends to consider his failure 
to be common to all, such as "accidental" tax evasion. On the contrary, 
virtues and successful behaviors, he considers to be unique to his person 
(false uniqueness effect). 52 
McClelland (1961)53 is one of the first who profoundly analyzed the 
social and cultural context of potential entrepreneurs and thus brings in a 
social-psychological aspect into the entrepreneurship discussion. He in-
vestigated the (social) psychological aspects of the achieving society and 
conjectured a basic motivation, a need for achievement within stereotypical 
societies; societies in which typical, cultural and societal values are trans-
ferred via socialization and education, so that as a result, a fundamental 
tendency towards entrepreneurial behavior becomes evident in society. 54 
8.1.3 Summary 
To put the Homo economicus into perspective, the cognitive process of 
bounded rational agents has been illustrated from a psychological perspec-
tive. Agents build subjective mental representations of the perceived real-
ity. The subjective mental model in general will correlate with reality55 but 
will not be completely consistent with reality, since agents have to learn. 
Furthermore, mental representations will also differ among actors. Via 
(social) interaction the mental models' resemblance is coordinated among 
actors. 56 Thus, we identify fundamental, coordinative forces, which tend 
to bring in line the (heterogeneous) actors' mental models and the implied 
behavior. Considering the theoretical hypotheses and the empirical ev,i-
dence in social psychology, the phenomenon of a common possibly false57 
behavior via reinforcement effects of certain behavior becomes possible. 
Figure 8.8 illustrates the basic idea of an economic agent that observes and 
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influences his social and economic environment: the "creative observer". 
This figure pictures social interaction, i.e. communication58 and the par-
ticipation in the economic transformation process. It renders information 
by experiencing his direct social and economic proximity. The agent pro-
cesses the information gathered, and the resulting mental model, which in 
addition is influenced by individual characteristics (accumulated knowl-
edge, capabilities, etc.), determines his behavior, which in return has an 
effect on (socio-economic) reality. The aspect to be stressed here, is that 
social interaction affects the interrelated mental models of the individuals 
involved. And, as individuals act in accordance with their mental model, 
any change in the model influences the cognition process (attention, per-
ception, etc.) and, hence, results in a certain behavior, which becomes part 
of reality. 
The closer we get to the actual, basic model of entrepreneurial behav-
ior in this work, the more the agent has to be idealized and adapted to 
the entrepreneurial case. After the cognition process of heterogeneous 
(bounded rational) agents has been integrated into a socio-economic con-
text, the cornerstone of an interdependent, socio-economic dynamics to 
model entrepreneurial behavior has almost been accomplished. 
For the reader's guidance a reference to figure 7.1 might be helpful. It 
sketches the author's incremental procedure ensuing to model entrepre-
neurial behavior. In this figure, the behavior of individuals is the subject of 
investigation. Considering entrepreneurial behavior, the birth of new firms 
in particular, meso- and macro phenomena have to be taken into account to 
describe individual behavior. Furthermore, between the isolated individual 
level - now, specified by the cognition process as provided by cognitive 
psychology - and the social context of economic behavior - fleshed out by 
social psychology - symmetry breaking59 is considered. 
Besides those individual and social psychological aspects, which are 
common to all bounded rational actors, there are more specific determi-
nants that are found in literature and underpin the specificities of entrepre-
neurial behavior. Still, two further steps are to be taken to round off the 
basic setting of such a model: first, the endowment set which seems to be 
crucial for entrepreneurial behavior from an empirical perspective will be 
stated, and second, the theory of social networks will serve to substantiate 
the socio-economic context of human behavior in the model. 
8.2 Characterizing the Homo agens from an 
Entrepreneurial Perspective 
In the first chapter of this book, the twelve "themes" of the entrepreneur-
ial role elaborated by Hebert and Link (1982) were cited. Afterwards, in 
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section 2.2, those twelve themes were evaluated in terms of their appropri-
ateness to characterize the entrepreneur. Some items were cancelled out 
because it was argued that the entrepreneurial role cannot be investigated 
in a static context. Other items addressed the issue of disequilibrium anal-
ysis subject to bounded rationality which concerns all economic actors. 
Kirzner's entrepreneur as an arbitrageur similarly emphasizes the role of 
information in the market process (in disequilibrium). Knight pointed out 
that it is especially the entrepreneur who has to deal with uncertainty, with 
an indeterministic future. Taking uncertainty as a stylized fact, again, all 
actors have to cope with it. It was Schumpeter who stressed the entrepre-
neurial role within the innovation process. His entrepreneur, discussed in 
section 3.4, brings along economic change, he brings along novelty. When 
we put Schumpeter's entrepreneur in the context outlined above, we ob-
tain a watchful observer of the socio-economic process, who believes in 
his competence and power to influence economic reality, i.e. to innovate, 
to found a firm and to make profits. 
Entrepreneurial component In the model below (chapter 9), each ac-
tor has - at least to a certain extent - the potential to be a Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur. Therefore, the first component of an actor is called "entre-
preneurial spirit," which can also be interpreted as the actor's propensity 
to perform entrepreneurial action by his intrinsic motivation. 
The entrepreneurial spirit, as it is labelled in this context, has been inves-
tigated in many studies. Some personal factors are decisive for entrepre-
neurial behavior. Szyperski and Nathusius (1977) offer a lot of apparently 
necessary qualities of firm founders. Klandt (1984) gives a good overview 
of the traits of firm founders. 60 Several dimensions of personal factors are 
analyzed such as the dynamic personality, age, sex, and so forth. Though 
most of these personal traits are influential, they are not decisive for entre-
preneurial behavior.61 Klandt (1984) points out that situational factors 
prevail. And organization ecologists62 continue in this direction criticiz-
ing such trait approaches. Nevertheless, personal factors (entrepreneurial 
spirit) cannot be neglected. At least, the entrepreneurial element has to be 
considered as a residual component inherent to the individual actor. 
Human capital With the second component the human capital of an 
actor is taken into account. The human capital approach, constituted by 
Theodor W. Schultz63 , and elaborated by Gary S. Becker among others,64 
allows for an empirical application. It tries to explain optimal investment 
in human capital and delivers insights on income distribution. The theoret-
ical concept basically is derived from investment theory in physical capital 
using marginal analysis. In the model below, this theory will not be used in 
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its strict, neoclassical sense, but in a less compelling way: it is simply seen 
as a positive correlation between the actor's human capital and his eco-
nomic performance. The human capital component is meant to emphasize 
the necessity of knowledge for any entrepreneurial action. Goebel (1990), 
Hunsdiek and May-Strobl (1986) for example tested the influence of per-
sonal resources on the entrepreneur's success. DesEite the mixed results 
and some doubtful comments on such an approach, 5 a higher-skill level, 
in particular a higher degree of business specific knowledge of founders, 
have a positive impact on success. 
Since agents are bounded rational, they know about the importance of 
human capital for establishing a firm, but they do not know the actual re-
turn when they decide to do so; when offering their human capital to the 
labor market, they face a different situation. Therefore, agents decide in 
a dichotomous way; if they expect the returns66 of going entrepreneur-
ial be higher than being an employee, they will decide to become an en-
trepreneur. Moreover, the agents' human capital is assumed to be the cru-
cial productive element for the long-run survival of the firm, once it is 
founded. 
Venture capital The third element we include into the agents' endow-
ment vector is the component of venture capital. Herewith, we pay tribute 
to the discussion whether "the roles of the capitalist and the entrepreneur" 
can be separated. The "early French view" rather saw the entrepreneur as a 
risk bearer; the "English view" identified the entrepreneur as the capitalist. 
Schumpeter (1939a) discusses the role of money, too.67 The bottom line 
is that potential entrepreneurs need to have capital to start their business, 
regardless of whether they own it themselves or borrow it from others, ac-
cording to Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Evans and Leighton (1989). 
Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that entrepreneurs in general 
face financial and liquidity constraints.68 Levinthal (1991), furthermore, 
shows that the initial endowment of a newly established firm increases the 
probability of survival at the beginning. As the model is meant to be a plat-
form approach to be specified later on for empirical application, a discrim-
ination between several populations such as venture and human capitalists 
is not undertaken. 
The intuition we draw out of this discussion is that each agent is en-
dowed with a certain amount of financial capital, which he can spend on 
a business venture. Again, we do not bother about the details, whether he 
inherited or accumulated a certain amount of money by saving. 
So far, the individual agents are characterized by their endowment fac-
tors. 69 Each actor possesses the potential to be an entrepreneur, as von 
Mises suggests from a theoretic perspective, and - as empirical data 
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shows - most agents have.70 Thereby, the decision (human action) is not 
an optimal behavior, calculating what the maximal return to total - human 
and (free disposable) venture - capital is. Although the long-term survival 
of a firm once founded is highly dependent on the agent's human capital. 
As we vested all agents with the option to own venture capital, we can 
incorporate the notion of risk bearing and uncertainty.71 
These three components summarize each a category of influential (em-
pirically motivated) determinants for entrepreneurial behavior.72 An agent 
might have a certain amount of each component necessary to establish a 
firm, although he might not have enough of it. 
In that case, the agent needs to complete the minimum endowment nec-
essary to his mind, which might be found in one's social network. 
8.3 The Sociological Context of Actors 
8.3.1 Theory of Social Networks 
In the previous sections, the context of human (economic) behavior was 
gradually introduced and the entrepreneurial specificities of actors stated. 
The section about cognitive psychology illustrated the determinants of 
knowledge diffusion; the section on social psychology went beyond the 
mere, technical understanding of real-world aspects and addressed the so-
cial context and its influence on agents' evaluation of future economic de-
velopments and their subsequent behavior which, thus, results in a partially 
self-fulfilling process. Both, the diffusion of knowledge as well as the 
common evaluation of economic opportunities are substantiated by socio-
economic interaction. Social network theory will help us now to bring in 
the dynamics of human behavior in its social context. Thereby, we also 
manage to climb up the aggregation level within the model. 
Wasserman and Faust (1994) summarize the basic assumptions about 
actors, relations and structure when doing social network analysis as fol-
lows: 
• Actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent 
rather than independent, autonomous units. 
• Relational ties (linkages) between actors are channels 
for transfer or ''flow" of resources ( either material like 
money, or nonmaterial, like information, political sup-
port, friendship, or respect). 
• Network models focusing on individuals view the net-
work structural environment as providing opportunities 
for or constraints on individual action. 
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• Network models conceptualize structure (whether social, 
economic, political, and so forth) as enduring patterns 
of relations among actors. 73 
Considering the birth of new firms, the entrepreneurial process strongly 
depends on such aspects. Once actors understand technology and com-
monly assume a high economic potential, future potential entrepreneurs 
might need their social network to complete the initial endowment, which 
is presumed to be necessary to start a business. They have to figure out 
how to get access to required resources 74 and whether the necessary com-
petence to combine these resources 75 is available. Some of the resources 
and competencies can be inherent to the agent, others have to be acquired 
on the market (Coase (1988)). Since it is not argued on the firm level76 
following Birley (1985), the pre-organization phase is to be investigated 
in order to stress the importance of an agent's social network as a main 
source of help to obtain resources and competencies to start a business. 
Granovetter (1973) provided the pioneering work on social networks. 
Actors' interactions constitute the economic process. Social network the-
ory investigates the relations, the "ties" between those actors.77 Relations 
may have several causal motivations. Actors exchange goods or services, 
or simply information, they transfer attitudes and norms, and build ex-
pectations. Thus they have a mutual influence on each other; an aspect 
which has already been covered above. The ties between actors are either 
strengthened or loosened by the level, frequency and already existing reci-
procity of their relationship. The role-set78 is constituted by direct relations 
between actors. Such relations will put more pressure on one's behavior 
than indirect relations. Nevertheless, the scope of interaction is broader 
according to anthropologists who enlarge the vision of interaction to the 
action-set of the actor, i.e. the entirety of an aggregate of people who pur-
posefully interact. The limits of a network, as it will be used for the model, 
are set by the scope and effectiveness of individuals' behavior.79 There are 
several dimensions networks are differentiated by. The density of a net-
work denotes the ratio of existing ties to all possible ties of a complete set 
of connections. When we look at the diffusion of less specific informa-
tion/knowledge, the whole population in which that information diffuses 
has to be considered a(n) (information) network. This has already been 
modelled above: the complexity of knowledge, absorptive capacities and 
the tacitness of knowledge decide over actors' reachability80 within a net-
work. The idea that information and communication technologies would 
reduce transaction costs reached almost all actors, at least within the in-
dustrialized economies. The scope of knowledge diffusion, being neces-
sary for the actual application of such technologies, reaches by far less 
people, since cognitive capabilities are not evenly distributed. On top of it, 
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entrepreneurial actions are restricted to an even smaller network, since not 
everybody who understands new knowledge will start a business. 
The relative position of an actor within a network, his centrality, thereby 
plays an important role.81 The diversity of the network82 increases the pos-
sibility of innovation, the possibility to detect new combinations. While 
the sum of connections rises, more opportunities become obvious; with a 
growing network size diversity increases, whereas its density declines: the 
more acquaintances are made, the less actors will know each other person-
ally. Nevertheless, those weak ties, as Granovetter calls them, are crucial 
for entrepreneurial behavior; a high centrality and connectivity to a diver-
sity of actors, provide access to important resources of all kinds (human 
as well as financial capital, but also access to charismatic and persuasive 
co-founders). 
A further example for network analysis is given by Aldrich and Zim-
mer ( 1996). They use a population perspective on organizational change 
to discuss entrepreneurial behavior. With the population perspective, they 
circumvent the shortcomings of purely (micro-) personality-based theo-
ries. Personal traits, which are unique to entrepreneurs, are hard to support 
from an empirical point of view, 83 especially when the context of the so-
cial group is neglected.84 Applying the population perspective85 to look 
at entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial decisions are associated with a cer-
tain population and not with an isolated decision of the actor. Random 
mutation, variation, makes an actor an accidental entrepreneur. The actor 
initially does not intend to become an entrepreneur but simply slips into 
it. Thereby, a selection process decides over the effectiveness the "logic 
of internal organizational structuring". Coordinating forces such as market 
competition are not under the control of the individual.86 Conclusively, 
the survival of a certain population depends on the retention of its overall 
technological and managerial competence, the preservation of the fitness 
criteria. With the latter, i.e. the fourth element of the evolutionary process, 
Aldrich and Zimmer introduce the idea of networks on a general basis. 
The merit of the population approach is that it reduces the emphasis on 
an otherwise omnipotent economic actor, but it also reduces its focus on 
individual decision making. Therefore - though following basic ideas of 
Aldrich and Zimmer - the interest is shifted to the basic functioning of 
social networks which play a role in entrepreneurial processes. 
In terms of firm founding, a social network especially provides access 
to necessary resources. In the case agents do not have a sufficient set of 
endowments and, hence, need additional resources, complementary assets 
and competencies, they use friends and acquaintances, strong and weak 
ties respectively, to complete their excogitated necessary set of endow-
ments. 87 Not only does the social network provide access to additional 
and complementary endowment factors, they also have a crucial influence 
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Figure 8.9: The agent within a social network. 
on the actual entrepreneurial decision to start a venture itself. 88 Suppose 
a single agent thinks that he is not able to start a business all by himself. 
Then, he has to convince others in order to be supported; he has to in-
fluence their mental model to achieve a certain behavior, whereas he that 
might gain even more self-esteem which reinforces his conviction. Other-
wise, the lack of legitimacy within the group may J'revent entrepreneurial 
actions and thus, a high degree of innovativeness8 might be ended by an 
agent's objecting social network. A synergetic outcome of either strong or 
weak ties within a network can be an enhanced, and a (by the group) highly 
valued business idea. In other words, a social network also functions as a 
catalyst to spark a venture.90 
Figure 8.9 puts the social network idea into a simple graph showing ac-
tors arranged on a lattice. It depicts nine agents. Every agent has a certain 
amount of entrepreneurial spirit (es), human capital (he) and venture cap-
ital (vc).91 Agents 1, 2 and 3 know each other personally. Given frequent 
interaction of those, strong ties are manifest, i.e. the edges persist for a 
longer duration. When agent 4 is considered an acquaintance of agent 3, 
we discuss a weak tie, a relation which is less frequent and intensive. Weak 
ties can stay for a longer time but might be broken up some day.92 Agent 5 
is known by agent 3, at the most, via agent 4. Agent 9 is isolated from all 
others and cannot be reached by any information for the time being (lim-
its of reachability). Since not all agents know each other personally, the 
density of the network is relatively low. 
All connections, either strong or weak, are subject to change. The way 
they change thereby depends on the dynamics of social interaction. There-
fore, in a further step, this process has to be modelled; even more so, 
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because social interaction is the heart of the evolution of shared men-
tal models inducing certain quasi-coordinated behaviors, which eventually 
lead to a specific economic structure. For this reason, the social dynamics 
is reduced to sketch the social network process concerning entrepreneurial 
behavior. 
8.3.2 Modelling Social Network Dynamics 
The scope of social network theory is far-reaching, almost infinite. Here, 
it is not intended to cover all contingencies of social network dynamics 
as outlaid in the section above, since the aim is to provide a first step to 
formalize a network forming process of bounded rational agents who pos-
sibly end up founding a firm. Furthermore, network analysis shall serve as 
a tool to gradually step up from the micro to the macro level. Recall that 
firms are a hyperstructured system93 which arise out of a social context. 
Network researchers phrased the term network entrepreneurs94 to empha-
size social networks as a hatchery for entrepreneurial behavior. Wasserman 
and Faust (1994) and Wasserman and Galaskiewicz (1994) deliver a bulk 
of literature on network analysis which exceeds by far the rather modest 
approach developed for this purpose. 
Using equation 8.2 and inserting the endowment set from above, the 
actor looks as follows: 
a;= { w;, K';, { es;,hc;, vc;}} (8.3) 
The endowment set of actors consists of: entrepreneurial spirit, es;, hu-
man capital, hci, and venture capital vc;. For simplicity absorptive capac-
ities K' of a fraction s of actors, will be set to K' = 1, so that the stock 
of "new" (technological) knowledge of those actors, wki, after the diffu-
sion of knowledge95 has occurred will also be equal to 1 saying that all 
those actors have access to the innovation potential. The simple dynamics 
assumed in the following is that actors of a kind tend to flock together. 
Again, a lattice is used to illustrate a set of actors. Only the fraction of 
actors who understand the basics of the new technology start to look out 
to join a network which might bring up any kind of business opportunity; 
others are not willing to change their socio-economic environment. Let's 
say the fraction of actors is b = 0.6 that have the personal traits to make 
a change, initiate new acquaintances and look out for their peers. As an 
example, suppose that actors have different parameter values in their en-
dowment factors, for example es;, he; and vc; randomly take the values 1 or 
2. Actors with a possible endowment set96 a; = { 1, 1, { 1, 2, 2}} will change 
their socio-economic environment unless at least a fraction <{> of their direct 
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network members have the same values. To keep things simple, actors of 
the same kind are considered to be all actors, who have an equivalent cross 
sum of endowment parameter values. The underlying intuition is that not 
all actors might have the same qualification profile but relatively the same 
level of overall qualification. An actor moves on according to rule 8.4: 
with 
and 
a;moves <=> E H(IJa;-ak111)/INd >"' 
keN; 
i,f,k 
{ 1 if X > E H(x) : heavysidefunction = 0 z"f else, 
N = actorsintheneighborhood, 
and the Ll-Norm: 
n 
11a11, = E larl, 
r=I 
with 
'Q= ( a1,a2,a3, ... ,an ). 
(8.4) 
In order to formalize this process adequately, the magnitude of an actor's 
direct network is standardized by all in all 9 members. This way, a cellular 
automaton can be used to illustrated the social networks dynamics with the 
Moore-neighborhood97 corresponding to the actor's direct network. Equa-
tion 8.4 says that an agent randomly moves iff more than a fraction</) of 
the agent i's network N; differs more than (JJa; -akll1) > e, with e ~ 0, in 
their endowments. Thereby, e has a twofold interpretation: first, the lower 
e, the more the agent is able to evaluate others precisely; second, the lower 
e, the higher is the actors' aspiration level concerning his network mem-
bers endowment level. When doing equilibrium analysis, e would be 0, 
meaning that the agent exactly finds his match.98 Given actors of the same 
kind, i.e. actors with the equivalent cross sum of endowment parameter 
values, would flock together. In figure 8.10 the network dynamics with 
e = 0 is shown. We observe a convergence which eventuallj will render 
clusters of homogenous actors, in terms of endowment sets.9 
As soon as the complexity of actors increases, the picture looks dif-
ferent. The more endowment levels are differentiated, the more different 
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Figure 8.10: Social network dynamics with E = 0. 
Note: the light grey color denotes empty sites. The darkness of the remaining 
sites denotes the level of endowments. 
qualification levels will arise. If then each actor is assumed to be look-
ing out for a perfect match of his kind, the search process becomes more 
sophisticated; more different clusters would exist and therefore a longer 
period of time is taken to meet a desired group. Nevertheless with E = 0 
all actors would eventually join that group. 
Such search, however, to find the perfect match - as it is often observed 
in real life - appears to be a hopeless venture. A bounded rational agent 
stops searching much sooner, because either a satisfying solution has been 
found or a group of people has been mistaken for the right peer. Both, the 
fact of different qualification levels as well as the respectively satisficing 
or deficient behavior of actors increases heterogeneity among themselves. 
The latter is expressed with an increasing E. In figure 8.11, the group-
forming process of bounded rational actors with likewise three endowment 
factors and three qualification levels but with E = 1 is shown. 
Again, clusters of networks of actors (action-sets) emerge, although 
these clusters are no longer homogeneous. When E is increased further, 
heterogeneity becomes even greater as figure 8.12 with E = 2 depicts. 
Compared to figure 8.11 clusters are formed faster, owing to either a lower 
aspiration level among actors or a more deficient perception, respectively. 
To summarize, bounded rational agents, who conceived the idea of a 
new technology, form heterogeneous networks. In a random process, ac-
tors bump into each other and in each time step decide whether to stay in 
a temporarily chosen network or to move on. The decision constraints are 
the actors' ability to evaluate the similarities of network members and the 
individual aspiration level to be content with a once chosen network. 
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Figure 8.11: Social network dynamics with E = 1. 
Note: the light grey color denotes empty sites. The darkness of the remaining 
sites denotes the level of endowments. 
Figure 8.12: Social network dynamics with E = 2. 
Note: the light grey color denotes empty sites. The darkness of the remaining 
sites denotes the level in endowments. 
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The fraction s of actors who engage in such networking efforts, thereby 
depends on the number of actors who have perceived and mentally pro-
cessed the knowledge about the new technology. At this point, the role of 
absorptive capacity and tacitness of knowledge play a decisive role as dis-
cussed in section 8.1.1. The diffusion of knowledge is a time-consuming 
process. While knowledge diffuses, the number of actors taking part in net-
working gradually increases, provided that the complexity level of knowl-
edge is sufficiently low and the absorptive capacities of actors high enough, 
i.e. w = 1 and ICi = 1 respectively. Using the terms of percolation theory: 
below the percolation threshold (assuming a high complexity of knowl-
edge and a low absorptive capacity of actors), isolated clusters are formed, 
which can be interpreted as innovation clusters. Owing to their isolation, 
spillovers are scarce and the effective electrical conductivity 8e is low, 
meaning that the diffusion of knowledge is strongly inhibited; that is to 
say, it stays tacit within the network. Spillovers occur only if agents decide 
to switch their network and move on to another one. Above the percola-
tion threshold, the accessible fraction X A (p) of the medium, the fraction 
of reachable actors during the diffusion process, is high. Networking ac-
tivities are epidemically spreading among actors. 100 
Finally, it has to be emphasized that the underlying dynamics are initi-
ated exclusively by the assumption of bounded rationality, otherwise con-
vergence and homogeneity would appear and continuous change would die 
down. 
Notes 
1 See Simon (1959). 
2Compare Hayek (1937) and also Loasby (1999) who discuss the role of knowledge in 
uncertainty from an applied economic perspective. This literature fits in well here, but the 
emphasize is to illustrate the psychology of actors in the model derived below. 
3Compare also Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Kahneman and Tversky (1986). 
4See for example Anderson (1947) for details. 
5Compare Reed (1996, Introduction p. 9). 
6Anderson (1947, chapter 3) which makes him adjust his behavior, agents learn. See also 
Hilgard and Bower (1975) for an attempted definition of learning. 
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of the nature of the human mind. Pinker (2002) stresses the role of a genetically influenced 
human psychology, saying that the human mind is not a completely blank slate (i.e. not a 
tabula rasa as John Locke called it), which is gradually formed to an individual psychol-
ogy by perception and interaction. The evolution of human genes cannot be neglected in 
the research on human psychology. This strand of literature brings Darwinian concepts 
into the discipline of psychology. Plotkin ( 1998) provides an Introduction to Evolutionary 
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Psychology which discusses the extent of the genetically driven constraints of the human 
psychology. At this point, suffice it to point towards the existing literature. A detailed 
survey of such will not be pursued in favor of the whole system to be established here. 
8Reed (1996, chap. 2). 
9Usually, the stock market is addressed when talking about an almost perfectly competitive 
market where prices would reflect complete information needed to make an optimal deci-
sion. Therefore, it would not even be necessary for an agent to collect all the data. But 
when we take a look at the phenomenon of the New Economy which for example pulled 
the "Neue Markt" in Germany in its wake, serious doubt is cast on this assumption. 
10Reed (1996) discusses in chapter 3 various models concerning selective attention. 
11The research on mental models is a confluence of several lines of disciplines: cognitive 
psychology, linguistics, anthropology, philosophy and also the research on artificial intel-
ligence. The bottom line of mental models is the attempt of researchers to understand 
how people think the world would work. Thereby, human knowledge representations and 
mental processing is analyzed. Mental models affiliate also to Piaget's work on learn-
ing to be discussed later on. See Gentner and Stevens (1983) for a basic overview. Bara 
(1993), Green (1993), and also Fomahl (2001) used the concept of mental models in an 
entrepreneurial context. 
12Piaget (1974) discusses in his work on "Biologie und Connaisance" the cognition process 
from a biological perspective. He shows to which extent epistemological issues frequently 
raise biological questions which go along with the interdependence between individuals 
and their environment. Darwin and Lamarck serve as examples to illustrate the evolution-
ary thinking of his concept of cognition. 
13See also Maturana and Varela (1987). 
14Note: Here, we see the parallels to Austrian economics. 
15Compare Brenner (1999) for a comprehensive picture on learning in economics. 
16Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980, p. 274). 
17See Kwasnicki (1996) for a sophisticated taxonomy to categorize knowledge. 
18See for example Machlup (1962). 
19see Penrose (1959a, p. 32). 
20see also Abramovitz (1956). 
21see Eliasson (1990). 
22See also Audretsch and Thurik (2000, p. 6). 
23See Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and, for a concise overview, Pyka (1999, p. 80). 
24See chapter 9. 
25Sahimi (1994) discusses the Application of Percolation Theory and Stauffer and Aharony 
(1992) provide an easy introduction. More on this topic can be found in Bunde and Havlin 
(1991) and Hughes (1993). 
26Sahimi (1994, Introduction). 
27Sahimi (1994, p. 5). 
28The first mathematical formulation of percolation processes was delivered by Broadbent 
and Hammersley (1957), modelling the spreading of hypothetical fluid particles through 
random media. · 
29 Sahimi ( 1994, p. 10) shows a lot more of possible networksnattices. 
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30 Assuming an infinite network. 
31 Sahimi (1994, p. 12). 
32That is, a sufficiently large set of actors would allow to speak of an infinite cluster. 
33Note: Occupied sites are evenly and uniformly distributed within the lattice. The medium -
the set of actors, as it will be called soon - is a static system so that no agglomeration effect 
can be detected. The dynamics of the medium can be incorporated, showing a possible 
agglomeration effect via a search process of actors. 
34See figure 3.2. 
35For convenience a binomial distribution is used with n=3 and p=0.5, meaning that a higher 
stage of absorptive capacities is less likely. See program source 8.4. 
36see x1 (p) in figure 8.3. 
37People's shared mental model on knowing how to ride a bike is robust over time. 
38 At this point, the reader ought to recall the bimodal position of the human mind by Hermann-
Pillath (2001). 
39Myers (1996, p. 2). 
40See Shrauger (1983), Osberg and Shrauger (1986) and Osberg and Shrauger (1990) for 
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44Myers (1996, p. 52). 
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46Compare Myers (1996, p. 52). 
47 See for example Mullen and Riordan (1988). 
48 Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak and Vredenburg (1995) give the details. 
49Compare French (1968). 
50see Myers (1996, p. 56) for examples. 
51 Kruger and Clement (1994), Marks and Miller (1987) show empirical evidence. 
52Compare Goethals, Messick and Allison (1991). 
53 As I was frequently reminded that I must not use a traits-approach when doing entrepreneur-
ship research, since empirical evidence would reject personal traits as being a crucial de-
terminant to detect "the" entrepreneurs in society, I want to stress that it is not claimed 
in the model below to be so and, furthermore, in reverse empirical evidence does not tell 
us either that traits are completely irrelevant to entrepreneurial behavior. Conclusively, I 
claim to use the traits approach to a reasonable extent. 
54McClelland (1961, chapters 6 and 7). 
55 As far as reality is perceivable at all in the sense of David Hume. 
56To recall Hermann-Pillath (2001): The human mind takes a bimodal position, on the one 
hand, the human mind serves as the (epistemological) core of (re)cognition and as an (on-
tological) element in the creation of reality, on the other. 
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57False with respect to the assumption that bankruptcy is not an intended successful result of 
any entrepreneurial behavior. 
58Communication and social interaction in general are essential for the evolution of shared 
mental models. See for example Kim (1993). 
59Though we need to draw the whole picture (from the micro- to the macro-level and the other 
way round) in order to describe entrepreneurial behavior, symmetry breaking will only be 
modelled between the two levels mentioned. Symmetry breaking on higher levels will not 
be considered, since the focus is put on individuals. Moreover, an additional specification 
e.g. of the firm would not change the basic behavioral pattern of individuals. 
60BrUderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler (1996) name more examples such as Brockhaus and 
Horwitz (1986) and Begley and Boyd (1987), etc. 
61 see Bruder! et al. (1996, p. 34). 
62Compare e.g. Aldrich and Zimmer (1996) and Carroll and Mosakowski (1987). 
63compare Schlutz (1971). 
64Compare Becker (1993). 
65Compare for example Szyperski and Nathusius (1977) and Klandt (1984). 
66Notice that the agent cannot calculate an exact present value of future returns. 
67compare Schumpeter (1939a). 
68compare Blanchflower and Oswald (1995). 
69Besides the suggested endowment factors any other desired factor can also be included into 
the endowment set. 
70see Blanchflower and Oswald (1995). 
71 Once we divide the actors in different groups, such as potential entrepreneurs without fi-
nancial capital and venture capitalists, the risk can be shifted among those populations. 
Hence, the entrepreneurial agent needs not be the risk bearer. This goes along the lines of 
Schumpeter (1939a, chapter: Entrepreneur). 
72Each component is the result of a cumulative evolutionary process which will not be dis-
cussed in this context. With respect to an empirical application, each component requires 
sector-specific observations. 
73Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 7). 
74see Penrose (1959b). 
75compare Foss (1993) 
76See Coase (1937),Penrose (1959b), Demsetz (1973) and Wernerfelt (1984). Their work 
will definitely give enough inspiration to extent the model in this respect. 
77Compare Granovetter (1973) and Granovetter (1983). 
78E.g. family members. Compare Merton (1957). 
79Compare Aldrich and Zimmer (1996, p. 20). 
80The aspect of reachability in networks is analyzed by Travers and Milgram (1969). 
81 See Aldrich and Zimmer (1996). 
82See Granovetter (1973) and Granovetter (1974). 
83see Aldrich and Wiedenmayer (1993) as an example. 
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84Compare Hall (1982) and above in this work. 
85see also Aldrich (1979). 
86see Aldrich and Zimmer (1996, p. 18). 
87compare Birley (1985). 
88This aspect has already been mentioned above. 
89 According to Stinchcombe (1965) the liability of newness. 
9()See Efring and Baden-Fuller (2000). 
91 See section 8.2 to see why those components have been chosen. 
92Solely from the graph, depicted in figure 8.9, weak ties cannot be differentiated from strong 
ones. Depending on the focus, relations have to be specified further. For our purpose here, 
such differentiation can be neglected. 
93See section 6.2. 
94See Wasserman and Galaskiewicz (1994, p. xiv). 
95Recall the example of the internet as a GPT within the Knowledge-based Economy in 
section 7. I. 
96Only the endowment triple of an actor is considered. 
97The Moore neighborhood denotes all eight neighboring sites to an actor on a square lattice. 
See Gaylord and Nishidate (1996, p. 4). 
98Notice, whether an agent actually tries to find perfect matches with equivalent endowment 
values is another question. 
991n neoclassical theory this search process would only take an infinitesimal period of time. 
That is a search process would not a time-consuming process. The corresponding program 
is given in appendix C. I. 
100see chapter 8. 
9 The Model 
9.1 The Basic Structure 
Now, the elements collected above will be synthesized into the entrepre-
neurship model. The model is designed in a very general form so that it 
will eventually allow to investigate different scenarios and, furthermore, 
to implement relationships and specificities of certain sectors. In a way, 
the basic design has to be seen as a platform approach allowing several 
extensions with regard to the theoretic perspective as well as with regard to 
a closer look at empirical application. Section 7.1 outlays the Knowledge-
based Economy as an example to clarify the theoretical procedure. 
The intuition on entrepreneurship has been collected in the first part of 
this work. In part II, meta-theoretical reflections on methodology rendered 
an approach to a possible treatment of the subject matter. In this part, the 
cognitive psychology of bounded rational agents has been modelled dis-
cussing the contingencies of knowledge diffusion as the fundamental pre-
requisite for innovative activity. Thereby, percolation theory served as a 
modelling instrument. Successively, social psychology was meant to con-
tribute the theoretical foundation to substantiate the evolutionary process 
of how shared mental models are accomplished. At the end of chapter 
8, social network dynamics was sketched to illustrated a simple, quasi-
random search process of bounded rational actors forming networks whose 
members share common objectives. 
9.1.1 The Static Perspective 
The Actor 
To model the evolution of entrepreneurship and the founding of new firms, 
we go one step further down the micro-level and formalize the individual 
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actor's endowments in resources and cognition capacities. The triple of 
individual endowments has already been discussed in section 8.2, so that 
we have: 
(9.1) 
Each actor has got a name i. The stock of knowledge about a newly 
diffusing GPT, w;, depends on the actor's absorptive capacity, "IC;. The 
entrepreneurial spirit, es;,, describes an actor's propensity to decide in fa-
vor of self-employment, being an independent firm leader, or to be a de-
pendent employee. Human capital, he;,, represents the specific level of 
technological as well as economic knowledge and skills. Notice that this 
type of knowledge denotes the fraction of knowledge accumulated through 
education, job experience, etc. and therefore belongs to the commonly 
used, consolidated knowledge of an economy's work force. The knowl-
edge about the new GPT, 1 however, has to be considered as the currently 
diffusing knowledge; i.e. the "understanding of the new invention" provid-
ing a large innovation potential. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed 
that the complexity of such knowledge is very low (w = 1) so that actors' 
absorptive capacities ("IC;= 1) suffice to comprehend the basic functioning 
of the GPT. Henceforth, during the diffusion process more and more ac-
tors absorb the new knowledge and the percolation threshold is exceeded2 
opening up a large potential for entrepreneurial activity within an emerging 
market. Last but not least, a very important endowment factor is addressed, 
venture capital vc;,, conducive to unfold entrepreneurial activity. 
The endowment parameter values are uniformly distributed pseudorandom 
numbers taking a value between [0,1000], higher values indicating higher 
levels of the specific characteristics and vice versa. Actors represented by 
vector 9.1 belong to a set of n actors with a;, := actor i at time3 t and, 
i E {1, ... ,n} so that we have: 
A,= {a;,}iE{l, ... ,n} (9.2) 
Think of all agents as being arranged on a m x m = n square lattice, 
indicating a certain socio-economic structure. As long as the knowledge 
about the new GPT has not yet diffused all actors remain idle in terms 
of entrepreneurial activities. In other words, all sites on the lattice are 
considered empty, since no actor yet engages in a network-forming process 
in terms of innovating on the new GPT. As soon as knowledge diffuses, 
actors, who receive the new knowledge, become activated and start doing 
so. 
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The Diffusion of Knowledge 
The diffusion process is modelled with a cellular automaton using a von-
Neumann neighborhood4 to obtain a logistic diffusion curve as shown in 
figure 8.7. Owing to the fact that only the lowest level in knowledge com-
plexity is considered, the speed of diffusion is taken into account as fol-
lows: a fraction b of actors is initially endowed with the knowledge about 
a new invention, i.e. the GPT. With b = I, all actors own such knowledge 
right at the beginning; that is, the speed of diffusion is infinitely high. The 
lower bis, the more time the diffusion process takes. An alternative inter-
pretation of b would be that the diffusion process has hitherto proceeded 
to b, without anybody yet coming up with an innovation. Intuitively, a 
high b reflects an entrepreneurial potential retained for quite some time 
which eventually might unfold much more rapidly than a slowly diffusing 
technology, i.e. a small b. 
9.1.2 The Dynamic Perspective 
Networking-matching Process 
A first attempt to model social dynamics was shown in chapter 8.3. The 
forming of networks is initiated by agents who have received new knowl-
edge, wlG = 1. The number of actors engaging in networking increases 
during the knowledge diffusion process. To keep the model simple, the 
network-forming process is reduced as follows: all agents with wlG = 1 
take part in networking. There will be no discrimination between different 
networks (clusters). All agents become members of the same cluster. As in 
section 8.3.2, agents search for similar kinds of actors, and with a positive 
e, actors are not always able to find their precise kind.5 The search be-
havior of agents is partially a random process. Actors only become heroic 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, once they happen to observe a window of 
opportunity which is not exclusively within their own power. This quasi-
search process is implemented into the model by randomly permutating all 
active actors to form groups of k actors. Thereby, activated actors which 
are not yet involved in a firm are omitted. In each iteration, agents half-
deliberately-half-undeliberately reflect over the possibility to found a firm 
as a k-group. 
The Entrepreneurial Decision 
Taking into account empirical evidence6 and using the notion of social 
networking, the entrepreneurial decision is made in the context of a group. 
The k actors, randomly brought together,7 evaluate their chances to found a 
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possibly successful firm. A single agent might not found a firm all by him-
self but rather within an adequate group of people an actor tends to decide 
in favor of such venture. Thus, symmetry breaking in decision making is 
implemented. For this purpose, the specific attributes of actors are consid-
ered to be additive so that also a potential firm p f qi can be characterized 
by the triple of attributes of its k members: 
(9.3) 
so that the set of potential firms at time t is 
PF, = {pfqt ( = ceqi)} qE{l, ... ,m} (9.4) 
where q E { 1, ... , m} denotes a specific potential firm and m the number 
of potential firms, i.e. the number of temporarily formed k-groups q in 
period t. 
The Founding Threshold 
Each group of actors has to evaluate if their comprehensive endowment 
ceqt, which for simplicity is equal to pfqi, is adequate. Yet, the actors' 
mere perception of their common resources, attitudes and motivation is 
not the only determinant for founding a firm. The actors involved are also 
influenced by their environment and the respective mood within the pop-
ulation. For modelling reasons, we introduce the so-called founding or 
entry threshold8 'l't. It is a "meso-macroeconomic signal" which depends 
negatively on the growth rate of sector sales Ut and decreases the threshold. 
Furthermore, it depends positively on exits ext, the number of firms in the 
market, inc1, having innovated on the GPT, and time t. After a certain pe-
riod of time positive returns to sale rut will be generated, which eventually 
again reduces the founding threshold and once more spurs entrepreneurial 
behavior: 
'l't = 'I' (~ut ,inc,,ext,rut, t) 
t (+) (+) (-) (+) 
(-) 
(9.5) 
If the k-group's, that is the potential firm pfqi's, comprehensive endow-
ment ceqi exceeds the foundation threshold 'l't, the k actors decide to found 
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a firm, thus the potential firm pfqr turns into an actual firm /j,, and the for-
merly potential firm's comprehensive endowment ceqt becomes the actual 
founded firm's comprehensive endowment ceit• Actors create economic 
reality. Equation 9.6 gives the set of newly founded firms F,new in period t: 
F,new = {pfqr: ~Pfqr > 'I',} 
qJ pfqrEPF, 
(9.6) 
Hence, the set of all firms that have been founded up to time t is given in 
9.7, whereby 9.8 gives a firm's comprehensive endowment. 
T 
F, ={/it}. {l . } ~ LJF,new JE , ..• ,mc1 (9.7) 
0 
(
k k k ) 
/j, = ce it = ce l= esu, l= he;,, l: vc;, 
1=1 1=1 1=1 jE{l, ... ,inc1},iEaj1 
(9.8) 
If the threshold is not exceeded, the option to found a firm, for the time 
being, is rejected by the actors. Consequently, the actors that do not get 
engaged in a firm are free to go for further trials in the following period. In 
the case of a successful foundation of a firm /j, with j E { 1, ... , inc,} the k 
actors involved are no longer available to found another firm. At the same 
time, this reduces the probability for other actors to find adequate partners. 
On the other hand, according to equation 9.9, the number of existing firms 
inc, is increased by the number of firms F,new founded within a period, 
thereby also exerting a positive influence on the sector's aggregate sales 
which positively feeds back on the founding threshold in the next period. 
inc, = inc,_ 1 + I F,new I 
inc, := number of firms in the industry at time t. 
9.1.3 The Micro-Macro Reciprocity 
(9.9) 
Up to this point, the determinants of entrepreneurial behavior have been 
modelled comprehensively. The founding threshold, thereby, reflects the 
macro-data of a sector's economic development, which influence the in-
dividuals' behavior. In traditional economics those data would be taken 
as exogenous variables legitimized by a ceteris paribus assumption. The 
methodological framework developed in this work, however, requires a 
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selection module to be introduced into the model to take account of the 
reciprocity between the micro- and macro-level. Figure 6.1 (chapter 6) 
summarized the methodological framework in general. Figure 7.1 (sec-
tion 7 .2) specified the framework to the case of entrepreneurial behavior. 
Correspondingly, that framework is now going to be completed: a market 
module is needed - appropriate to generate stylized facts which influence 
the actors entrepreneurial behavior via the founding threshold. A selec-
tion process is used to substantiate competition. The easiest way to take 
into account the heterogeneity of competitive firms is the implementation 
of a heterogeneous oligopoly, although other models of competition would 
be feasible. A change of such a module would only change the results of 
the model as much as it effects the founding threshold, but it would not 
change the nature of entrepreneurial behavior in the model. Thus, we ob-
tain a holistic approach while simultaneously focusing on entrepreneurial 
behavior. 
Eventually, we end up with a system which is driven by the endogenous 
entrepreneurial behavior of individuals. 
The Firm 
The firm is the total of endowments actors bring into the firm. This is 
stated in equation 9.8. As emphasized earlier, the subject matter here is 
not to explicitly model the evolution of firms but to model entrepreneurial 
behavior. However, the need for a holistic approach asks for a rudimentary 
treatment of that, since the economic performance of firms also has an 
influence on actors' behavior. 
For simplicity the firm derives from its initial endowment set /j,. Fur-
thermore, once the firm is founded, its structure is manifest meaning that 
the firm is not able to adjust to any competitive pressure by restructuring 
the firm. 9 The cost structure of a firm consists of fixed cost K {,ix determined 
by the venture-capital/human-capital ratio at time to (time of founding), 
with parameter ~ limiting the maximal burning rate of firms, 
and the variable unit costs, kvlr, determined by 
k~ar =C. • (:x!;"m)lr 
Jt JO Jt 
(9.10) 
(9.11) 
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with 
(9.12) 
Firms learn while accumulating output, ~~m, and reduce their variable unit 
cost, by the learning rate lr. The initial variable unit cost, CjO, thereby 
depends on the initial value, co, ( equal for all firms) and their standardized 
relative human capital, hcj, to the best practice human capital, h~ax. 
Finally, the total cost curve, 1½, of firm j looks as follows: 
Kt kvar + Kfix j= jt ·Xjt j (9.13) 
With its total cost curve, a firm's competitiveness, i.e. its relative fitness is 
defined. 
The Selection Process 
To implement a selection process, we have to introduce the demand side. 
This is done by using an oligopoly model. Although such type of mod-
elling does not perfectly fit the demands laid out above, it does the trick 
for the purpose analyzed here. Remember, the methodological approach 
developed allows for a modular construction of models. The sector's dy-
namic evolution is decisive for entrepreneurial behavior, but only to the 
extent facts have an influence on entrepreneurial behavior. Therefore, it is 
enough to generate some stylized facts of an industry's evolution in order 
to model a path-dependent process of entrepreneurial behavior in a contin-
uously changing socio-economic environment.10 Suppose all firms at time 
t face their individual demand curve, given in equation 9.14: 
h ·, 
Pit =Yjr-TIXjt+_.1_1 LPl,t-1; n- I 
l'Fi 
pit :=product price of firm j at time t; 
Yit :=price limit of firm j at time t; 
r, :=price elasticity of demand; 
Xjt := output of firm j at time t; 
j,l E {l, ... ,n},; 
hj, := oligopolistic interdependence of firm j at time t; 
n, :=number of firms at time t. 
(9.14) 
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The price p jt of firm j depends on y jt, which is to be interpreted as the 
firm's quality standard which increases its price limit. Furthermore, the 
firm's output decision Xjr. the demand elasticity T/, the oligopolistic inter-
dependence h jt which considers the past price decisions of all other firms, 
have an influence on the firm's price. 11 With the total cost function in 9.13, 
the firm's profit function conclusively looks: 
_ ( kvar) Kfix 1Cjt - Pjt - jt •Xjt - j (9.15) 
1Cjt :=profit of firm j at time t; 
In standard textbook manner the reaction functions of the myopic opti-
mizing firms would be: 
_planned = Yit + kj~r + h jt '{'"' . ~tanned > O 
Pjt 2 2(n-l)~Pl,t-l,Pjt _ (9.16) 
lfj 
kvar h 
x1:_lanned = Yit - jt + jt '{'"' . x1:_lanned > O 
Jt 2f'/ 21'/(n-l)~Pl,t-l, Jt _ (9.17) 
lfj 
Notice that equations 9.16 and 9.17 are considered to be a firm's fore-
cast. They are a firm's routinized behavior. A firm sets its price and plans 
to sell the corresponding output. The price decision is taken as a con-
stant in each period. Equation 9.17, however, will slightly change since 
the actual output looks different. It is assumed that the turnover of exit-
ing firms, which drops out in the following period, has a positive effect 
on the turnovers of the remaining incumbent firms. Hence, an incumbent 
firm's actual turnover is increased temporarily; this positive output shock 
is non-permanent and disappears after some time depending on parame-
ter p indicating the persistence of such a shock. Moreover, firms which 
produce a positive output are assumed to be able to grow over time with a 
positive impact, 'P(r), of past sales on current sales, whereby this impact is 
decreasing over time. So that the actual price and output look as follows: 
actual _ _planned _ Yit + ki~r h jt '{'"' 
Pjt - Pjt - 2 + 2(n- l) ~Pl,t-l (9.18) 
lfj 
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• .actual _ 
.,tjt -
0 
(x1:_lanned) . (l + (pr)8. Exa;,,,) 
Jt Exsurv,r 
if x'J:anned = O 
. ( (1 + 'Pt) ·X1,t-i) if x'J:anned > O 
with ¥r- < 0 and ~ > 0; 
g E{l, ... ,t}; 
r := lag operator with rxt = Xt- I; 
Xsurv,t := total turnover of surviving firms at time t; 
Xexit,t := total turnover of exiting firms at time t. 
(9.19) 
Again, though the selection process strongly reminds of a standard text-
book optimization problem, the deterministic modelling procedure of the 
demand side can be tolerated for our purposes here, i.e. modelling en-
trepreneurial behavior. Certainly, entrepreneurial actions also include the 
estimation of demand; the specificities, however, do not have a crucial in-
fluence on the agents' behavior. At least the myopic foresight of agents 
and the routine perspective on their price setting and output production 
behavior imply a rudimentary bounded rational behavior of firms, too. 
Now, as the system is complete, the only thing which is left to do is to 
present the numeric results obtained by simulation. Before doing that, a 
short summary will help to recall the basic structure of the model from an 
intuitive perspective. 
9.1.4 Summary 
Figure 9.1 summarizes the basic structure of the model. To start with, 
we distinguish several levels of analysis: the actors level, the firm level 
and the sector level. The entrepreneurial process takes place primarily on 
the actors level. A set of actors with heterogeneous endowments is given. 
Actors form social networks that change over time, expressed by a random 
matching process. 
The actors, grouped together by a networking process, constitute a po-
tential firm. Since they neither have perfect foresight nor complete in-
formation about future prospects, their decision will be myopic, based on 
their common evaluation of the economic situation which is influenced 
by their subjective perception of measurable economic indicators (shared 
mental model). The more economic indicators paint a promising picture 
of a possibly prosperous outcome of entrepreneurial actions, the lower the 
economic indicators 
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Figure 9.1: Basic structure of the model. 
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threshold for actors to decide in favor of such action. The same holds vice 
versa. If actors decide against founding a firm, they return to the set of 
actors available for another trial to evaluate entrepreneurial actions within 
a changed socio-economic environment. If they decide to found a firm, 
the firm is established and actors' resources are bounded within the firm 
so that they are excluded from a further firm-founding process. On the 
sector level, the firm is forced to compete with incumbent firms. 12 Their 
competitiveness is determined by their comprehensive set of endowments 
constituted by the founding actors individual endowments. The selection 
process, which is competition, has an effect on each firm either worsening 
or improving its fitness to stand future competition. Firms may exit in the 
short run while they compete for the market and spend their money for 
penetrating the market. Others may not stand long-run market competi-
tion, the competition in the market, a selection process which decides over 
the competitiveness of the actual business idea. 
9.2 Results and Discussion 
Up to this point the model has been the result of theoretical and method-
ological reflections and the consideration of some stylized facts in litera-
ture. Eventually, the time has come to look at the explanatory power of the 
model's propositions and implications. Some selected preliminary results 
delivered by simulation analysis and a couple of empirical findings will 
be added subsequently to provide a further clarification, albeit no fully 
fledged empirical analysis, to test derived hypotheses constrained by data 
which has not yet been comprehensively collected. 
9.2.1 Simulation Results 
The simulation runs have been exerted for several rates of knowledge diffu-
sion.13 The set of actors counts 2,500 heterogeneous actors with sufficient 
absorptive capacities, ,c > 1, to grasp the low level of the diffusing techno-
logical knowledge about the new GPT (intemet).14 For the three scenarios, 
three different diffusion rates have been chosen, instantiated by different 
fractions s of "knowing actors" who have already absorbed such knowl-
edge right at the very beginning of the scenario. 15 Doing this, for each s 
we obtain a logistic diffusion curve (figure 9.2).16 
With a low fraction of actors, who initially have a full understanding 
of the GPT's potential, we obtain a diffusion curve with a lower slope as 
depicted in figure 9.2, and so forth. 
In order to show that the model also takes account of stylized fact, 
figure 9.3 diagrams the emerging sectors' total sales for all three scenarios: 
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Figure 9.2: The diffusion of knowledge with a low, medium and fast rate 
of diffusion. 
Note: The fraction b of actors who have already observed the new knowledge at 
the beginning of a scenario is hs = 0.0001, in the case of a slow rate of knowledge 
diffusion, bm = 0.001 in the case of a medium rate of diffusion and ht = 0.01 in 
the case of a fast rate of diffusion. 
Once firms are founded, the industry's total sales increases sharply. The 
high growth rates at the beginning function as one of the signals for other 
actors to enter the market (i.e. to innovate). 17 From a certain point in 
time onwards, as competitive pressure increases, with more and more firms 
entering the market, and as market diffusion proceeds, growth rates decline 
remaining positive though. 
Thus, the total sales curve takes a stylized sigmoid shape irrespective 
of the different rates of knowledge diffusion. It is just that the evolution 
of sector sales is slowed down by the knowledge diffusion process, which 
constrains entrepreneurial actions. 
Basically, the number of agents being activated increases with the rate of 
knowledge diffusion and all along, the potential of entrepreneurial behav-
ior. Figure 9 .4 depicts the total number of firms in the market in each time 
step. With a rapidly diffusing knowledge, the number of firms in the mar-
ket skyrockets at an early stage.18 In comparison, with a slower diffusion 
process the growth of the number of firms is rather balanced.19 
There are first movers,20 that is, network members who believe that they 
meet the necessary endowments at the right point in time and decide to 
found a firm. Those early entrants might have a first-mover advantage 
total sales 
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Figure 9.3: The sector's turnover with a low, medium and fast rate of know-
ledge diffusion. 
Note: Fraction of initially informed actors is bs = 0.0001 (slow diffusion), 
bm = 0.001 (medium diffusion) and bi= 0.01 (fast diffusion). 
because they reduce their variable unit cost by accumulating output. Fur-
thermore, there are also late movers who are carried along by a, in general, 
positively interpreted data about economic opportunities, which is repre-
sented by founding threshold in this model, i.e. the shared mental model of 
economic actors. With a high rate of knowledge diffusion, a reinforcement 
(or bandwagon) effect makes the number of firms overshoot. Colloqui-
ally, we would call this "euphoria". Actors are overconfident and act in 
accordance with their belief and their shared mental model about the po-
tential profitability of the GPT. As time goes by, this effect is quenched by 
negative information. 
Looking at figure 9.5 we see entries and exits with a low rate of know-
ledge diffusion compared with a medium and a fast rate of diffusion. Ac-
tors get "activated" - receive the knowledge about the basic understanding 
of the new GPT - and start to positively evaluate the economic oppor-
tunities and thus their chances for entrepreneurial activities. In the fast 
diffusion case, negative information, such as exits, do not occur until the 
number of firms is already at a high level: firms with an unbalanced set of 
endowments are doomed to failure21 and eventually face insolvency. Yet, 
in the early stage they are still in the market and might be able to pur-
port - at least to a certain extent - to be still a potentially successful firm, 
since losses at the beginning are usual and therefore tolerated. The shared 
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Figure 9.4: The number of firms within the sector with a low, medium and 
fast rate of knowledge diffusion. 
Note: Fraction of initially informed actors is bs = 0.0001 (slow diffusion), 
bm = 0.001 (medium diffusion) and bt = 0.01 (fast diffusion). 
mental model (the founding threshold) has not been affected yet. Once 
first exits occur and agents start to rethink their attitude (adapt their mental 
model), the number of firms in the sector is brought down in two ways: 
first, by the number of exits as firms gradually run out of money and sec-
ond, by an increasing founding threshold as negative information reduces 
expected economic profits. In the case of slowly diffusing knowledge, the 
same forces work in such an evolutionary process. But the phenomenon of 
an overshooting founding behavior is much more moderate or even unde-
tectable as figure 9.4 shows. 
With a slowly diffusing knowledge, actors become only gradually in-
formed about the GPT and, counterproductively, negative information such 
as exits, market concentration and the wearing out of novel ideas over time, 
a less turbulent evolution is observed. 
Not surprisingly, the shake-out22 in the fast diffusion scenario is more 
fierce than in the other scenarios. To be specific, in the slow diffusion case 
there is no shake-out process observable at all. This is what figure 9.6 
illustrates. 
In figure 9.7 the founding threshold illustrates the dynamic development 
of actors' shared mental model about a common evaluation of a GPT's 
overall innovation potential, its economic applicability. With this threshold 
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Figure 9.5: Entry and exit with a low, medium and fast rate of knowledge 
diffusion. 
Note: Fraction of initially informed actors is bs = 0.0001 (slow diffusion), 
bm = 0.001 (medium diffusion) and bf = 0.01 (fast diffusion). 
a psychological/sociological aspect has been incorporated into economic 
modelling, and thus connecting actors' psychology/sociology to economic 
behavior, and in this context in particular, to entrepreneurial behavior. We 
see that in the case of fast diffusing new technological knowledge, the 
amplitude of the founding threshold at the beginning of an industry's evo-
lution is very high. A therefore more fierce shake-out process - as a lot of 
less competitive firms are founded - entails a rebound effect as indicated 
by a fast rising founding threshold. Only when the industry's return on 
sales becomes positive, again, does the founding threshold slowly start to 
decrease until a gradual obsolescence of technology eventually increases 
the founding threshold for a last time heralding the end of a technology's 
economic application. 23 
Up to now, the micro-behavior of agents, their endowment, their social 
networking process and the symmetry breaking in economic behavior con-
sidering their social context has been outlaid. With the founding threshold 
we manage to make the connection from the macro- to the micro-level, 
which we need in order to explain entrepreneurial behavior. However, with 
rationally bounded agents we cannot simply aggregated micro-behavior 
to the macro-level, as is the case when perfect rationality, optimality and 
hence deterministic behavior is assumed. Nevertheless, micro behavior is 
crucial for the macro-level performance, a connection which has not been 
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Figure 9.6: Net entry of firms with a low, medium and high rate of know-
ledge diffusion. 
Note: Fraction of initially informed actors is bs = 0.0001 (slow diffusion), 
bm = 0.001 (medium diffusion) and bi= 0.01 (fast diffusion). 
modelled owing to symmetry breaking which occurs when moving from 
the micro- to the macro-level. Regardless of the exact processes of mar-
ket competition and a sector's evolution, since the demand side has not 
been modelled accurately, it suffices to produce stylized facts on the firm 
and sector level, which have a decisive influence on entrepreneurial be-
havior. Indeed, actors are not able to calculate present values of potential 
entrepreneurial actions, they have to cope with true uncertainty and eval-
uate the economic applicability of a technology, i.e. an industry's future 
development to justify their actions. They have to act on existing data of 
the market. Using the methodological framework in figure 7.1, a modular 
construction of the model becomes possible. Once the demand side, that 
is market competition, is modelled more precisely, the oligopoly module 
can be substituted for a new evolutionary theory of the firm and ceteris 
paribus (with respect to the stylized fact considered to be decisive for en-
trepreneurial behavior) will not change actors' entrepreneurial behavior. 
For a last step, the stylized facts produced by the model will be illus-
trated. As the reader has already understood, industry life cycle theory 
tells the story about the stylized facts generated by the model. Note that 
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Figure 9.7: The founding threshold with a low, medium and high rate of 
knowledge diffusion. 
Note: Fraction of initially informed actors is bs = 0.0001 (slow diffusion), 
bm = 0.001 (medium diffusion) and bt = 0.01 (fast diffusion). 
the model does not explain the determinants of an industry life cycle in par-
ticular, but rather puts entrepreneurial behavior into the context of industry 
life cycle theory. 
Entrepreneurial behavior is the underlying driving force of the endoge-
nous evolution of an industry. Klepper (1997) summarizes some of the 
literature on industry life cycles as by Williamson (1975), Abernathy and 
Utterback (1978) and Drew (1987). Although each of these come from a 
different stance such as the transaction cost, a technological and a manage-
ment strategy perspective, respectively, the basic dynamics of an industry's 
life cycle resemble, despite the fact that those concepts differ in the num-
ber of phases an industry life cycle may consist of. Klepper (1997, p. 149) 
argues that the differentiation of stages seems rather arbitrary.24 Neverthe-
less, such a distinction of stages, which the model clearly suggests, will be 
made. 
Each of figures 9.8, 9.9 and 9.10 depict the stylized facts of an industry 
life cycle contingent to different rates of knowledge diffusion. We distin-
guish five stages an industry life cycle passes through. Considering fig-
ure 9.8 starting with stage I: the exploratory, embryonic phase is character-
ized by a high degree of uncertainty and a high level of innovation. As firm 
entry rapidly grows and total sales start to increase, the founding thresh-
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old plummets. In stage II, the net entry rate reaches its peak and slowly 
diminishes with a still positively growing output. Hence the number of 
firms has not reached its maximum yet, while the founding threshold has 
already passed its trough and gradually increases as more and more exits 
occur. In the third stage, a shake-out period lowers net entry below zero. 
The founding threshold is increasing and the total number of firms starts to 
decrease too. Sales growth rates decline. Stage IV shows a less turbulent 
development. Net entry is close to zero, so that the number of overall firms 
stays roughly the same. The total sales growth rate stays low. Since more 
and more firms reach or pass their break-even point, profits will be gener-
ated. Consequently, positive return on sales increase, reducing the found-
ing threshold again and thus motivating new actors to enter the market. The 
industry's output keeps on growing slowly. In stage V the obsolescence of 
the applied technology takes effect and increases the founding threshold so 
that any entrepreneurial action concerning the economic application of the 
now obsolete technology is smothered. 25 
As figures 9.8, 9.9 and 9.10 show, the rate of knowledge diffusion plays 
an important role. Though we observe all five stages discussed above in 
figure 9.8, the stage of shake-outs (negative net entries) is less fierce in 
figure 9.9. The industry life cycle seems to reduce to only four stages. In 
the last case with a low rate of knowledge diffusion, it would be acceptable 
to talk about a three-stage industry life cycle. 
To sum up, the oligopoly model used in this entrepreneurship 
model as a modular element, produces the stylized facts suggested by in-
dustry life cycle theory. Thus, the macro-micro feedback effects complete 
the dynamic process on endogenous entrepreneurial behavior; moreover, 
the role of the rate of knowledge diffusion shows an interesting difference 
in the evolution of an industry life cycle.26 
9.2.2 Further Discussion 
To round off this work, an empirical part would be appropriate. So far a 
methodological discussion has led to build a theoretical model which is ad-
equate to cope with the phenomenon of entrepreneurship in the economy. 
Some stylized facts were taken account of along the path of modelling, 
whereby some implications resulted from assembling a wide range of ideas 
found in literature, to build a consistent whole. The model can definitely 
be applied to many sectors but it was derived to illustrate especially the en-
trepreneurial behavior in a Knowledge-based Economy. The internet as a 
General Purpose Technology (GPT) served as an intuitive scaffolding and 
some hypotheses addressed require empirical testing. Unfortunately, the 
adequate data has not yet been collected to do so. 
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Considering the actors' endowments, a lot of empirical work has already 
been done in this respect. In the model above, the endowment factors were 
chosen, motivated by theoretical and empirical findings. 
The venture capital component Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), for exam-
ple, tested how the"( ... ) exogenous receipt of capital affects the decision to 
become an entrepreneur( ... )." They found a positive influence. A first ma-
jor step towards an empirical investigation of the Knowledge-based Econ-
omy was made by Klandt and Krafft in 2000 and 2001. They collected data 
on about 9000 Internet/E-commerce start-ups. Klandt and Krafft (2000b) 
show that the availability of financial capital is decisive for entrepreneurial 
success. The majority of new firms is financed by venture capital at an 
early stage and the fraction increases over time. Nevertheless, the ini-
tial surge of start-ups began without venture capital and regrettably, the 
individual financial endowment, as suggested in the model, has not been 
investigated yet. 
The human capital component Chandler and Jansen (1992) explored 
founder's self-assessed competence and venture performance. Herron and 
Robinson (1990) also depicted entrepreneurial skills which would refer to 
the human capital component of actors. Taking a look at the Klandt/Krafft 
study27 , founders of internet/E-business firms in Germany have an above-
average level of education. More than 75 percent graduated from college. 
A more detailed empirical analysis to figure out specific skills and compe-
tencies would be useful. 
The entrepreneurial spirit component This is a rather difficult one. 
It is associated with the traits-approaches to entrepreneurial behavior such 
as discussed by Locke (1993), Begley and Boyd (1987), Locke, Wheeler, 
Schneider et al. (1991). The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. Traits 
alone do not make an entrepreneur. But on the other hand, this does 
not mean that traits should be discarded as a possibly causal element of 
entrepreneurial behavior. In the study of Klandt/Krafft, traits were basi-
cally omitted so that no propositions can be made yet with regard to the 
founders' traits in the Knowledge-based Economy. 
Social interaction and networking Once the data is collected, so-
cial interaction can be substantiated. Populations can be built to match 
the empirically underlying structure of an economy's population. Possi-
ble populations might be a venture capital population, a highly educated 
population with an affinity to new technologies, etc. Then, the psycholog-
ical and sociological aspects could be taken into consideration so that a 
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social interaction, or networking process can be modelled in more precise 
terms. Temporarily, the empirical data only allows to maintain that most 
internet/E-commerce businesses are founded in groups of two to three peo-
ple. 28 Specifically, empirical investigation is needed on the actors' cog-
nition process, how actors perceive and evaluate a new technology, and, 
moreover, how this correlates with entrepreneurial behavior contingent to 
the rate of knowledge diffusion. The quasi-random search process or the 
networking process, which leads to clusters that hold potential firms, has 
to be fleshed out with empirical data. Even more difficult: The founding 
threshold needs a conversion to a measurable magnitude in order to detect 
feedback effects from the macro- to the micro-level and vice versa, i.e. 
to take into account micro-macro reciprocity. 29 In other words, to what 
extent do economic indicators influence the actors' shared mental model 
about the functioning of innovation processes which causes them to make 
suboptimal decisions.30 Most of these tasks have been worked on in var-
ious fields, but it has not yet been done extensively when focusing on a 
single sector. The Knowledge-based Economy by virtue of its topicality 
and dynamics would be an appropriate focus for such venture. 
Despite the amount of empirical work that still has to be done, the ex-
isting data on the Knowledge-based Economy gives some stylized facts, 
which also the model complies with. Figure 9.11 for example shows 
swarms of innovations in the internet/e-commerce sphere. A surge of in-
ternet technology firms was followed by internet services and E-commerce 

































Figure 9.8: The industry life cycle - assuming ah gh rate of knowledge 
diffusion. 
Note: "# of firms" stands for the total number of firms in the market. The scaling 
of total sales is in thousand currency units. The starting value of the founding 
threshold 'Po = 6,300. 
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Figure 9.9: The industry life cycle-assuming a medium rate of knowledge 
diffusion. 
Note: "# of firms" stands for the total number of firms in the market. The scaling 
of total sales is in thousand currency units. The starting value of the founding 
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Figure 9.10: The industry life cycle - assuming a slow rate of knowledge 
diffusion. 
Note: "# of firms" stands for the total number of firms in the market. The scaling 
of total sales is in thousand currency units. The starting value of the founding 
threshold 'Po = 6,300. 
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Figure 9 .11: Swarms of firm foundations 
Note: In all three cases, the vertical axis depicts the number of firms. B-B and 
B-C stand for Business-to-Business and Business-to-Consumer, respectively. 
Source:Compare Klandt and Krafft (2000a, p. 10) 
<http://www.e-startup.org/ergebnis.htm> database, Newsfeeds, 
RWS-Verlag <http://www.rws-verlag.de/indat/inso.htm>, 
Insolnet GmbH <http://www.insolnet.de>, 04/26/2002. 
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Figure 9.12 delivers another stylized fact: the exit rate is increasing and 
will presumably be followed by a shake-out process. Although the time 
series only goes back to the year 2000, a clear rise in the rate of exits 
emerges. Taking figure 9.12 and figure 9.11 together, a picture similar to 
the simulation result in figure 9.5 - assuming a high rate of knowledge 
diffusion - is the outcome. Since there is neither data about the rate of 
knowledge diffusion, nor about the actors' technology-specific absorptive 
capacities in order to distinguish those scenarios as given in the simulation 
study, nor data about a comparable, endogenous evolution of a sector, no 
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Figure 9 .12: Insolvencies of intemet/E-commerce firms per month. 
I 
Note: ( 1) The numbers for January are lower than depicted in the diagram because 
of a lag between acceptance and publication of insolvency proceedings. 
Source: Compare Klandt and Krafft (2002) 
<http://www.e-startup.org/download/5>, database, Newsfeeds, 
RWS-Verlag <http://www.rws-verlag.de/indat/inso.htm>, 
Insolnet GmbH <http://www.insolnet.de>), 04/26/2002. 
While the last figure only focused on insolvencies, figure 9.13 illustrates 
an even more drastic picture of "give-ups". It summarizes the total of firms 
that had to exit the market in a very short period of time. Here, exit is used 
in its broadest sense: mergers and acquisitions, insolvencies, shutdowns, 
etc. The exit rate dramatically increased from July 2000 to January 2002. 
Starting with 676 operating firms in early July 2000, an accelerating se-
lection process reduced incumbent firms by 274 exits. Thereby insolvency 
is the major cause of exit; a stylized fact which is also represented in the 
simulation analysis in figure 9.5. Furthermore, venture-capital-financed 
firms apparently face a higher risk of insolvency than non-venture-capital-
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financed firms.31 This supports the idea that an imbalanced set of a firm's 
endowments leads to failure owing to a lack of adaptability, the incapabil-
ity to cope with a rapid growth strategy enforced by the availability of a 
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Figure 9.13: Overall ex.its of internet/E-commerce firms. 
Note: a*: firms not trackable, b*: still incumbent firms, c*: firms acquired by 
others, d*: firms having merged with others, e*: insolvent firms and shutdowns, 
f*: firms that exit after having merged with others, g*: early-phase give-ups. 
Source: Compare Klandt and Krafft (2002) 
<http://www.e-startup.org/download/l 0>, database, Newsfeeds, 
RWS-Verlag <http://www.rws-verlag.de/indat/inso.htm>, 
Insolnet GmbH <http://www.insolnet.de>, 04/26/2002. 
The empirical findings support the theoretical implications of the model. 
As far as the evidence exists, the empirical phenomena of the Knowledge-
based Economy - in particular when considering the internet - suggests 
that it be classified as a case of fast knowledge diffusion: the wave of entries 
has almost peaked before the wave of exits even started. 
There are also other examples which draw similar conclusions to the 
ones of the model. The appropriate empirical work about industry life 
cycles we find for example in Klepper (2002).32 He investigates several 
industries: the automotive, the tire, the television and the antibiotics in-
dustry. He diagrams entries, exits and the overall number of firms in those 
industries. In contrast to the internet industry, where ex.its and a shake-out 
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occur with quite a lag, we find that in the automobile and the tire industries 
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Figure 9.14: Entries and exits in the automobile industry. 
Source: Klepper (2002, p. 44). Copyright © 2002. Reprinted by permission of RAND. 
The automobile industry (figure 9.14) started in 1895 with a low rate of 
entry but then rose quickly to peak in 1907 at 82 entries. After 1910 entry 
was much lower and almost negligible after 1923. The maximum number 
of firms (271) in 1909 was reduced by 60 percent till 1923. Since the 
growth rate of output was very high in that period the shake-out cannot be 
attributed to a decline in the market. 33 This supports the oligopoly idea as 
it is implemented in the model. The tyre industry draws a similar picture. 
Concerning the rate of knowledge diffusion, the automobile as well as the 
tire industry are better classified as examples of slower diffusion compared 
to the internet case. Nonetheless, this needs further investigation in order 
to come to a more precise conclusion. 
The television industry did not start before the end of World War II. 
The peak of entry was in 1948, only a few years after the industry's be-
ginning. With 105 incumbent firms, the maximum of firms in this in-
dustry was also reached very early in its life cycle in 1949. In 1959 the 
number of firms came down to only 36 percent of the peak. Compared 
to the automobile industry, stage I of the industry life cycle lasted only 
about 3 years (automobile: about 12 years), stage III, the period of ex-
treme shake-outs took only 10 years to bring the number of firms down 
to a share of 36 percent of its peak compared to about a duration of about 
14 years in the automobile industry to render still 40 percent of its peak. 
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Figure 9 .15: Entries and exits in the television industry. 
Source: Klepper (2002, p. 44). Copyright© 2002. Reprinted by permission of RAND. 
This suggests that the television industry may be ranked after the internet 
but before the automobile industry, concerning a classification along the 
lines of the model. 
Looking at the penicillin industry, we observe a more balanced devel-
opment. All firms founded had experience in this sector (pharmaceutical 
and chemical producers). In World War II the government selected the 20 
most qualified firms to engage in the production of penicillin. Therefore, 
the penicillin industry represents a special case in terms of entrepreneurial 
behavior. The restrictions on market entry was not abolished before the 
end of World War II, but the entry of new firms remained modest, peaking 
in 1952 with 30 firms in total. Also the shake-out was modest and even-
tually reached its low after about 40 years with a 30 percent fraction of its 
peak. Hence, the conclusion would be to categorize the penicillin industry 
a case of slow diffusion according to the model. 
Certainly, it has to be recalled at this point that the demand side has not 
been modelled profoundly, which explains why the curve in the simula-
tion runs do not finally follow the empirical ones that closely. Therefore, 
the long-term selection process that decides over the long-term number 
of firms in the industry is rather static and therefore rather arbitrary in 
the model. Furthermore, it is not meant to explain industry life cycles. 
The purpose simply is to bring entrepreneurial behavior into the dynamic 
context of industry life cycle theory, which explains to a large extent the 
evolution of an industry life cycle. 
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Figure 9.16: Entries and exits in the penicillin industry. 
Source: Klepper (2002, p. 44). Copyright© 2002. Reprinted by pennission of RAND. 
Therefore, it will be necessary to make the connection between the model 
and economic fields also from an empirical perspective. In order to test the 
core propositions of the model, the psychological, sociological processes, 
that is, the fundamental determinants of human decision making in terms 
of entrepreneurial behavior, additional data has to be collected and brought 
into the context of economic behavior. It has to be emphasized that this 
ought to be done by focusing on a certain sector, so that eclecticism is 
overcome not only from a theoretical perspective - as done in this work -
but also from an empirical one. 
Notes 
1 For a reminder see section 7. l. 
2See section 8.1.1. 
3Time is not implemented as a detenninistic function, which would ex ante detennine an 
individual's lifetime path. It expressed the fact that an actor is subject to change, depending 
on the reciprocity of the individual and his time-dependent socio-economic environment. 
4See Gaylord and Nishidate (1996, p. 4). 
5see also section 8.3.2. 
6Compare Klandt and Krafft (2001). 
7The random matching process counts for the fact that actors are not able to find a perfect 
match. This is a simplifying technique to implement the notion the parameter e suggests. 
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8The founding threshold represents the actors' shared mental model. 
9Tois idea is adapted from organization ecology. Compare e.g. Aldrich (1979), Aldrich and 
Zimmer (1996) and Stinchcombe (1965). 
IO An appropriate formulation of the demand side, which fits the methodological requirements 
outlaid in this work, still has to be developed. Some of the instruments discussed here, 
such as percolation theory, cellular automata and so forth, will be helpful to get started 
with a first basic, theoretical approach. It is possible to model bandwagon effects on the 
consumers' side in a similar way as the swarming behavior of entrepreneurs using e.g. 
percolation theory and cellular automata. Leibenstein (1950) offers a lot of ideas on that. 
Rohlfs (1974), for example, discusses network effects on the demand side. The oligopoly 
model used here is based on myopically optimal behavior, which will do for the purposes 
pursued here. Nevertheless, in future work the demand side ought to be tackled from a 
similar perspective since bandwagon effects on the consumer side align entrepreneurial 
behavior on the supply side. 
11 Compare Meyer et al. ( 1996) and Pyka (1999) who also used such a heterogeneous oligopoly 
model. 
12The firm and sector level simply need to take into account the reciprocity between the 
micro- and the meso/macro-level. See chapter 6. 
13Toe corresponding program code is given in appendix D. 
14Recalling the intuitive example in section 7.1. 
15See program code in the appendix D. 
16For a reminder, the diffusion process has been modelled using a von Neumann automaton. 
17This is one of the stylized facts also put forward by industry life cycle theory. Compare for 
example Klepper (1997) and also Williamson (1975). 
18The analogy to percolation theory, discussed in section 8.1.1, suggests that the percola-
tion threshold is reached long before any type of entrepreneurial action has taken place. 
Therefore: once first entrepreneurial actions, first firm foundations have been undertaken, 
the fact of an exceeded percolation threshold allows for a highly dynamic process of addi-
tional firm foundations. In other words, the contagion process takes place very quickly so 
that bandwagon effects of entrepreneurial behavior occur. 
19Gort and Klepper (1982) also discuss the rate of knowledge diffusion as a determinant of 
the evolution of an industry in the context of industry life cycle theory. 
20see Robinson and Fornell (1985) and Urban et al. (1986) for additional literature. 
21 This is an idea borrowed from organization ecology saying that once the firm is founded, 
its structure becomes manifest and will not change over time. Compare e.g. Aldrich and 
Zimmer (1996), Aldrich (1979) and Stinchcombe (1965). 
22Gort and Klepper (1982) define the shake-out phase within an industry's life cycle the 
period of negative netentries. 
23Certainly, the underlying assumption is that the technology cannot be improved and step-
by-step is substituted by another innovative technology. 
24The number of phases, which are distinguished, differ among authors. Williamson (1975) 
recognizes an early exploratory phase, an intermediate development stage and a mature 
stage. The first represents the introduction of a new product under high uncertainty pro-
ducing with little specified machines. The second phase comprises a period of refinement 
in manufacturing techniques and a further specification process of the market. The third de-
notes the established market of a mature industry (for more details see Williamson (1975, 
p. 215)). Abernathy and Utterback (1978) call the early phase ajl,uid period in which 
certain criteria of the new products are not yet well defined, innovation is fast and fun-
damental, and production techniques are very flexible. The specific phase thereby brings 
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along less innovative changes of the product and the production techniques. Work flows 
are rationalized. Drew ( 1987) delivers a business school perspective, where it is taught that 
an industry passes four stages: an embryonic, a growing, a mature and an aging phase. 
The embryonic phase is identified by low barriers to entry, a rapid growth in the number of 
firms and uncertainty is dominant. The peak in the number of firms is reached in the second 
(growing) phase followed by a shake-out. Once an established market becomes predictable 
and hence uncertainty is reduced the mature phase has been reached. In the aging phase 
the market declines (compare Drew (1987) for further details). Gort and Klepper (1982) 
distinguish five stages of an industry life cycle. Stage I starts with the introduction of a new 
product by one or a couple of producers and ends with a rapid increase in entries. Accord-
ing to Klepper, this phase also depends on the speed of technological knowledge diffusion. 
Stage II continues with a high rate of entry and ends with a drastic decrease in entry. Stage 
III is characterized by a low or even zero net entry. Stage IV shows a negative net entry 
which he calls shake-out. The final stage V represents an "( ... ) equilibrium in the number 
of producers that coincide with the maturity of the product market and continues until some 
new fundamental disturbance generates a change in market structure." (Compare Gort and 
Klepper (1982, p. 639).) 
25This holds only in the case of the assumption of the static perspective on firms. They are 
not able to adjust to the competitive pressure and besides learning effects no innovation is 
allowed for. Here again, the shortcomings of the demand side come into effect. 
26Compare Gort and Klepper (1982) for additional reflections on the role of knowledge dif-
fusion in the industry life cycle. 
27See Klandt and Krafft (2000b). 
28See Klandt and Krafft (2000c). They state that on average 1.9 (firms, not financed by 
venture capital, Business Angels or strategic investors) and 3.1 (firms, financed by venture 
capital, Business Angels or strategic investors) respectively, take part in a firm foundation. 
29Possible instrumental variables to be measured may be: the number of articles about new 
technological innovations in newspapers and citations of technology-specific keywords by 
using cliometrics; the emergence of novel magazines/journals on the internet; the turnover 
of such medium; and the mediated positive or negative information about economic oppor-
tunities. 
3°Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Kahneman and Tversky (1986) would be a reference 
in this respect. 
31 see Klandt and Krafft (2002). 
32Klepper (2002, p. 44) collects several data provided by Smith (1968) (automobiles), from 
the annual editions of the general trade register Thomas' Register of American Manufac-
turers (Thomas' ( 1905-1993)) (Tires), the periodic editions of Thomas' and Synthetic Or-
ganic Chemicals (SOC ( 1944-1992)), based by an annual survey of the U.S. Tariff Com-
mission, and the FTC's 1939 study of antibiotics. 
33compare Klepper (2002, p. 43). 

10 Conclusions and Prospects 
The aim of this book was to develop a model on entrepreneurial behavior. 
The synopsis of the literature delivered a multitude of eclectic ideas on 
entrepreneurship. It turned out that the basic intuition among economists 
has been persistent throughout the literature. It was just the adequacy of 
the means used to tackle such a fundamental phenomenon of economic 
behavior that made a difference. 
Early in the history of economic thought, precursors of entrepreneurship 
theories recognized and emphasized the role of entrepreneurs in economic 
life. Striving to explain the struggle of human beings with the burden of 
seemingly scarce resources, they pursued to elaborate the concept of the 
entrepreneur as a unique economic man who nourishes the economic pro-
cess and appears to excel compared to others who faced scarcity and un-
certainty. With this end in view, economists have always been looking for 
a proper means to structure economic thinking. What pure verbal con-
cepts could hardly manage, the Newtonian mechanics did; that is, to en-
sure consistency. And with consistency the ends finally justified the means. 
But implicitly, the means (Newtonian mechanics) did no longer justify an 
entrepreneur who would be different to a methodologically reduced eco-
nomic man: the Homo economicus. Henceforth, the entrepreneur became 
the Achilles heel of orthodox theory, a sacrifice of ends to conventional-
ized means. Without such a powerful methodological toolbox, however, 
the theory of the entrepreneur got stuck in eclecticism, since neither a suit-
able deductive apparatus to assert and formalize a consistent theory was 
available, nor any inductive procedure rendered significant progress in de-
tecting the deterministic features of an entrepreneur. 
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So it emerged that the entrepreneurship discussion had become perma-
nently interlocked with a methodological discussion. 
The methodological discussion - though not claiming completeness -
was prominent in this work. The first step was to circumvent eclecticism 
by providing a holistic view on entrepreneurial behavior, based on a sound 
methodological framework. Indeed, the latter is quite demanding, and still 
needs to be enhanced by future research work. Some modest steps have 
been made, using graph theory and simulation studies. A consistent whole, 
a coherent apparatus, a methodology which we may call evolutionary still 
has to be accomplished. 
Concerning the entrepreneurhip model in this work, it was emphasized 
that the focus was put on entrepreneurial behavior, the birth process of 
firms and industries; a further discussion of the industry life cycle was 
touched but not chosen to be the explanandum. The core elements of 
the model are heterogeneous actors, their cognitive process, which fuels 
bounded rational behavior and leads to myopic decisions with possibly 
sub-optimal outcomes. The bimodal ontology of the human mind, making 
the actor a creative observer, was substantiated by the micrer-macro feed-
back effects (founding threshold) which lead to a certain trajectorial de-
velopment, since such models of entrepreneurial decisions are irreversible 
(history matters). A selection mechanism has been attached to the out-
come of a fallible decision making process - an imbalanced endowment 
set leading to firm exit. Simultaneously, a dynamic element is incorpo-
rated. The market process as well as the changing attitude of actors, driven 
by their perception of the economic situation, influence economic behavior 
and hence, economic reality. At the initiation of the emerging new sector, 
actors have to deal with true uncertainty dominating the decision-making 
process; actors have to rely more on their subjective and possibly "false" 
intuition concerning their entrepreneurial actions, which lead to market 
turbulence in the early phase of the sectors life cycle. As time goes by, 
actors are better able to understand the new technology, to assess market 
opportunities and their chances for successful innovative, entrepreneurial 
behavior; consequently, uncertainty decreases. More precise predictions 
and more careful decisions will be made so that stabilizing forces set in. 
The rate of knowledge diffusion plays a critical role, here. 
The emphasis of future research work definitely has to be put on the em-
pirical application of the model as indicated in the short empirical appetizer 
above. Some specifications will be necessary. Starting at the actors level, 
the actors' individual set of endowments has to be investigated in order to 
identify the actual essential components that spur entrepreneurial behavior 
as well as the creative process of generating a business idea. A possible 
classification of actors and the formation process of social networks that 
have an impact on entrepreneurial behavior needs to be made. 
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The most challenging part will be to analyze the psychological and soci-
ological part of the story, how economic actors build their mental models 
and how shared mental models lead to certain patterns in behavior; and to 
investigate the way economic actors perceive an economic situation and a 
universal mental construct comes into existence leading to a bandwagon 
effect in entrepreneurial actions showing swarms of innovations and con-
tributing to the evolution of industry life cycles. The methodological ap-
proach developed here, will thereby be helpful to enhance various aspects 
in this direction, since the modular system, characterized by symmetry 
breaking, 
allows us to put together the bits and pieces of the economic system to 




A Quantum Theory 
The modem quantum theory is a fascinating concept. It has been very 
successful since its introduction, although it seems to be common that no-
body has a complete understanding of it yet. It poses strong contradictions 
to classical theories in physics. Below, there will be given an intuitive 
and very simplified version of the quantum theory, in order to give the 
reader the possibility to trace the author's intuition towards an alternative 
approach to economic theory. 
Mainzer (1996a) and Mainzer (1996b) provide a non-formal outline of 
what quantum physics is about. For a very easy access to quantum theory 
the intemet1 provides a website which will be referred to in the following 
to sketch quantum theory. I will restrict myself not to use too many of 
the underlying technical terms to be found in any standard textbook on 
quantum physics.2 
In figures A. I - A.4 a so-called Mach-Zehnder Interferometer is given. 
It is a simple apparatus that makes it possible to show the characteristics 
of both classical wave theory and quantum theory, and at the same time 
renders the implications of quantum theory. 
The Mach-Zehnder Interferometer consists of four mirrors of which two 
are semipermeable. Besides, there is a source that emits waves or photons. 
Two detectors measure incoming waves or photons. In figure A. I we see 
the scenario of a light wave as it flows through the apparatus. The first 
semipermeable mirror reflects only half of the wave. The two halves are 
each reflected by the top left mirror and the bottom right mirror, respec-
tively. Successively, they meet at the second semipermeable mirror top 
right and, eventually, the wave is detected at detector 1. Notice that no 
wave is detected at detector 2. 
In figure A.2 we add an obstacle, the black spot between the upper two 
mirrors. Now, the scenario looks a bit different: Again, the wave parts in 
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Figure A.1: Wave theory depicted in a Mach-Zehnder Interferometer with-
out obstacle. 
the first semipermeable mirror and consequently, is reflected by the follow-
ing mirrors. The obstacle, however, reflects one half of the wave, whereas 
the other half proceeds to the last semipermeable mirror. In contrast to 
the scenario above, we now measure incoming waves at both detectors, 
detector 1 and detector 2. 
Wave theory gives us the explanation: The fact that the vertical wave 
reaches detector 2 in figure A.2 but does not reach detector 2 in figure A.1 
shows the phenomenon of interference. Interference, in very simple words, 
denotes two waves that cancel each other out because of a phase difference. 
A wave consists of troughs and ridges. When a trough of a wave coincides 
with a ridge of another wave (given the same wave with just a difference 
in its phase), the wave vanishes and can no more be detected. This is what 
happens in figure A.1. 
The same apparatus is used to illustrate the gist of quantum theory. 
Light waves consist of so-called photons. Photons are very small particles. 
Nowadays, it is even possible to produce a single photon in a laboratory. 
Doing so, the source in our apparatus produces one photon and sends 
it through the arrangement of mirrors. In figure A.3, we have the same 
setting as in figure A.1, i.e. no obstacle. Similarly, we detect the incoming 
photon only at detector 1 and never at detector 2. Hence, the probability 
p = 1. Notice that even though we only had one single photon, something 
prevented the photon from reaching detector 2; if we think in classical 
wave theory, we observe interference with a single photon. The question 
mark in the middle of the figure represents the puzzling explanatory deficit 
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Source 
Figure A.2: Wave theory depicted in a Mach-Zehnder Interferometer with 
obstacle. 
in quantum theory. Suppose the photon takes the path from the source 
via the mirrors bottom right - top right to detector 2, how does the photon 
"know" that there is no obstacle in order to show interference? 
In figure A.4, a Mach-Zehnder Interferometer with obstacle is 
shown. We emit a photon, and what we observe is again a paradoxical 
phenomenon. With probability p = 0.5 the photon hits the obstacle and 
gets diverted, with probability p = 0.25 the photon is detected either by 
detector 1 or by detector 2. And again, we cannot say anything about the 
path of the photon within the apparatus. The photon is a particle but it 
behaves like a wave. However, nothing can be said about the locality of 
the photon before it is measured in one of the detectors. If we added an-
other detector, we would simply add another obstacle, which would change 
the setting of the apparatus but not the fact that nothing can be said about 
locality. 
Now, what is the answer to one of the many questions: how can inter-
ference occur, when we only have one photon? Quantum theory interprets 
the wave property of the photon as the probability of photon's locality. The 
light wave becomes a probability wave and the intensity of the light wave 
denotes the probability distribution of the photon's locality.3 The photon 
apparently has two possible ways to take, the "upper" and the "lower" one. 
The puzzling explanation of quantum theory is that the photon takes a su-
perposition, i.e. it takes both ways. This does not solve any problem but it 
illustrates the paradox of quantum theory. 
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Figure A.3: Quantum theory depicted in a Mach-Zehnder Interferometer 
without obstacle. 
When we repeat the experiment and use a bomb as an obstacle, the para-
dox of quantum logic become even more obvious. Suppose we have two 
options: a bomb with a highly sensitive fuze, sensitive to a single photon 
or a bomb unarmed which would equal the scenario of the no-obstacle case 
in A.1. In classical physics it is not possible to prove whether the bomb 
is armed or not without having the armed bomb exploded. In quantum 
physics, if the bomb is armed (i.e. the bomb is an obstacle as in figure A.4) 
and the photon is detected in detector 2, we know that the bomb is armed 
without having it exploded. Definitely, the photon could never have been 
there because then, the bomb was exploded. The conclusion is that the 
pure possibility of the photon hitting the fuze (what it obviously did not 
do) influenced the final position of the photon. This turns classical physics 
upside down; locality and causality become equivocal terms and possibil-
ities that never occur influence physical procedures. 
Quantum mechanics turns out to be less a new overwhelming insight 
into a better understanding of time and space and physical reality but rather 
questions contemporary commonly accepted philosophical, metaphysical 
and epistemological, concepts. It raises questions of ontology and rejects 
determinism. It questions a Newtonian world and it humbles scientists 
in their sophisticated claim towards a world of generally valid causalities. 
As the Cartesian system reduced nature to its alleged fundamentals, quan-
tum theory reduces natural fundamentals to a pure possibility of indefi-
nite states; it almost seems that nature itself is constrained ontologically, 
and from a philosophical perspective, epistemology becomes qualified by 
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Figure A.4: Quantum theory depicted in a Mach-Zehnder Interferometer 
with obstacle. 
a subjective observer, a part of reality who reciprocally influences reality 
by observation. Quantum theory leaves a lot of questions open but it sup-
ports the necessity of alternative explanations and approaches. Although 
quantum mechanics is hard to comprehend, if anybody at all has ever un-
derstood such phenomena. We are still far from speaking of a quantum 
theoretic paradigm or whatever, which can be transformed into a method-
ology of investigation. All the same, it provides us some analogies which 
are worth considering. 
Notes 
1<http://www.univie.ac.at/future.media/qu/quantentheorie.html> (03/26/2002). 
2See for example Fink (1968). 
3Only with a huge number of photons does the probability wave appear to 
be a light wave. 

B Percolation 
All the programs illustrated in this section are programmed in Mathemat-
ica. More than a overview is provided by the author of Mathematica him-
self, Wolfram (1996). The literature by Gaylord and D'Andria (1998), 
Gaylord and Nishidate (1996) and Gaylord and Wellin (1995) contributed 
most to the author's modelling procedures. 
Program B.1 Parameters 
n-2 = •lattice - size• 
p = •fraction of occupied sites• 
Program B.2 Actors on a square lattice 
society= Table[1, {n}, {n}] /. 
1 :> {Floor[1 + p - Random[]]}; 
1, 
res = Partition[Partition[Flatten[society], n], n]; 
Program B.3 Graphics Output 
Shov[GraphicsArray[ 
Map[Shov[Graphics[ 
RasterArray[# /. {O -> GrayLevel[0.6], 1 -> 
GrayLevel[O]}]], AspectRatio -> Automatic, 
DisplayFunction -> Identity] &, 
res [ [Range [1]]]]]] ; 
,l. 
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Program B.4 Knowledge Diffusion - Heterogeneous Actors 
<< Statistics'DiscreteDistributions' 
n-2 = •lattice size• 
s = •density of actors informed• 
a= •states of knovledge• 
k = •name of actor• 
society= Table[!, {n}, {n}] /. 
1 :>{Floor[!+ s - Random[]], 
1 + Random[Binomia1Distribution[3, 0.5))}; 
VonNeumann[func_, lat_] := MapThread[func, Map[ 
RotateRight[lat, #] &,{{O, O}, {1, O}, {O, -1}, 
{-1, O}, {O, 1}}], 2]; 
spread[{O, ab_}, {kl_,_}, {k2_, _}, {k3_, _}, 
{k4_, _}):= {1,ab} /; (kl+ k2 + k3 + k4) >= 1; 
spread[{O, ab_}, {_, _}, {_, _}, {_, _}, {_, _}) 
:= {0,ab}; 
spread[{!, ab_}, {kl_,_}, {k2_, _}, {k3_, _}, 
{k4_, _}):= {2,ab} /; ((kl+ k2 + k3 + k4) >= 4 
&& ab >= 2); 
spread[{2, ab_}, {kl_,_}, {k2_, _}, {k3_, _}, 
{k4_, _}):= {Min[ab,2 + Floor[(((kl + k2 + k3 
+ k4)/4))]], ab}; 
spread[{y_, ab_}, {_, _}, {_, _}, {_, _}, {_, _}) 
:= {y, ab}; 
result= NestList[VonNeumann[spread, #] &, 
society, 100) ; 
res = Partition[Partition[Flatten[result /. 





RasterArray[# /. {O -> Hue[0.05), 
1 -> Hue[0.2], 
2 -> RGBColor[O, 1, OJ, 3 -> Hue[0.25), 
4 -> RGBColor[O, 0, 1]}]], 
AspectRatio -> Automatic, 
DisplayFunction -> Identity] 
&, res[[Range[l, 21, 2)))), 8]]]; 
C Social Networks 
Program C.1 Parameters, Society and Move Rule 
n-2 = •lattice size• 
p •fraction of actors engaging in networking• 
w = •para.meter values of an endowment factor• 
v = •number of endowment factors• 
t = •number of iteration steps• 
RND := Random[Integer,{1,4}]; 
society = Table[Floor[p + Random□], {n}, {n}] /. 
1 :> {RND, Table[Random[Integer, {1, w}], {v}]}; 
movestay[0, __ ] := 0; movestay[{a_, b_}, res __ ] := 
{a• Round[1 - Count[Map[Plus ~~ Abs[b - #[[2]]] &, 
{res} /. 0 -> {0, 0}], _?(# <= 1 &)]/8.], b}; 
Program C.2 Walk Rules 
walk[{1, a ___ }, 0, _, _, _, {4, ___ }, _, _, _, _, _, 
:={RND,a}; 
_, 
walk[{1, a ___ }, 0, _, _, _, _, _, _, {2, ___ }, _, _, _, 
:={RND,a}; 
walk[{1, a ___ }, 0, _, _, _, _, _, _, _, {3, ___ }, _, -· :={RND,a}; 
walk[{1, a ___ }, 0, -· _, _, _, -· -· -· -· _, -· _] := walk[{2, a ___ }, _, 0, -· _, {3, ___ }, _, _, -· -· _, _, :={RND,a}; 







walk[{2, a ___ }, -· 0, -· -· -· -· -· _, _, {4, ___ }, _,_] :={RND,a}; 
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Program C.3 Walk Rules 
walk[{2, a ___ }, -· o, -· -· -· -· -· -· -· -· -• ] ·= - . 0; walk({3, a ___ }, -· 0, -· -· {4, ___ }, -· -· -· -· -· _) :={RND,a}; 
walk[{3, a ___ }, -· _, 0, -· -· -· {2, ___ }, -· -· _,_, _] :={RND,a}; 
walk[{3, a ___ }, -· -· 0, -· -· -· -· -• -· _,{1, ___ }, _] :={RND,a}; 
walk[{3, a ___ }, -· -· 0, _, -· _, -· _,_, -· -· _) ·= 0; walk[{4, a ___ }, -· -· -· 0, -· -· {1, ___ }, _,_, -· -· _] :={RND,a}; 
walk[{4, a ___ }, _, -· -· 0, -· -· _, {3, ___ }, -· -· -· _) :={RND,a}; 
walk[{4, a ___ }, -· -· -· 0, _, -• -• -· -· -· {2, ___ }] :={RND,a}; 
walk[{4, a ___ }, -· _, -· 0, -· -· -· -· -· -· -· _) :=0; walk[{_, a ___ }, -· -· -· -· -· -· -· -· -· _, -· _) :={RND,a}; 
walk(0, {3, ___ }, {4, ___ }, -· -· -· -· -· -· -· -· -· _] :=0; 
walk[0, {3, ___ }, -· {1, ___ }, _, -· -• _, -· -· -· -• _] :=0; 
walk[0, {3, ___ }, _, -· {2, ___ }, -· -· -· -· -· _, -· _) :=0; 
walk[0, -· {4, ___ }, {1, ___ }, _, -· -· _, -· -· -· -· _) :=0; 
walk[0, -• {4, 
___ }, -· {2, ___ }, -· -· -· -· -· -· -· _) :=0; 
walk[0, -· -· {1, ___ }, {2, ___ }, _, -· -· -· -· _] :=0; 
walk[0, {3, a ___ }, -· -· -· -· -· -· _, -· -· -· _) :={RND,a}; 
walk[0, -· {4, a ___ }, -· -· -· -· -· -· -· -· -· _] :={RND,a}; 
walk[0, -· -· {1, a ___ }, -· -· -· _, -· -· -· -· _) :={RND,a}; 
walk[0, -· -· -· {2, a ___ }, -· -· -· -· -· -· -· _) ·= RND,a}; 
walk[0, -• -· -· -· -· -· _, -· -· -· -· _] :=0; 
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Program C.4 Moore Neighborhood and Random Search 
Moore[func_, lat_] := 
MapThread[func, Map[RotateRight[lat, #] &, 
{{0, 0}, {1, 0}, {0, -1}, {-1, 0}, {0, 1}, 
{1, -1}, {-1, -1}, {-1, 1}, {1, 1}}], 2]; 
GN[func_, lat_] := 
MapThread[func, Map[RotateRight[lat, #] &, 
{{0, 0}, {1, 0}, {0, -1}, {-1, 0}, {0, 1}, 
{1, -1}, {-1, -1}, {-1, 1}, {1, 1}, {2, 0}, 
{0, -2}, {-2, 0}, {0, 2}}], 2]; 
result= NestList[GN[walk, Moore[movestay, #]] &,# 
society, t] ; 
res = Partition[ 
Partition[Flatten[result /. {k1_, {es_, he_, vc_}} 
-> {es +he+ vc}],n], n]; 
Program C.S Graphics Output 
Show[GraphicsArray[ 
Map[Show[Graphics[RasterArray[# /. 
{0 -> GrayLevel[0.85], 
3 -> GrayLevel[0.8], 
4 -> GrayLevel[0.6], 
5 -> GrayLevel[0.4], 
6 -> GrayLevel[0.2]}]], 
AspectRatio -> Automatic, 
DisplayFunction -> Identity] &, 
' {First[res], Last[res]}]]]; 

D Basic Entrepreneurship Model 
Program D.1 Parameters 
b = (*density of initially informed actors*) 
n =(*lattice-size*) 
anz = n~2;(*number of actors*) 
inf = !;(*actors' knowledge stock about the GPT*) 
g = (*times of immunes*) 
v ~ (*number of an actor's attributes*) 
k= (*names of actors*) i = (*iterator*) 
foundthresh = 6400; 
aiO =50; 
ciO 100; 
piO = O; 
xiO = O; 
\ [Eta] = 1; 
\[Rho] = 1; 
\[Gamma] = 0.001; 
learningrate = -0.05; 
Program D.2 Society 
SeedRandom [1] 
society= Table[!, {n}, {n}] /. 
1 :> {++k, Floor[!+ b - Random[]], 
Table[Random[Real, {0,1000}, OJ, {3}], N}; 
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Program D.3 Knowledge Diffusion - Spreading Rules 
VonNeumann[func_, lat_] := MapThread[func, 
Map[RotateRight[lat, #]&, 
{{0, 0}, {1, 0}, {0, -1}, {-1, 0}, {0, 1}}], 2]; 
spread[{s1_, 0, s3_, N, sbr_}, {a1_, a2_, a3_, unta_, 
abr_}, {b1_,b2_, b3_, untb_, bbr_}, {c1_, c2_, 
c3_, untc_, cbr_}, {d1_, d2_, d3_, untd_,dbr_}] 
:= {s1, 0, s3, N,sbr}; 
spread[{s1_, inf + g, s3_, N, sbr_}, {a1_, a2_, a3_, 
unta_, abr_}, {b1_, b2_, b3_, untb_, bbr_}, 
{c1_, c2_, c3_, untc_, cbr_}, {d1_, d2_, d3_, 
untd_, dbr_}) := {s1, inf + g, s3, N, sbr}; 
spread[{s1_, 0, s3_, N, sbr_}, {a1_, a2_, a3_, unta_, 
abr_}, {b1_, b2_, b3_, untb_, bbr_}, {c1_, c2_, 
c3_, untc_, cbr_}, {d1_, d2_, d3_, untd_, dbr_}] 
:= {s1, 1, s3, N, sbr} /; 
MemberQ[Range[1, inf + g], a2 I b2 I c2 I d2]; 
spread[{s1_, x_?Positive, s3_, N, sbr_}, {a1_, a2_, a3_, 
unta_, abr_}, {b1_, b2_, b3_, untb_, bbr_}, 
{c1_, c2_, c3_, untc_, cbr_}, {d1_, d2_, d3_, 
untd_, dbr_}]:= {s1, x + 1, s3, N, sbr}; 
spread[{s1_, st_, s3_, U, sbr_}, {a1_, a2_, a3_, unta_, 
abr_}, {b1_, b2_, b3_, untb_, bbr_}, {c1_, c2_, 
c3_, untc_, cbr_}, {d1_, d2_, d3_, untd_, dbr_}) 
:= {s1, st, s3, U, sbr}; 
spread[{s1_, st_, {0, 0, 0}, P, 0}, {a1_, a2_, a3_, 
unta_, abr_}, {b1_, b2_, b3_, untb_, bbr_}, 
{c1_, c2_, c3_, untc_, cbr_}, {d1_, d2_, d3_, 
untd_, dbr_}):= {s1, st, {0, 0, 0}, P, 0}; 
knowingagents = Count[society, {_, 3, {_, _, _}, _}, 2]; 
cumknowingagents = AppendTo[cumknowingagents, 
knowingagents]; 
Program D.4 Networking 
RandomPermutationList[list_) := 
Part[list,RandomPermutation[Length[list]]]; akteurlnd 
Table[i, i,1, anz}]; society= VonNeumann[spread, 
society]; r =RandomPermutationList[akteurlnd]; 
permutlist = Flatten[AppendTo[permutlist, r]]; 
akteurtripel = Partition[Part[Flatten[society, 1), r], 3]; 
potFirm = 
Cases[akteurtripel, {{a1_, inf + g, {c1_, c2_, c3_}, 
N}, {a2_, inf + g, {c4_, c5_, c6_}, N}, {a3_, inf 
+ g, {c7_, c8_, c9_}, N}}]; 
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Program D.5 Entrepreneurial Decision 
actorsNewFirms = 
Cases[potFirm, {{al_, inf + g, {cl_, c2_, c3_}, unt_}, 
{a2_, inf + g, {c4_, c5_, c6_}, unt_}, {a3_, 
inf + g, {c7_, c8_, c9_}, unt_}} /; 
Plus[c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, c9] 
> foundthresh]; 
Program D.6 Firms 
newFirms = 
actorsNewFirms /. {{al_, _, {cl_, c2_, c3_}, 
unt_}, {a2_, _, {c4_, c5_, c6_}, unt_}, 
If {a3_, _, {c7_, c8_, c9_}, unt_}} -> 
{{al, a2, a3}, {cl+ c4 + c7, c2 + c5 
+ c8, c3 + c6 + c9}, 
{ai0, ci0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}; 
If[newFirms != {}, 
newFirms = 
newFirms /. {{al_, a2_, a3_}, {ec_, he_, vc_}, 
{ait_, cit_, cij0_, pit_, xit_, sumPj_}, 
{kumout_, ums_, gew_, kfix_}} -> 
{{al, a2, a3}, {ec, he, vc}, 
{ait, cit, ci0•(3000 - hc)/3000, pit, xit, 
sumPj}, {kumout, ums, gew, 
Min[(vc/hc)•vc, 0.3•vc]}}]; 
firms= Join[firms, newFirms]; 
#newfirms = 
Count[newFirms, {{_, _, _}, {_, _, _}, {_, 




Count[firms, {{_, _, _}, {_,_,_?Positive}, 
{_, -· -· -· -· _}, {_, _, _, _}}]; 
kumultotal#firms = AppendTo[kumultotal#firms, total#firms]; 
' 
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Program D.7 Oligopoly 
(•price calculation•) 
SummePj 
Plus (l)(l) Cases[ 
firms, {{a1_, a2_, a3_}, {ec_, he_, vc_}, {Qit_, 
cit_, cijO_, pit_, xit_, sumPj_}, {_, _, _, _}} 
-> pit]; 
Qmax = Max[Cases[firms, {{ __ }, {_,he_,_},{ __ },{_, _, 
_, _}}->he]]; pit[ait_, cit_, total#firms_, 
sumPj_] = O.S•(ait + cit) 
+ (0.5•(1/(2•(total#firms)))•sumPj); 
(•quantity calculation•) 
xit[ait_, cit_, total#firms_, sumPj_] := 
0.5•(1/\[Eta])•(ait - cit) + 
(0.5•(1/(2•\[Eta]•(total#firms)))•sumPj); 
(•relative quality•) 
firms= firms/. {{a1_, a2_, a3_}, {ec_, he_, 
vc_?Positive}, {ait_, cit_, cijO_, pit_, 
xit_, sumPj_}, {kumout_, ums_, gew_, kfix_}} 
:> {{a1, a2, a3}, {ec, he, vc}, 
{aiO•Log[1 + total#firmsJ-((Qmax - hc)/Qmax)-4, 
cit, cijO, pit, xit, (SummePj - pit)}, 
{kumout, ums, gew, kfix}} /; Qmax > O; 
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Program D.8 Oligopoly 
(•calculation of "pit" and "xit"•) 
If[total#firms > 1, 
firms= 
firms/. {{a1_, a2_, a3_}, {ec_, he_, vc_?Positive}, 
{ait_, cit_, cij0_, pit_, xit_, sumPj_}, 
{kumout_, ums_, gew_, kfix_}} -> {{a1, a2, a3}, 
{ec, he, vc}, {ait, cit, cij0, 
pit[ait, cit, total#firms, sumPj], 
xit[ait, cit, total#firms, sumPj]• 
If[i > 3, ((Plus ee Take[Exp[exitinducedgrrate], 
-3) + Plus ee Take[Exp[exitinducedgrrate], -2) 
+ Last[Exp[exitinducedgrrate)))/6)-2, 1), 
sumPj}, {kumout, ums, gew, kfix}}]; 
firms firms/. {{a1_, a2_, a3_}, {ec_, he_, vc_}, 
{ait_, cit_, cij0_, pit_, xit_?Negative, sumPj_}, 
{kumout_, ums_, gew_, kfix_}} -> {{a1, a2, a3}, 
{ec, he, vc}, {ait, cit, cij0, pit, 0.001, sumPj}, 
{kumout, ums, gew, kfix}}; 
(•operational performance•) 
firms= firms/. 
{{a1_, a2_, a3_}, {ec_, he_, vc_?Positive}, 
{ait_, cit_, cij0_, pit_, xit_, sumPj_}, 
{kumout_, ums_, gew_, kfix_}} -> {{a1, a2, a3}, 
{ec, he, vc}, {ait, cit, cij0, pit, xit, sumPj}, 
{kumout, (pit•xit), ((pit - cit)•xit) - kfix, 
kfix}}; 
Program D.9 Sector Performance 
sectorsales = 
Plus H Cases [ 
firms, {{a1_, a2_, a3_}, {ec_, he_, vc_?Positive}, 
{ait_, cit_, cij0_, pit_, xit_, sumPj_}, 
{kumout_, ums_, gew_, kfix_}} -> ums]; 






sectorsalesprevper = sectorsales; 
cumsetorsales = AppendTo[cumsetorsales, sectorsales]; 
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Program D.10 Feedback on Firms 
firms= firms/. 
{{a1_, a2_, a3_}, {ec_, he_, vc_?Positive}, 
{ait_, cit~, cijO_, pit_, xit_, sumPj_}, 
{kumout_, ums_, gew_, kfix_}} 
-> {{a1, a2, a3}, {ec, he, vc + gew}, 
{ait, cit, cijO, pit, xit, sumPj}, 
{kumout + xit, ums, gew, kfix}}; 
profits= 
firms/. {{a1_, a2_, a3_}, {ec_, he_, vc_}, 
{ait_, cit_, cijO_, pit_, xit_, sumPj_}, 
{kumout_, ums_, gew_, kfix_}} -> {gew}; 
Program D.11 Feedback on Actors 
(•societal change•) 
feedback= 
firms/. {{a1_, a2_, a3_}, {ec_, he_, vc_}, 
{ait_, cit_, cijO_, pit_, xit_, sumPj_}, 
{kumout_, ums_, gew_, kfix_}} 
-> {{a1, gew/3}, {a2, gew/3}, {a3, gew/3}}; 
If[total#firms > 1, 
feedback= Flatten[feedback, 1]; 
societyflat = Flatten[society, 1]; 
changingactors = 
Flatten[Table[ 
Select[societyflat, #1((1]] == feedback[(i, 1]] &], 
{i, 1, Length[feedback]}], 1]; 
changingactors = 
changingactors /. {a_, st_, {ec_, he_, vc_}, N} -> {a, 






' 1], Part[Transpose[Part[Transpose[changingactors], 3]], 
2], Part[Transpose[Part[Transpose[changingactors], 3]], 
3] + Part[Transpose[feedback], 2]}], 3]]; 
Table[ 
societyflat[[changingactors[[i, 1]]]] 
= changedactors[[i]], {i, 1, Length[changedactors]}]; 
society= Partition[societyflat, n]]; 
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Program D.12 Learning Curve 
firms = firms /. 
{{al_, a2_, a3_}, {ec_, he_, vc_?Positive}, 
{ait_, cit_, cij0_, pit_, xit_, sumPj_}, 
{kumout_, ums_, gew_, kfix_}} 
-> {{al, a2, a3}, {ec, he, vc}, 
{ait, cij0•(l + kumout)-learningrate, cij0, 
pit, xit, sumPj}, {kumout, ums, gew, kfix}}; 
Program D.13 Exit 
#exits= 
Count[firms, {{al_, a2_, a3_}, {es_, he_, vc_?Negative}, 
{ait_, cit_, cij0_, pit_, xit_, sumPj_}, 
{kumout_, ums_, gew_, kfix_}}]; 
turnoverexitors = 
Plus (ll(ll 
Cases[firms, {{al_, a2_, a3_}, 
{es_, he_, vc_?Negative},{ait_, cit_, cij0_, 
pit_, xit_, sumPj_}, {kumout_, ums_, gew_, 





Cases[firms, {{al_, a2_, a3_}, 
{es_, he_, vc_?Positive}, {ait_, cit_, cij0_, 
pit_, xit_, sumPj_}, {kumout_, ums_, gew_, 
kfix_}} -> xit]; 
cumturnoverinc = AppendTo[cumturnoverinc, turnoverinc]; 
exitinducedgrrate = cumturnoverexit/(1 + cumturnoverinc); 
cumexit = Flatten[AppendTo[cumexit, #exits]]; 




{{a1_,a2_, a3_}, {es_, he_, vc_}, {ait_, 
cit_,cij0_, pit_, xit_, sumPj_}, {kumout_, 
ums_, gew_, kfix_}}:> {{al, a2, a3}, 
{0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},{0, 0, 0, 0}} 
/; vc < O; 
society/. {a_, st_, {es_, he_, vc_}, unt_} :> 
{a, st, {0, 0, 0}, P} /; 
vc < 0; . 
I . 
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Program D.14 The Founding Threshold - A Shared Mental Model 
foundthresh = 
foundtru:esh - If[i > 2, 40•Log[2, Max[!, Plus©© 
Take[cumsectorsalesgrowthr, -3)/3)), 0) + If[i > 2, 
50•Log[2, 1 +Plus©© Take[cumexit, -3)/3), 0) 
- 30•If[sectorsalesretab > 0, · 
Exp[sectorsalesretab], 0) 
+ Exp[0.06•i]; 
i = i + 1; 
cumfoundthresh = AppendTo[cumfoundthresh, foundthresh]; 
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